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ABSTRACT
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Crimea had to define the
terms of its status within a new context – the maintenance of Ukrainian sovereignty.
The issue regarding the Crimea’s territorial status had two aspects: the status of the
peninsula per se, that is, whether it should form a part of Ukraine or Russia, and the
status of the territory within the state, part of which it constituted. The overall
situation was complicated by the claims of the separatist-minded Russian majority,
who now was opposed by the native inhabitants of the peninsula – the Crimean
Tatars, who were in process of mass return from Central Asia, where they were
deported en masse in 1944. Inter-ethnic clashes could have detrimental effects on
Ukrainian independence and, therefore, their avoidance was essential for Ukrainian
authorities. In this context, the constitutional process, which this thesis aims at
presenting, acquired great importance, as it was the only tool through which the
accommodation of interests of different national groups inhabiting the peninsula and
protection of their basic rights was possible. Examination of this process, however,
reveals the inability of the Crimean authorities to achieve these goals and their failure
to grant the Crimea a legal “passport” that would reflect the historic, ethnic, and
cultural peculiarities of the region. The Ukrainian-Russian confrontation over the
Crimea and the dispute between these two states over the possession of the Black Sea
Fleet was exacerbating the situation further and had great impact on the political
situation in the peninsula and on national, regional, and international security.
vÖZET
Sovyetler Birliği’nin 1991 yılında dağılmasından sonra, Kırım kendi statüsünün
koşullarını Ukrayna’nın bağımsızlığı gibi yepyeni bir içerikte belirlemek zorunda
kalmıştı. Kırım’ın toprak statüsü ile ilgili sorun iki yönü ile ortaya çıkmaktadır.
Birincisi, Kırım yarımadasının statüsü, yani onun Ukrayna ya da Rusya’nın bir
parçası olması gerektiği konusu, ikincisi, bağlı olduğu ülke içerisindeki toprak
statüsü. Kırım’daki genel durumu zorlaştıran sebebi 1944’te toplu halde sürüldüğü
Orta Asya’dan geri dönüş çabasında olan yarımadanın yerel halkı, Kırım Tatar’ları
tarafından karşı çıkılan ayrılıkçı düşünceli Rus çoğunluğun talepleri oluşturmaktadır.
Etnik sorunların Ukrayna’nın bağımsızlığı üzerinde yıkıcı etkisi olabileceğinden,
Ukrayna devleti için sorunlardan kurtulması hayati önem taşıyordu. Bu koşullar
altında bu tez yarımadasında yaşayan değişik milli grupların isteklerinin yerine
getirilmesini ve onların temel haklarının korunmasını mümkün kılan anayasal
gelişmelerin büyük önem kazandığını göstermeyi amaçlar. Fakat konunun
incelenmesi, Kırım’daki idarenin bu amaçlara ulaşmasındaki başarısızlığını ve
Kırım’a onun tarihi, etnik ve kültürel özelliklerini yansıtacak bir yasal ‘pasaport’un
sağlanamamasını ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ayrıca, Ukrayna ile Rusya arasındaki Kırım ve
Kara Deniz filosu üzerindeki hakimiyeti ile ilgili sorunlar iki ülke arasındaki durumu
kötüleştirmenin dışında, Kırım yarımadasındaki siyasi durumu, ulusal, bölgesel ve
uluslararası güvenliği de etkilemektedir.
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1INTRODUCTION
The Crimean peninsula, situated on the northern shores of the Black Sea, has an area
of 27,000 square km and population of approximately 2,700 million. The natives of
the peninsula – the Crimean Tatars – are Turkic people, who have inhabited the
Crimea for more than 14 centuries. The presence of the Turkic peoples on the territory
of Crimea goes back to sixth, if not fourth century – the time when the Huns invaded
the peninsula, and includes the Khazars, Pechenegs, Kumans, the Golden Horde,
Anatolian Turks (Seljuks and Ottomans), and, then, the Crimean Tatars.1 The
Crimean Khanate, a successor state of the Golden Horde was founded in 1440s and
from 1475 on until the end of the Turco-Russian war of 1769-1774, it existed as an
Ottoman protectorate, but remained a mighty power in Eastern Europe dominating
vast areas along the Kuban River and the territories north of the Khanate. With the
signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, Russian influence on the Crimea
increased dramatically. By the manifesto, issued by Catherine II on April 8, 1783, the
Crimean Khanate ended its existence as a separate entity and was annexed to the
Russian Empire.
Since then the policy of the Tsarist Russia towards the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars
changed drastically. If until 19th century among approximately 30 ethnic groups that
immigrated to the Crimea there were no Eastern Slavs, whose invasions from 8th
century were always aimed at “military booty,” after 1783 thousands of Russian
peasants were artificially settled on the territory of the peninsula, while the natives
                                                          
1 Hakan Kırımlı, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905-1916),
E. J. Brill, 1996, p. 1.
2were forced to migrate. The offensive of the Russian government’s policies was
expressed with the importation of serfdom, Russification of education and civil
administration, redistribution of land (the native population lost the most valuable
areas on the Southern shore which the new settlers, because of the unpreparedness for
traditional economic activities on ecological environment alien to them, turned into
wastelands. Starvation and poverty became widespread at the turn of the 19th century
and resulted in the emigration of the Crimean Tatars in the form of massive waves.
The situation of that time was best described by the Russian historian Smirnoff, who
in 1887 wrote
“On April 8, 1883, loss of the Crimea of its independent political existence by its
complete annexation to Russia was celebrated. During these hundred years many
things have happened that modified the Crimea not only related to its political
character: the deportation of the Tatars and coming of large numbers of the colonisers
of other nationalities altered the Crimea’s face in regard to its population and
economy. It is difficult to say what is going to happen in the future with the handful of
the Tatar people, who have remained in the Crimea. However, the past of these people
was not so trivial, that is could be kept in the memory of the history.”2
An important period in the history of the Crimean Tatars was the end of the 19th and
the beginning of the 20th century, the time when a movement of national awakening
among these people began to take shape.3 The revolution of March 1917 in Russia
helped the underground nationalist groups of the Crimean Tatars to surface; in
November of the same year, direct democratic elections to the Qurultay (National
Parliament) were held and, in December, the Crimean Democratic Republic was
declared. During the next three years, the Crimea “changed hands” three times
between “White” and “Red” Russian Armies, none of whom were sympathetic to the
national aspirations of the Crimean Tatars and always aimed at destroying the national
                                                          
2 V.D. Smirnoff, Krymskoe Khanstvo [The Crimean Khanate], St. Petersburg, 1887, p. 1.
3 See Hakan Kırımlı, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905-
1916), E. J. Brill,1996.
3republic; only during the German occupation of the Crimea in April 1918, did the
Qurultay experience a brief resurgence.4
In November 1920, the Red Army took over the Crimea and in October 1921 the
Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (CASSR) was formed as an integral
part of the Soviet Russia. The policies of the new Russian government were not very
different from those of the Tsarist one and resulted in the almost total elimination of
the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia; hundreds of thousands people lost their lives during
famines, deportations, and state terror.
The bigger tragedy, however, occurred later. On 18 May 1944, the entire Crimean
Tatar population of about 195,000 was entrained and deported to the Central Asia for
alleged collaboration with the Nazis during the II World War. Many people perished
in the very beginning of this genocidal operation, during the terrible journey which
took some three weeks, and within a few years only half of the deportees were able to
survive their new place’s poor economic and climatic conditions; there were mass
deaths from hunger and epidemics. The CASSR, on the other side, first became an
oblast of the Russian Federation and in February 1954, the Crimea was incorporated
into the Ukrainian SSR, as a supposed “gift” to commemorate the 300th anniversary of
the Russian-Ukrainian union.
The mass expulsion based upon ethnicity was an ordinary case in the policies of the
Soviet government, though similarly deported peoples of the Karachay, Chechen,
Ingush, and Balkar nationalities, unlike the Crimean Tatars, were allowed in the
                                                          
4 Hakan Kırımlı, “The Crimean Tatars,” Research Report, Ankara, 1993, p. 7.
41950s to return to their homelands and re-establish their national institutions. Thus, in
around 1956, the Crimean Tatar National Movement was formed in exile. Using legal
ways, it demanded absolution for their people of the crimes of which they had been
falsely accused and a right to return to their homeland. However, the response of the
Soviet authorities was to continue repression; even after the charges of treason were
officially rescinded in 1967, the Crimean Tatars were still strictly prohibited to return
to the Crimea. It was not until the last days of the Soviet Union that the Crimean
Tatars were fully rehabilitated and given a right to return. Even then practically no
official assistance was displayed to facilitate their return.
In February of 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted a law “On the
Restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,” granting the
Crimea a new status in the framework of which the problems of the deported peoples
were to be solved. The founding of an independent Ukraine in 1991 moved this
problem to a new level. It became very important for the new Ukrainian state to avoid
inter-ethnic clashes, which could have detrimental effects on its independence. Major
problems might stem from the Russian majority of the Crimea, which constituted 67%
of the whole population of the peninsula, and this became apparent even before the
final collapse of the Soviet Union: as support for sovereignty grew in Ukraine in
1990-1991, the separatist sentiment in the Crimea was growing correspondingly and it
increased dramatically after the demise of the old empire. It was up until January
1999, time when the new Crimean Constitution entered into force, that the relations
between the Ukraine’s central authorities and those of the ARC were characterised as
drawn-out crisis. However, the adoption of the constitution resolved none of the
problems relating to the Crimean Tatars.
5This current thesis aims at presenting the constitutional process in the Crimea in the
context of inter-ethnic relations and the effect the “Crimean problem” has had on
Russian-Ukrainian bilateral relations.
As the complexity of the situation on the Crimean peninsula is determined by the
presence of numerous political parties, groups, movements and societies, an
examination of major political organisations in the first charter is intended to facilitate
the better understanding of the current state of affairs in the domestic politics of the
Crimea.
The next two chapters bring into focus the developments related to the constitutional
process in the ARC with particular emphasis on the Crimean Tatar national
movement. While the former deals with the events until 1995, the time when some
major powers of the autonomous republic were curbed, the latter comprises the
developments until the adoption of the new constitution, and post-adoption events.
The last chapter encompasses the effects the “Crimean problem” has had on relations
between Russia and Ukraine, and briefly explains the role of Turkey in these
developments in and around the Crimea.
6CHAPTER I
KEY PLAYERS: POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS,
AND BLOCS
         1.1. Introductory Remarks
A complex ethno-political situation on the Crimean peninsula after 1991 emerged
from the interaction of several political forces, which after the demise of the Soviet
Union has appeared on the political scene of the republic in the form of parties,
movements, or organisations. For a better understanding of this situation it is
necessary to have a look at the key political actors, the dynamics of their interaction,
their political orientation and objectives. To present a precise picture of these forces is
practically very difficult, as not only the programmes of many of these organisations,
but also their ideologies have been subject to permanent change. Thus, for instance,
democratic forces turned out to be more nationalist-radical, some groups or
movements abandoned their extreme policies and others were either collapsing, re-
organising themselves, or re-appearing with different names or status. So, the absence
of one or another political party or movement on the political scene of the Crimea in
the following years would simply mean that that particular organisation has been
liquidated or had not been registered officially.1 An appropriate example here would
be the Meclis [National Assembly] of the Crimean Tatars, which has been playing an
active role in the political life of the peninsula for a long time, but has no official
status.
                                                          
1 S. M. Chervonnaya, Krymskotatarskoe Natsionalnoe Dvizhenie: 1991-1993 Gody, [The Crimean
Tatar National Movement: 1991-1993], Volume 3, Moscow 1996, p. 55.
7Despite these difficulties, I will try to consider the most important political actors that
have appeared on the peninsula mainly after 1991, and describe their aims and
activities. In order to simplify our task it is possible to analyse these actors within
three main categories, namely pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, and the Crimean Tatar
political forces; the ‘centrist’ or ‘democratic’ movement will also be mentioned.
          1.2. The Pro-Russian Movement
1.2.1. Russian or Russophone Parties
The pro-Russian movement unites under its umbrella many political parties,
sometimes very opposed in their political ideologies, ranging from radical communist
groups, openly advocating the restoration of the USSR, to radical right-wing parties.
In theory, these groups should be adversaries, but there is something that unites these
parties and organisations –a common ‘imperial mind-set.’ “A psychological complex
of prejudice, and the perception that the Crimea had originally been an integral and
inalienable part of Russia predominate in this movement, thus, defining the mentality
of its leaders..., the tone of slogans and the character of passions, displayed in the
demonstrations of the so-called Russian-speaking population.”2
Most of the various parties and organisations, advocating a national-Russian idea for
the Crimean sovereignty were established in the immediate aftermath of the August
1991 putsch. Among those, the most important place was occupied by the Republican
Movement of the Crimea (RMC) [Respublikanskoe Dvizhenie Kryma], led by Yuriy
                                                          
2 Chervonnaya, p. 27.
8Meshkov and established as a result of demonstrations on 23 August 1991 against
Ukraine’s independence and in support of the Crimea’s remaining in the USSR.3 The
movement was registered at the end of 1991 and since then it had taken an active role
in the Crimean politics. By propagating the idea of outright independence it
succeeded in gathering the support of the Russian-speaking population of the Crimea,
most of whom was dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. Thus, in 1992, at a
time when the movement was really powerful, it organised a collection of signatures
to demand a referendum on the Crimean independence.4 Always alluding to the will
of people, the RMC was trying to create a democratic image for itself and a proposed
referendum became an important tool in the hands of its leaders.5
In order to manipulate the masses more easily the RMC had chosen another good
tactic and in the period between 1991-1993 it was acting as “popular opposition”
power to the “ruling regime.” As a matter of fact, its position was completely opposite
to that of the Crimean Tatar national movement and the democratic forces, which
were demanding more radical changes and the abandonment of everything that was
related to the old totalitarian systems.6 In reality, there were not so many points on
which “opposition” and “ruling regime” would disagree. Thus, for instance, during
1991 and 1992 Nikolay Bagrov found it useful to support the RMC in order to put
pressure on Kyiv in negotiations concerning the Crimean autonomy, but “he quickly
dropped his association once he had achieved what he desired.”7 At the same time,
Meshkov and the other twenty-nine deputies representing the same faction were at
                                                          
3 Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 45, 12
November 1993, p. 3.
4 SWB, 7 February 1994.
           5 Chervonnaya, p. 27.
6 Ibid., p.61.
7 Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron,”p. 3.
9that time in the Supreme Soviet of the Crimea and no doubt had influence on the
formulation of official policies of this “ruling regime”.8
When the Supreme Soviet gave up the idea of establishing a Crimean independent
state, the RMC’s influence diminished and the disagreements within the movement
led to a split. A new party, very similar to the RMC - the Republican Party of the
Crimea (RepPC) [Respublikanskaya Partiya Kryma] was officially formed on 18
October 1993, by the group of deputies from the RMC under the leadership of the
same Meshkov.9 Now, along with the RepPC, another five parties with the similar
platforms were formed on the peninsula. One of them is the Russian Party of the
Crimea (RPC) [Russkaya Partiya Kryma], which was established by the journalist and
people’s deputy, Sergey Shuvaynikov, in autumn 1993 as a result of personal
disagreements between him and Meshkov.10 Party’s founding congress was held on
25 September 1993, where its members criticised the policies of the Russian
government, particularly for giving little attention to the problems of the Russian
Crimeans.11 Their political platform was the “rejoining Crimea to Russia,” which
would be the first step towards “the creation of a new union state” and the best way of
“dealing a decisive blow to nationalist forces in Ukraine.”12 The RPC with its
ideology was the Crimean version of Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia (LDPR) [Liberal’no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii]. The connection
between these parties and their sympathy towards each other was expressed by
Zhirinovskiy in one of his interviews. He then said, “the LDPR thinks of the Russian
Party of the Crimea as the only party in the Crimea which is capable of sincerely
                                                          
8 Chervonnaya, pp. 61-62.
9 BBC Monitoring Service, 28 October 1993, as distributed by Reuters.
10 UNIAN news agency, 13 October 1993, as distributed by Reuters.
11 SWB, 29 September 1993.
10
defending the interests of the Crimeans, the interests of the Russian people.
Remember, the LDPR together with the Russian Party of the Crimea will be fighting
for your [the Russian Crimeans’] rights.”13
The RPC is a representative of the bloc of “Russian” parties and movements much
more radical than the Meshkov’s RMC. Actually, this bloc had appeared before the
RPC was formed. The first congress of this movement – the Congress of Russian-
Language People of the Crimea was held on 25 April 1993, where its delegates,
openly advocating a “Russian national idea as a base for the Crimea’s state
sovereignty,” were constantly repeating that the Crimea was always a Russian land
and would remain such in the future.14  The movement had such great success that
those twenty-eight (hard-core) deputies, who used to represent Meshkov’s RMC in
the Supreme Soviet, defected to this movement. Irritated at the idea of independent
Crimea, key local business groups transferred their allegiance to the same movement,
which was explicitly advocating union with Russia.15 The more radical stance of the
organisations of which the bloc consists could be explained by the fact that these
groups have either strong links with the radical nationalists of Sevastopol or
themselves are based in the “city of Russian glory.”
There was another group, possessing the above-mentioned characteristic and
representing the same bloc - the “Russian Society” [Russkoe Obschestvo] formed in
1991 by Anatoliy Los’ and based in Sevastopol. It was contemplated about the
merging of this party with the RPC of Shuvaynikov in 1993, when the latter was
                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron,” p. 3.
13 L. Takosh, “Iskushennaya politika ili strasti po Shuvaynikovu,” Avdet, N. 1 (92), 13 January 1994, p.
2.
14 Chervonnaya, p. 65.
11
formed, but again personal animosities between the two did not let it happen.
However, there was a party that merged with the RPC successfully – the National
Salvation Front (NSF) [Front Natsional’nogo Spaseniya], headed by Sergey Kruglov
and also had its central offices in Sevastopol. Although, in October 1993 Kruglov
announced the dissolution of the party that, in his words, “accomplished its task,”
most of its members joined the RPC.16 Kruglov has become famous for his speeches,
denouncing “Tatar gangsters” and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” and claiming
that “the main goal of [local Crimean] patriots must be the dissolution of Ukraine;
only then will it [the Crimea] join a new union.”17
Together with the neo-communists Kruglov organised a “People’s Assembly of the
Inhabitants of Sevastopol and Black Sea Sailors” (or the Russian people’s council of
Sevastopol) in July 1993. The decision was taken in a rally in Sevastopol, attended by
about 5,000 people, who decided to hold an assembly on 16 July to form a lesser
council – Veche, the main task of which would be to “control the implementation of
Russian laws and organise parliamentary and executive elections in Sevastopol for the
transition period.”18 At the same meeting the participants prepared an address to the
Russian Supreme Soviet, thanking it for the resolution on the status of Sevastopol and
expressing the hope that the Russian parliament would speed up adopting legislation
to put this decision into practice.19 Although, the Sevastopol City Council (Soviet)
had declared this council as an “illegal body,”20 the members of the Veche didn’t stop
                                                                                                                                                                     
15 Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron,” p. 3.
16 UNIAN news agency, 13 October 1993, as distributed by Reuters.
17 Molod Ukrainy, 31 August 1993, cited in Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron,” p. 3.
18 SWB, 16 July 1993.
19 Ibid.
20 FBIS-SOV-93-142, 27 July 1993.
12
their activities and continued pro-Russian propaganda, organising rallies and
preparing numerous appeals to the political bodies of Russia.
In most of its activities the National Salvation Front was allying with the
Communists. This clearly articulates its radical political orientation. At the time of
events in Moscow in September 1993, on the initiative of both the NSF and the
Communist Party a rally was organised which proceeded beneath the flags of the
USSR and Russia, and slogans “All power to the Soviets” and “Fascism will not
pass.” The resolution of the rally called the events in Moscow “an anti-popular state
coup, carried out by Yeltsin and his regime in the interests of the bourgeoisie and
foreign capital.”21 Another appropriate example would be that again in September
1993 a leader of the Crimean Communists, Leonid Grach, and Kruglov took part in a
Congress of Peoples of the USSR, where they openly sided with Rutskoy and
Khasbulatov in their struggle with Yeltsin.22
In November 1993, pro-Russian organisations together with the Crimean communists
had announced that the People’s Unity Bloc [Narodnyi Soyuz] was reinstated. This
decision had been reached by the representatives of the Crimean Communist Party,
the Republican Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Green Party, the youth
organisation “Young Guard,” and the Crimean Cossack’s Union. The newly formed
body was willing to assume power and formulate a “new course” for the Crimean
Republic.23
In 1996, at a time when Russian political circles renewed their attempts to claim the
Crimea for Russia, some new parties, politically oriented towards Russia, were
                                                          
21 FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 24 September 1993
22 Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron,” p. 3.
13
formed on the territory of peninsula. Thus, the ex-president of the ARC, Yuriy
Meshkov, on 16 April 1996, announced the re-formation of the Republican Party of
Crimea “Russia” (RepPC “Russia”), whose main objective would be to help the
republic to restore lost rights and protect the interests of ethnic Russians.24 The newly
founded party united the primary organisations that broke away from its predecessor,
the former RepPC. Although, Meshkov did not re-acquire his former popularity, lost
together with the post of president, the party continued to function and in summer of
1997, the transformation of the “Russia” party/bloc into the Soyuz [Union] Party was
announced. The programme of the Union Party was aimed at the decentralisation of
state power, a consistent transition to a federal system in Ukraine and maximum
independence for the regions. It advocated the recreation of the union of the states
[USSR], but on new terms: “not an amorphous CIS, but a real tightly-knit economic
and political union of states and peoples, especially native ones.”25  It should be added
that this party was to become one of the most influential political organisations in the
Crimea in the next five years.
There are other movements and groups of pro-Russian orientation: the Union of
Russian Officers, the Russian Movement of Sevastopol, the Pushkin Society of
Russian Culture, the Union of Afghanistan Veterans (later renamed as “Bagram”)
amongst others. Whatever their title, all of them have been taking an active role in the
political life of the peninsula and have had an important impact on the ethno-political
situation in the Crimea. However, the presence of so many of such organisations does
not allow detailed description of each of them.
                                                                                                                                                                     
23 FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993.
24 BBC Monitoring Service, 18 April 1996, as distributed by Reuters.
14
All these Russian parties, had a negative stance towards the Crimean Tatars, and
many saw this nation as a threat to the attainment of their political objectives. Thus,
the members of the NSF and the Russian Society of the Crimea, when participating in
the first congress of the Slavic Unity Party that was held in Kyiv in 1993, described
the return of the Crimea Tatars on the peninsula as a fundamental threat to “Eastern
European Slavism.”26  As Andrew Wilson has noted, “the Russian-speaking
population that took the Tatars’ place after their expulsion has consistently sought to
exclude the Tatars from positions of influence in local politics since their organised
return began in 1989-1990.”27 This gives an idea why the Russian-speaking
population so desperately want to become a part of Russia and so intensively
participate in all these rallies and demonstrations against the Ukrainian state. This
situation also puts pressure on the more moderate Crimean Tatar politicians, as now a
more radical younger generation demands protection of their rights.28
All these parties opposed any attempt at the implementation of policies favouring the
Crimean Tatars. First of all, they did not want to accept the Crimean Tatars as
“indigenous” people. Instead, they proposed a policy of priority for the Russian-
speaking population and invent tales about the state [Ukrainian] discrimination.29
More importantly, they are against the introduction of quotas in the Crimean
parliament for the Crimean Tatars which, according to Meshkov, “are simply a means
of achieving personal positions of power for the leaders of the Medzhlis [Meclis].”
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So, “the Russian parties tend to dress up their opposition to pro-Tatar policies as the
principle of ‘equal rights’ for all citizens of Crimea.”30
1.2.2. The Communists
One of the major elements of the pro-Russian movement is the Communist Party of
Crimea (CPC) which increased in power even before the formal dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Its ‘rebirth’ had actually been associated with the formation of the “20
January” movement, which was named after the referendum on the future of the
peninsula that took place in the Crimea on 20 January 1991. The leaders of the
movement were demanding the retention of the USSR with the Crimean ASSR, being
a part of it and not a constituent part of the Ukrainian SSR.31 However, as happened in
other parts of the USSR, it was officially banned when the old empire collapsed.
Already by the beginning of 1992, the old members of the party started working
intensively at restoration of the CPC. Thus, in March of the same year, they held an
illegal meeting in one of the villages of Razdolnenskiy (Akşeyh) rayon (region) under
the leadership of the ex-First Secretary of the Crimean Republican Committee of the
CP of Ukraine, who served in the office from February to March of 1991, Leonid
Grach. At this meeting the participants discussed the possibilities of alliance with the
RMC and the Union of Afghanistan Veterans, the Crimea’s secession from Ukraine
and declaration of the Crimean SSR, and the ways of reinstating the leading role of
the CPC.32
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In June 1992, the Union of Communists of the Crimea was established under the
leadership of the same Grach; already on 18 June 1993 this union renamed itself as
the Communist Party of Crimea and on 18 September of the same year it was
registered officially by the Crimean authorities as the first political party on the
peninsula.33 According to its leader, the CPC had at that time about 30,000 members,
compared to 131,000 members of the CP in the Crimea before the demise of the
Soviet Union; 23-25 deputies were at that time representing the CPC in the Crimean
Supreme Soviet and there were four deputies from the CPC in the Ukrainian
parliament.34
It is difficult to trust the authenticity of the in the number given by Grach for the
members of the CPC, as even the main Ukrainian parties would hardly claim the same
figure about their membership throughout the whole territory of Ukraine. Still, it is
true that the communists became very popular among the Russian population of the
peninsula; only in a year of its existence their movement appeared quite solid and
self-confident. One of the main reasons for this seemed to be economic hardship. In
comparison to Russia, the economic performance of Ukraine was very poor. Grach’s
promises were therefore very popular - of the re-unification with Russia, the re-
establishment of the Soviet Union to struggle against “speculation” and “the rise of
bourgeois capitalism,” “to protect people against forced decollectivisation,” to
“guarantee maximum state support for collective property,” and “the social protection
of the population” gained great support for his party.35 “The aim of my policies is to
restore the USSR. For this the Crimea should enter the CIS independently – this is the
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path of salvation for the peninsula. Its economic problems can only be solved by large
credits from Russia,” noted Grach in one of his speeches during the Crimean
presidential election campaign.36
Grach was determined to win the presidential elections. “We don’t have a right to lose
in the forthcoming election,” noted the CPC’s leader on the party congress, also
attended by the leader of the Russian communists Gennadiy Zyuganov, in November
1993.37 The strong ties between the members of the CPC with the old communist elite
in Russia were always an important factor, strengthening the position of the
communists on the peninsula. Thus, the events in Moscow in autumn 1993 were an
obvious setback for the CPC members, who reacted very negatively and demanded an
immediate release of Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. Although, the CPC lost its great
supporters and sponsors in Russia then, the fact that it was organised and settled so
effectively on the peninsula itself made not only for its survival, but also its
prospering.
As can be guessed, the CPC was very hostile both towards the Crimean Tatars, whose
problem it considered as “anything but economic,”38 and towards those supporting the
Ukrainian independence, especially members of the Rukh. As a matter of fact, though
in theory of communism, any communist movement should include “proletariat” of a
country and is open to all nationalities; however, in the Crimea it was so just the
Russians – the ex-communist elite, who were intensively involved in the activities of
this party.39
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The CPC members’ hatred towards everything related to democracy and their desire
to re-build the old empire were always a reason that was bringing them closer to the
nationalist and chauvinist movement of the pro-Russian orientation. Therefore, when
Grach lost already in the first round of the elections, he called the supporters of the
CPC to vote for the candidature of Meshkov in the second round, justifying it by the
similarity in their stances towards those who were in power.40
In the 1998 parliamentary elections in the Crimea Grach and his party received the
majority of the seats in the new Supreme Soviet (parliament – Verkhovnyi Sovet) of
the Crimean Autonomous Republic, with Grach becoming the chairman of the
parliament. The influence of the CPC on the politics in and around the Crimea
therefore increased dramatically. It must be added that the CPC is not the only
communist organisation in the Crimea, there are also more radical elements such as
the Communist Party of Crimean Workers and the organisation “Working Crimea,”
although their membership counts hardly more than a few hundred.
1.3. Democratic or “Centrist” Forces
There are not so many democratic organisations or political parties on the territory of
the peninsula, and, unfortunately, none of them is strong enough to counterbalance the
forces of pro-Russian orientation. The reason for this is not only the lack of potential
followers, but also an absence of interconnectedness and co-operation in activities
between the parties representing this force. Thus, neither in 1991, when the old
empire collapsed, nor in 1994 and 1998 elections did these parties come to power.
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At the end of September 1991, 23 deputies, who already in April 1991 formed a
deputy group, called DemKrym established in Simferopol the organisation
“Democratic Crimea” under the leadership of Yuriy Komov.41 In the beginning,
“Democratic Crimea” became allied with the RMC, as both of them were calling
themselves “oppositions.” However, on the following congress of the party on 30-31
May 1992 in Yalta, the contradictions and divergence of interests had appeared not
only with those organisations which were considered to be the allies of the movement
(the Rukh and the RMC), but also with the ‘constituent elements’ of the “Democratic
Crimea” such as the Socio-Democratic Union of Crimea, local branch of the Party of
Democratic Revival of Ukraine, and Farmers Organisation of Feodosiya (Kefe).42 The
main contradiction was in this party’s programme on the “federalisation of Ukraine,”
according to which the Crimea was to become a federative part of Ukraine and if this
did not happen, the Crimea should be re-annexed to Russia.43 The promotion of such a
strange idea did not increase its popularity even within the pro-Russian chauvinist
circles and only alienated its supporters.
The party completely lost the meaning of its existence after Komov left it to join the
Union for the Support of the Republic of Crimea (USRC) [Soyuz v Podderzhku
Respubliki Krym], which was formed in September 1993 by Yakov Apter and Sergey
Kunitsyn, and which united the people of heavy industry, concentrated mainly in the
northern and eastern Crimea. This party’s members were typical examples of old-style
directors, anxious to maintain the flow of subsidies from the ministries in Kyiv.44 But,
it is noteworthy that in its statements, the USRC considered the problem of the inter-
                                                          
41 Ibid., p. 67.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Andrew Wilson, “The Crimean Tatars,” p.33.
20
ethnic relations to be the most important and declared its support and readiness to help
the deported peoples of the peninsula.
One of the most significant centrist organisations at that moment was the Democratic
Party of Crimea (DPC) [Demokraticheskaya Partiya Kryma], formed in June 1993
and led by Anatoliy Filatov.45 Although, this party propagated Crimean autonomy
within Ukraine, it also demanded the establishment of confederate relations between
the republics of the ex-USSR. It favoured accommodation with Crimean Tatar
organisations and in October 1993 the DPC and the Organisation of the Crimean
Tatar National Movement (OCNM) [Organizatsiya Krymskotatarskogo
Natsionalnogo Dvizheniya] announced that they were merging in a joint bloc in the
election campaign for deputy mandates to the Supreme Councils of Crimea and
Ukraine.46 The two bodies had similar opinion on other matters, too. For instance,
both favoured a two-chamber parliament in the Crimea, one of which must be a
chamber of nationalities; both believed that “Sevastopol was an alienable part of the
Crimea and regarded all actions aimed at revising this status as provocative;” both
sides thought that privatisation should take place alongside the creation of conditions
that would help the deported people to participate in acquiring of private property.47
Another organisation, which could also be classified as ‘centrist,’ was the Party for
the Economic Revival of Crimea (PERC) [Partiya Ekonomicheskogo Vozrozhdeniya
Kryma]. Its first congress was held on 20 March 1993, where it was stressed that it
had about 30,000 supporters (businessmen, bankers, and representatives of trade). On
the same congress it was announced that the main goal of the party was “to create the
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necessary economic, political and legal conditions for the development of the Crimea
as a democratic republic, which is part of Ukraine and is capable of protecting the
interests of all citizens and nationalities.”48 At that time, the party had three co-
chairmen, which was symbolising the alliance of different forces: Vladimir Shevyov,
a local businessman and a leader of the Union of Entrepreneurs of the Crimea;
Vladimir Yegudin, the Crimean Minister of Agriculture; and Vitaliy Fermanchuk, a
former ideology secretary of the CP in the Crimea and a representative of heavy
industry. The PERC claimed to be a strong supporter of the market economy and was
interested in establishing a free economic zone on the territory of Crimea. The party,
however, disappeared from the political arena of the peninsula as a result of the
“snatch” by the local mafia and had it rebirth a few years later, but now as a local
branch of the all-Ukrainian party with the same name.
Very similar to the PERC was the so-called party “Crimea,” established on 8 June
1996, in Simferopol. It evolved from the former People’s Party of Crimea, on the
proposal of the Ukrainian parliament deputy Lev Myrymskiy, president of the Imperia
[Empire] concern.49 The newly established party was supposed to represent the
interests of the Crimean entrepreneurs, however, it was unable to speak loudly in the
following years.
The peculiarity of the situation in the Crimea with regard to political forces comes
from the fact that alongside with political parties or groups, members of which are
brought together by a common political idea or orientation, the majority of the parties
have been formed according to the nationality factor and represent Russians,
                                                                                                                                                                     
47 BBC Monitoring Service, 15 October 1993, as distributed by Reuters.
48 SWB, 26 March 1993.
22
Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars or other nationalities. With no regard to the political
orientation or name of any of these parties (i.e. they can be left or right wing), they
promote the interests of the nationality they represent. At the same time, organisations
such as the Society of Ukrainian Language of Taras Shevchenko Prosvita
[Enlightenment], at first glance appear to be apolitical bodies. However, they are very
much politicised and the nationality factor in fact plays a very significant role in the
definition of their political orientations.50
         1.4. The Pro-Ukrainian Forces
Ukrainian organisations appeared on the territory of the peninsula in late 1980s, at
that time to dissimilate Ukrainian culture and language, strengthen ethnic solidarity
and self-consciousness among the Ukrainians, living on the territory of the peninsula.
But, these organisations could not be isolated from politics; thus, they became an
important tool in the hands of the central Ukrainian government.51
At the beginning of the 1990s, the number of parties representing pro-Ukrainian
forces increased dramatically. They differed widely as regards to their political
ideology, but were too small to be able to effect the distribution of power on the
peninsula.
Among the pro-Ukrainian organisations on the peninsula are the local branches of the
Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian
National Assembly. The members of these organisations under the leadership of
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Mykola Porovsky in May 1992 founded the movement “The Crimea with Ukraine,”
on its first congress in Canköy, called “The All-Crimean Bloc of Democratic Forces;”
it was joined by the local branch of the Ukrainian National Party, the Union of
Officers of Ukraine, the Rukh, and Prosvita. The formation of this bloc was merely a
reaction to the ratification by the Crimean Supreme Soviet on 5 May 1992 of the
Crimean Constitution, the provisions on the status of the Crimea of which were in
contradiction with the Ukrainian constitution.52 Thus, this organisation is seen to be
more an artificial implant from Kyiv, as the Ukrainians, inhabiting the peninsula are
thoroughly Russified people who have no sympathy towards the Ukrainian
independent state. The most serious organisation within the pro-Ukrainian forces was
established in autumn of 1993 - the Ukrainian Civic Congress of the Crimea.
Despite the weakness of the pro-Ukrainian forces on the peninsula, the presence of
these organisations had certainly a positive impact on the political situation in the
Crimea. All of them strongly resisted the secessionist pro-Russian forces and
supported the Crimean Tatar national movement, often allying with it in the political
activities or undertaking initiatives together. Most of these parties have stressed many
times in their statements the insufficient attention paid by the governments of both
Crimea and Ukraine to the problems of the Crimean Tatars; they also supported the
Crimean Tatars very strongly in their demands for the establishment of cultural-
national autonomy within the Ukrainian state.
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          1.5. The Crimean Tatar National Movement
1.5.1. The Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement and the
Crimean Tatar National Meclis   
Among all these different political parties, groups, and organisations that have their
existence on the peninsula, a very special place is occupied by the Crimean Tatar
national movement. The movement is a well-organised political force, the leaders of
which possess all necessary instruments and skills at their disposal in order to operate
and co-ordinate its supporters effectively. The political mainstream of the Crimean
Tatar politics is represented by the Meclis [parliament], elected by secret ballot on the
first session of the Second Qurultay [congress] in June 1991 in Bahçesaray. At the
same congress the long-term dissident, an intellectual with a long history of resistance
to and imprisonment by the Soviet authorities, and world-wide known fighter for the
rights of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Cemil Kırımoğlu, was elected a head of the
Crimean Tatar Meclis. Previous to that position, Kırımoğlu was a leader of the
Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCNM) – a political party,
which was established in 1989 to promote the same aims as the Meclis. Thus, while
the Meclis is a representative assembly of the Crimean Tatars, the OCNM is its
equivalent as an organised political party; after the first elections half of the Meclis’
council, consisting of 33 deputies, were members of the OCNM and the OCNM’s first
two leaders, Mustafa Kırımoğlu(1989-1991) and Refat Çubar (1991-1993) became
head and deputy head of the Meclis, respectively.53
                                                          
53 Wilson, Andrew, “The Crimean Tatars,” p.29.
25
However, after the election of Erecep Hayredin as a head of the OCNM in 1993, the
relationship between the Meclis and the OCNM became somewhat lukewarm; a kind
of divergence in views on the functions of both bodies had occurred.54 In fact, when
the idea of the establishment of the political body, representing all the Crimean Tatars
regardless of their political orientation, was put into practice and its newly elected
chairman, Mustafa Kırımoğlu, was replaced by Refat Çubar at his post within the
OCNM, the association of the Meclis with the OCNM did not lose its meaning and it
was difficult to delineate the differences between these two bodies. But the election of
Erecep Hayredin brought a new dimension to this relationship. It is not that the
political programme of both started to diverge. On the contrary, the OCNM appears to
have no new ideas at all. Thus, for instance, in a declaration on “The Immediate Tasks
of the OCNM,” adopted at the V Congress of the OCNM in March 1996, it is
impossible to find neither serious differences in the programmes of both the Meclis
and the OCNM, nor a single new initiative or idea; all the tasks mentioned in this
resolution are simply the reiteration of the goals that the Meclis had been struggling to
reach for all these years.55 Actually, the real problem lies in a perceptions of the ruling
circle of OCNM of the functions of their political party; they want to act
independently of the Meclis, trying to establish themselves as a kind of opposition to
the Meclis. The Crimean Tatar media and public blames for this situation the
chairman of the OCNM, Erecep Hayredin, who definitely lacks charisma and any
image of a ‘hero’ among the population, or the broad thinking and creativity that
previous leaders of the OCNM had possessed, and he desperately imitates Kırımoğlu
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and Çubar.56 In this context, the programme of the Crimean Tatar Meclis acquires
more importance.
Among its many tasks, the Meclis pursues policies aiming at implementation of a
broad programme that would meet the needs of its people in the social sphere of life,
which would include the revival of national culture, religion, and spiritual
consolidation of the nation, and in the economic sphere of life, by providing material
aid to destitute parts of the population. Thus, soon after the Second Qurultay’s first
session, the Meclis launched the formation of local organs of national self-government
(local meclises, committees, etc) on the entire territory of the peninsula, including the
villages and places of temporary settlements of the Crimean Tatars for more effective
implementation of its programmes.57
However, the main objective is the re-establishment of the Crimean Tatar national
republic on the territory of the peninsula.58 It is significant to mention that the Meclis
“resists vigorously any separatist attempts aimed at [the] Crimea’s secession from
Ukraine,”59 and demands the implementation of the right of their people to self-
determination within Ukraine. They believe that “nations and peoples are the basic
subjects of the human civilisation,” and therefore stand for “the return of the Crimean
Tatar people to their historic homeland, and the restoration of their national
statehood.”60
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The Meclis also demands compensation for the victims of deportation and considers
that financial assistance should come first of all from Russia, as the legal successor to
the USSR, and then from Uzbekistan and Ukraine. As it appears, the first two are
indifferent towards the problems of the Crimean Tatars, and aid comes only from the
West. Because of the poor economic conditions in Ukraine and its inability to sustain
the volume of expenditures in the process of resettling deported nationalities of the
Crimea, in January 1995, at the initiative of the UN mission to Ukraine, agreement
had been reached that assistance in this matter would be granted by Turkey, Italy, the
Netherlands, France, Canada, Sweden, Germany, and other countries.61 There is, of
course, an amount of money set aside annually by the Ministry for Nationalities of
Ukrainian government, though this aid was usually woefully inadequate (as before the
introduction of Grivna, Ukrainian money had always been subject to galloping
inflation) and dispensed through the Crimean Cabinet of Ministers, while caused
many doubts as to the very existence of any assistance to the people. In the last few
years the situation has changed somewhat. In 2000, for instance, 20 million Grivnas
were allocated to the programme related to the return and resettlement of the deported
peoples.62 It was reported that during 1992-1998, $300 million were allotted to the
realisation of the same programme and this made possible the construction of 273,000
square meters of accommodation, 375 kilometres of water and 851,4 kilometres of
electricity supply system, 84,3 kilometres of roads. However, 130,000 Crimean Tatars
who had already returned to the Crimea still do not possess any housing; only 65,2 of
136,6 thousand of people have permanent jobs; 60% of the places inhabited by the
repatriates are not provided with water and 25% - with electricity; only 3-5% of the
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roads have been constructed.63 Obviously, even the most vital problems are still very
far from being solved.
The Meclis perceived itself as a sole successor of the Crimean Tatar national
movement with its long-standing history and traditions, therefore, demanded from
Ukrainian government to be recognised as “the authorised representative body of the
Crimean Tatar people” and believes that measures should be introduced into the
Ukrainian constitution guaranteeing the Meclis representation in Ukraine’s highest
legislative body.64 During last decade, the Crimean Tatar patriots organised
demonstrations, held hunger strikes aiming at the promotion of these demands.
However, this demand was not met and it was only in 1999 that President Leonid
Kuchma made some resemblance of recognising the Meclis; he granted it a status of a
consultative body under the Cabinet of the President of Ukraine.65
The problem of representation was not solved either. While before the 1994
parliamentary elections in the Crimea it was agreed to grant a quota of fourteen seats
(for one term only) to the Crimean Tatars deputies, a law “On the Elections to the
Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” of 1998, stated that the
Crimean Parliament, unlike the Parliament of Ukraine, would be elected under a
purely majority system. And another law “On the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous
Republic of the Crimea,” stipulated that all the deputies would be elected on the basis
of universal, equal, and direct suffrage. These two laws stripped the Crimean Tatars of
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any chance of being represented in the Crimean legislative body, as in all of the
electoral districts they constituted a minority.66 Thus, there is not even a single
representative of the Crimean Tatars in the republican parliament. As regards the
legislative body of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatars are represented there by their two
leaders - Mustafa Kırımoğlu and Refat Çubar, the former was elected from the Rukh
in multi-mandate (party list) and the latter – in a single mandate district under the
majoritarian system.67 Nevertheless, this achievement of being represented at national
level does not facilitate the solution of numerous problems at local level and the
present situation forces the Crimean Tatars to continue the struggle for their basic
rights.
So, it is clear that the lack of understanding and indifference towards the problems of
the Crimean Tatars on the side of the officials in both Kyiv and Simferopol are the
main factors that have been impeding the stabilisation of the situation on the
peninsula, often provoking the Crimean Tatars to extremes in dealing with the
problems, and straining the relationship between the Meclis and the governments of
Ukraine and the Crimea. This lack of interest in the problems of the Crimean Tatars
resulted in initiatives by some of their leaders to establish more radical parties.
1.5.2. Milli Fırka, Adalet and its “Askers”
One of such initiatives was promoted by the radical leader of the local Meclis in
Bahçesaray, Ilmi Ümer, who announced in July 1993 that he intended to re-establish
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the Milli Fırka (the same National Party that promoted Tatar self-government in
1917-18), which would stand for the establishment of an independent Crimean Tatar
state. The Milli Fırka was to impose Crimean Tatar as the only state language, and
place more emphasis than the OCNM on the revival of Islam in the Crimea.68
According to Ümer, both Russia and Ukraine are “occupying powers,” and struggle
against them, as well as against the authorities of the Crimea, who were “a colonial
administration,” was a priority. Unlike the OCNM and the Meclis, which are in favour
of seeking an inter-ethnic accord and harmony by using peaceful means, the followers
of this movement would approve all the necessary methods, even very extreme, in
securing the rights for the Crimean Tatars.69
Although, the idea of the establishment of the Milli Fırka was not brought into life as
was intended, new initiatives on the creation of a similar kind of parties followed.
Thus, on 13 March 1995, newspaper Avdet published the “Charter of the Crimean
Tatar Nationalist Party “Adalet” [Justice]” and on 19 August of the same year the first
congress that assembled 49 candidates of the party was held in Simferopol, where
Server Kerim, the Meclis member, was elected as the party’s chairman.70
In many features, this newly formed party resembled the Milli Fırka of Ümer,
particularly on the issues such as religion, language, culture. From the speech of
Server Kerim on this congress, it became obvious that the Adalet would take more
radical stance towards many issues related to the Crimean Tatar problem than the
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Meclis does. Among its objectives, for instance, the Adalet leaders consider as a main
priority the establishment of a national state of the Crimean Tatars within Ukraine and
to secure 40% representation for them in local authority structures.71 Thus, while the
Meclis sets the same goal as its long-term objective, it does not make an emphasis on
this issue permanently; taking into consideration the political realities, it tries to elude
the contradictions this idea produces with the present Constitution of Ukraine and
norms of international law and stresses the importance of the equal rights for all the
nationalities inhabiting the peninsula.72
Their views also differ on the issue of the language. While the Meclis is rather silent
on this issue, the supporters of Adalet put forward their demands for the Crimean
Tatar to be used in all spheres of political and social life of the Crimea. The similar
divergence of opinion is present with regards to the compensation of material losses
of the Crimean Tatars. The Adalet members say that this compensation should come
not only in the form of some payment, but “all the property criminally confiscated
from the people during the deportation of 1944 must be reimbursed totally,”73
whereas the Meclis is setting more realistic demands.
At the same congress in 1995, Server Kerim was talking about the settlement of the
commercial and other structures to serve the Crimean Tatar interests and warned that
any attempt on the rights of the nation would be met with resolute response by the
“Crimean Tatar national liberation movement.”74 No one at that time, actually, knew
what the Adalet leader implied. However, later on, when news about the formation of
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the military units, the so-called askers (soldiers), by the Crimean Tatars started to
circulate in the Crimean newspapers, these words became a subject for speculation.
Not many people in the Crimea felt apprehensive about the formation of the Russian
Cossack units in Sevastopol, but many expressed anxiety when they heard that a
similar kind of body was created by the radical Crimean Tatars.75 It is clear that there
are no such units at the moment, because it would be simply very difficult to keep
them secret in a small place like the Crimea. The falseness of such information has
been many times repeated by Kerim himself, but, at the same time, the leader of the
Adalet has stressed that if necessary, it is possible to organise such forces at any
time.76
It is hard to predict the future of this party. At present, it does not have many
supporters. But it will continue to grow bigger if efforts by the governments of
Ukraine and the Crimea to solve the problems of the Crimean Tatars are feeble. It is
also noteworthy that despite the fact that the Adalet has its separate existence, be in no
way it considered as an opposition to the Meclis and the OCNM. It is more
appropriate to contemplate of it as of a radical force within, or next to, the mainstream
movement.
1.5.3. The National Movement of the Crimean Tatars – Shadow of the Past
It was often repeated in the press that the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars
(NMCT) has disappeared from the political scene of the peninsula. This became more
apparent when its leader, organiser and ‘ideology-maker,’ Yuriy Osmanov was
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murdered by street criminals on 6 November 1993.77 He was replaced by Vasfiy
Abdurayim, but then the party could not speak of itself loudly. Thus, the entire debate
between the Meclis and the OCNM and the NMCT was over. The NMCT was
advocating the re-establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Republic of 1921,
formed with the decree of Lenin, and was oriented towards the Soviet power and the
Communist Party, hoping that it would give back everything to the Crimean Tatars
what was taken from them during the deportation.78
The organisation firstly re-initiated its activities in summer 1995 and it had at that
time about 50 supporters. However, during the 1996 elections almost every vote of
the Crimean Tatar was given in support of the Qurultay deputy faction candidates; the
help from and alliance with the Meshkov’s party did not help either.79 Thus, it was
very unlikely that it will ever become a serious opposition to the Meclis in the future.
As a surprise for many, however, in October of 1998 another appearance, and last
until nowadays, of the NMCT had occurred. At that time it held its congress that
gathered about 200 delegates. “Ukraine must voluntarily disavow as illegal the 1954
act on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine and settle relations with the Crimean
Autonomous Republic on a basis of an agreement together with Russia, Simferopol
and commissioners of the Crimean Tatars,” the final document adopted at the
congress says.80 There is no doubt that the party has strong support from the Russian
Communists in the Crimea who help and want it to exist, though only in an artificial
form. Having no supporters from within the Crimean Tatar population of the
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peninsula, the NMCT with its pompous name, tried to create the impression that
would show that not every Crimean Tatar shares the methods and goals of the Meclis.
Sometimes it helps, especially when people with no basic knowledge about the
Crimean Tatars tried to deal with the question. Thus, for instance, some Western
newspapers, when talking about the congress of the NMCT, headed the news’ lines
“Tatars Call on Ukraine to Give Up [the] Crimea,” grossly misportraying the stance of
the overwhelming majority of the Crimean Tatar people.81
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CHAPTER II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN THE CRIMEA IN THE
CONTEXT OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS: 1990-1995
2.1. The Formation of Crimean Autonomy
Demands for the restoration of the Crimean autonomy appeared in the middle of
1989, at the time when the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet was preparing a law on the
Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian nationalist party Rukh started to emerge as a
serious political force – the democratic opposition to the ruling regime.1 These
demands became even more evident after Ukraine had declared its state sovereignty in
July 1990, and it was actually the Communist Party members who started to mobilise
public opinion in support of the Crimean self-determination. The presence of all-
Union assets such as tourist resorts, ministerial dachas, sanatoria, and of a large
number of military personnel and retirees was making the CPC one of the most
conservative in the old USSR. Thus the rise of Ukrainian nationalism and a large-
scale return of the Crimean Tatars was profoundly disturbing to the CPC leaders. As a
result, hoping to be isolated from both threats, Nikolay Bagrov, who was head of the
Crimean Oblastnoy [regional] Soviet, and his allies initiated a campaign for the
maintenance of Crimean independence – of the Crimean ASSR to be a subject of the
USSR.2
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The first serious step by the Crimean authorities in this direction was taken in
September 1990, when it prepared an appeal to the USSR and RSFSR Supreme
Soviets asking them to nullify the 1945-46 decisions abolishing the Crimean
autonomy. Two months later the Crimean authorities issued a declaration, claiming
that these decisions were unconstitutional and that the “Crimeans were entitled to the
restoration of their statehood in the form of the Crimean ASSR “as a subject of the
USSR and a party to the Union treaty.”3 At the same time, it was decided that a
referendum on the question of statehood would be held on 20 January 1991. 81.4% of
the eligible voters gave an affirmative answer to the establishment of the Crimean
ASSR as a subject of the USSR. Before the referendum it was repeated that all the
deported nations were highly encouraged to participate in the voting, however, the
Crimean Tatars, supported by the Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the
Democratic Party of Ukraine simply boycotted it.4 The Crimean Tatars expressed the
reasons behind the decision not to take part in the referendum in the statement of the
Central Committee of the OCNM of 8 March 1991, where it was stressed that the
decisions concerning the “legal status of national territories can not be determined by
an arithmetic majority of the population, moved in from other territories, and of
military servicemen. This kind of practice is a gross violation of the rights of the
nations on self-determination and a cause for serious ethnic conflicts.” In the Crimean
case, the determination of its legal status by this kind of referendum the declaration
said it was the continuity of a long history of the criminal policy of the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union towards the Crimea’s native population.5
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However, it did not take long for the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to approve the new
status of the peninsula and it was acknowledged in a law dated 12 February 1991, “On
the Renewal of the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic.” This law was ratified in the
same day and became binding with the entry of the new amendments into the Crimean
Constitution on 6 June 1991.6
Nevertheless, it is really difficult to accept this decision as having legal force, because
there are certainly some errors, which had been overlooked. First of all, as the law
from 12 February 1991 talks about “the restoration of the Crimean ASSR on the
territory of the Crimean oblast within the Ukrainian SSR,”7 it simply misses the fact
that there had never been a Crimean ASSR within the UkrSSR. The Crimean ASSR
was both established and liquidated within the RSFSR by means of the actions taken
by the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and RSFSR. Thus, there was an error as
restoration might occur only of something that had previously existed, but there had
never been a connection, as claimed in this law, between the UkrSSR and the Crimean
ASSR.8
The second mistake lied in the fact that in accordance with the formulation of a
question asked on the referendum, people were voting for the establishment of a
separate republic as it was intended to be a party to the Union treaty and subject to the
USSR. However, the law of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet recognised the
establishment of the Crimean ASSR within the boundaries of Ukrainian SSR. Thus,
the results of the referendum must be considered as non-binding.
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Finally, neither a Ukrainian nor a Crimean referendum law was in existence at that
time.9 This also renders the results of the referendum invalid.
Despite all these disputable points of the decision, autonomy was established. “The
Crimean Tatars were now forced to face the fact that their traditional nostalgia for the
Crimean ASSR was somewhat misplaced.” They knew that the restoration of 1991
with the local communist elite firmly in charge would not do anything for the
Crimean Tatars, but would make things even worse, as now they had to deal not with
the central Soviet government, which at that time was going increasingly pro-Tatar,
but with people who thought of the Crimean Tatars certainly as a threat.10   
Instead of accepting an offer from Bagrov of seven places in the ‘new’ parliament, the
Crimean Tatars organised elections of their own representative assembly - the
Qurultay, the preparation for which started already on 23 September 1990. All the
Crimean Tatars over the age of 16 were able to vote from October 1990 to June 1991
in order to choose one delegate for each 1000 people.11 This campaign was really
difficult to sustain as the Crimean Tatar population was dispersed throughout the
whole Soviet Union. However, most intensively the work was going on in the Crimea
and Uzbekistan as 120,000 of the Crimean Tatars were then living in the Crimea and
the majority was still in the Central Asia.
Held on 26-30 June 1991 the Second Qurultay had gathered 262 delegates, who
issued the “Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People” on 28
June stating that “the Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, and
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only they have the rights to self-determination in accordance with accepted norms of
international law. The political, economic, spiritual and cultural rebirth of the
Crimean Tatars is only possible in their own sovereign national state.” But, very
importantly, the Declaration also stated that “relations between the Crimean Tatars
and other national and ethnic groups inhabiting the Crimea must be based on mutual
respect and recognition of human and civic rights.”12 The same kind of thoughts were
expressed in the appeal of the Qurultay to the all Crimean population, which said that
the mass return of the Crimean Tatars to their sole native land did not mean an
attempt on the Crimean people’s political, cultural, religious and other rights and
stressed the importance of “respect for national feelings and human dignity of all
nations.”13 On the same Qurultay the delegates elected plenipotentiary body – the
Meclis and its members, adopted a state flag and hymn, decided to restore the Latin
alphabet, forcibly changed in 1938 to Cyrillic, for the Crimean Tatar language.14
Not surprisingly, the Crimean Supreme Soviet, in its resolution dated 29 July 1991,
immediately denounced the Meclis and other related organs, their activity and the
documents issued by these organisations as illegal and claimed them to be contrary to
the Constitution of the UkrSSR and USSR. It also accused the Qurultay of the attempt
to create “parallel structures of power.”15
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Interestingly enough, the decision of the Crimean Supreme Soviet to eliminate the
Qurultay and the whole Crimean Tatar movement came on 20 August 1991, when the
famous putsch was still going on with the GKChP (governmental committee for the
state of emergency) people in power. However, this attempt was not a successful one
as the “weapons” the Crimean authorities were thinking of using for the achievement
of their goal – the constitutions of the USSR and UkrSSR – with the failure of the
coup ceased to have any power.16 The Ukrainian declaration of independence on 24
August 1991 and approval of it by the Ukrainian people that followed with the
referendum of 1 December of 1991 were the sequential steps that finally led to the
collapse of the old regime and the beginning of a new epoch.
However, this new epoch did not take off in the Crimea, where, despite all the
developments that had taken place on the territory of the Soviet Union in 1991, not
many things changed. One could understand this simply by looking at the people who
were in power before and after the collapse of the USSR. The Crimean authorities,
who were trying to eliminate the Qurultay and its structures on 20 August and whose
connection to the putsch was not ‘clear,’ were in power not only during the immediate
aftermath of the 1991 events, but exactly until the elections of 1994.17
On 29 August 1991, the Crimean Republican Committee of the Communist Party was
closed down. The country as a whole was seen to undergo a process of massive
democratisation, but the Crimean authorities, aware of the fact that everyone’s
attention at that time was focused on more important things such as Ukrainian
independence and fate of the Soviet Union, were desperately trying to devise clever
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tactics in order to remain in power and to get a broader sphere of political influence.
For example, on 29 August 1991, on the special session of the Supreme Council of
the Crimean ASSR, the deputies had a vote of confidence in favour of their Chairman
Bagrov, thus removing the issue of his support for the GKChP people and giving him
and themselves an opportunity to carry on with their traditional policies.18
         2.2. The Beginning of the Crimean Separatism
For Ukraine it was really the beginning of a new era, however, its independence at the
same time meant the beginning of political crisis, which was mostly related with the
situation in the Crimea. On 4 September 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Crimean ASSR
declared state sovereignty of the Crimea as a constituent part of Ukraine and the
“supremacy, unity, and indivisibility of the Crimean ASSR.”19 And, with the law on
the “Government Power Structure of the Crimean ASSR” from September 10, 1991
all the energy of the Crimean authorities was directed on the preparation and
correction of the project of new constitution, according to which the Crimea was to be
a presidential republic, though within Ukraine, but not possessing the status of oblast
or autonomy. This project envisaged the Crimea as a state that would be independent
enough of implementing its own foreign, economic, and social policies; and, this plan
was accepted by the Crimean deputies on 26 December 1991.20
Of course, it was hard to believe that Ukraine would accept the constitution in that
form; it was also difficult to assume that the Crimean Tatars would approve the draft
where their name was not mentioned. Actually, it must be added that despite the
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absolutist attitude of the Meclis, since 1991 formally committed to establishing the
Crimean Tatar national state, its leaders had often shown flexibility and understanding
of political realities when dealing with the Crimean authorities. At this time, the
Meclis had proposed its own draft of the constitution, according to which the
parliament of the Crimea would have two-chambers, the lower one would be the
Soviet of People’s Representatives consisting of 100 members elected from territorial
constituencies and the upper one (50 members) would represent the indigenous
population of the peninsula, including the Crimean Tatars, the Krymchaks and
Karaims, and would defend their rights and interests in the Crimean Supreme Soviet
(Article 93). The President would be elected by the universal suffrage but, again, his
power would be checked by a Vice-President, elected by the Qurultay from the
number of candidates nominated “in agreement with the President of Republic”
(Article 109).21 The draft constitution elaborated by the Meclis was based on the
democratic norms and was meant to protect all kind of rights and legal interests and
equality of all the nationalities inhabiting the peninsula.
Similar demands were made by 8,000 of the Crimean Tatars, who gathered at a rally
on 16 February 1992 in the centre of Simferopol, where the resolution “On the
Political Situation in and around the Crimea and the State (situation) of the Crimean
Tatars” was adopted. Among other things, the participants of the meeting accused the
government of Ukraine of inaction with regard to the problem of deported peoples
and the Crimean establishment - of taking an advantage of this inaction; they
requested the Meclis to declare its people to be fighting for their liberation if the
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present situation not changing. The resolution demanded participation of the Crimean
Tatars in the settling of the problem on the status of the peninsula, protection of the
political, economic and cultural rights of all people of the Crimea, and recognition of
the present borders between Russia and Ukraine.22 The Crimean authorities, however,
were not only turning a deaf ear on the demands of the Crimean Tatars, but were
seeking all the possible means to avoid pressure for its activities from Kyiv.
This period, the beginning of 1992, could be considered as the starting point of
separatist movement in the Crimea, the main driving force behind which was the
RMC that at that time had already initiated a campaign of collecting signatures in
support of the referendum for independence. This action went into full swing and
within a few months the electoral authorities declared that about 247,000 signatures,
much more than 180,000 that required by law, were collected.23
 The reaction of most of the political forces in Ukraine on these developments was
very negative and they demanded the immediate dissolution of the Supreme Council
of the Crimea and installation of direct presidential rule from Kyiv; they also wanted
the prohibition of the activities of separatist-minded groups.
The Ukrainian government also understood the importance of its alliance with the
Crimean Tatars in the ‘fight’ against the separatist pro-Russian movement in the
Crimea. For instance, on the initiative of the Ukrainian government, on the meeting of
the heads of the CIS states on 20 March and 15 May 1992, the issue of the restoration
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of the rights of the deported peoples was brought on the agenda. However, this
initiative received negative feedback from the leaders of the Central Asian republics,
Kazakhstan and Russia, though, if accepted, such decision could contribute greatly to
the mass repatriation of the Crimean Tatars.24 Additionally, on 27 March 1992, the
Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a resolution, expressing
responsibility and care for the situation with the Crimean Tatars.25
Actually, beginning from the summer of 1992, the authorities in Kyiv started to pay
more and more attention to the problem of the Crimean Tatars. Thus, at the beginning
of August, the draft law of Ukraine “On the Status of the Crimean Tatars” was
prepared by a special commission, in accordance with which the right of self-
determination of the Crimean Tatars was accepted; it was said that “Ukraine is the
Motherland not only of the Ukrainian people, but also of the Crimean Tatars.”26
Although, this draft never became a law, yet the consideration of such a proposal
meant that the Ukrainian legislative body was examining the theoretical elaborations
of the Crimean Tatar national movement. However, it is clear that the support of the
Crimean Tatars would not be enough for the stabilisation of the situation. The
Ukrainian government still had to deal with those Crimeans who were striving for
independence.
 The national government knew that in order to retain the Crimea within Ukraine it
would have to make some concessions, otherwise the consequences could be
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unpredictable. Thus, a parliamentary delegation from Kyiv, led by the Deputy
Chairman, Volodymyr Hryniov, was sent to the Crimea to negotiate with the local
parliamentarians. These negotiations resulted in the signing of an agreement between
the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on a free economic
zone on the territory of peninsula, as well as the Bill “On Separation of Powers of
Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea,” which was examined and approved on 2 April
1992 by the Crimean Parliament (119 votes in favour) and then was submitted for
approval to Kyiv.27 However, the Ukrainian parliamentarians, when examining this
draft law on 29 April 1992, were not very enthusiastic about it, because adoption of
such law was to imply that the both Crimean and Ukrainian Parliaments are
absolutely equal “as the subject of legal relations,” which was possible only in a case
of the Crimean-Ukrainian confederation.
The Ukrainian deputies finally passed the Bill, but changed the name of the law to
“On the status of Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”28 Thus, in accordance with the
new law, which stated that the Republic of Crimea is an autonomous part of Ukraine
and decides independently on all issues within its competence, the Crimean peninsula
was granted unprecedented freedom, i.e. local authorities were empowered to decide
on a wide range of issues, including their own constitution, financial and social
policies, deployment of Ukrainian troops on the territory of peninsula.29 This step was
intended apparently at forestalling the referendum and avoiding political tensions on
the peninsula. But, it was still not very probable that it would be enough to stop this
movement. First evidence of dissatisfaction with this decision was expressed by the
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deputies of the Crimean parliament who during the session of the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada where the draft was considered “stormed out of the chamber during
the debate, saying they wanted independence and not mere autonomy.”30 The
Crimean Tatars were not pleased either. Statement of the Meclis was saying that
ratification of such law did “release our people from any moral and political
obligations relating to the Ukrainian State as the lawful sovereign power in the
Crimea.”31
         2.3. The Assertion of Independence and the Centre’s Reaction
Despite the concessions made by the Ukrainian government, pressure in the Crimea
continued to grow and this led to the adoption (118-in favour, 28-against, 21-
abstentions) on 5 May 1992 of the Act of State Independence of the Republic of
Crimea.32 The independence declaration was made subject for approval to local
referendum scheduled for 2 August,33 where the voters now had to answer two
questions: “Are you for an independent Republic of Crimea in union with other
states?” and “Do you approve of the act declaring the state of independence of the
Republic of Crimea?” The Crimean Tatar Meclis immediately denounced as illegal
and against the norms of international law the “Act of State Independence” and
demanded from the President and Ukrainian Supreme Soviet the abolishment of all
power structures of the Crimea which were separate from Kyiv 34
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But, in all likelihood, the Crimean deputies knew the kind of reaction that would
follow from Kyiv and, Nikolay Bagrov, the parliamentary Chairman, in an attempt to
soften the situation said “the independence declaration was not tantamount to
secession from Ukraine.”35 However, the text of the declaration clearly explains the
meaning of this decision. It states that the “Verkhovna Rada of the Republic of
Crimea declares: the establishment of a sovereign state – the Republic of Crimea,”
which “will establish its relations with other states in accordance with the
international law, in terms of equality and cooperation.”36
The centre’s response was instantaneous and unequivocal. On 6 May 1992, at the
meeting of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine it was stated that the
decisions adopted by the Crimean authorities were unconstitutional.37 Leonid
Kravchuk, then the Ukrainian president, who was at that time on an official visit to
the USA also asserted that the Act was a gross violation of the Ukrainian constitution
and added that Ukraine would not treat this declaration as valid.38
The full parliament of Ukraine met on 13 May and adopted a resolution recognising
the act on independence and referendum as such that run counter to the Ukrainian
constitution and demand annulment of these decision by May 20, 1992; it also offered
a continuation of a dialogue with representative bodies of the Crimea in terms of the
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Constitution and Law of Ukraine on the status of ARC.39 There was a lot of pressure
from the Ukrainian political forces on the government to introduce direct presidential
rule on the peninsula and to dissolve the Crimean parliament and many people
thought that it would be done so, but against all forecasts the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine provided the Crimean authorities with opportunity to correct all mistakes.
Although, already on the next day after the declaration of independence, on 6 May
1992, the Crimean parliament, when adopting a constitution, included the article on
the “Crimea’s belonging to Ukraine,” Kyiv’s inflexible stand had a sobering effect on
the Crimean politicians. Thus, on the special session of the Crimean parliament on 23
May 1992, a resolution cancelling the act on independence, proposing the suspension
of the Law of Ukraine “On Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and of the
consideration of the law on representation of the President of Ukraine in the Crimea,
and suspending the resolution on referendum until 10 June [in order to consult with
the electoral committee organising referendum] was adopted.40
The dialogue between Kyiv and Simferopol was resumed on 1 June in Yalta, which
resulted in the issuing of a joint statement of the Presidiums of the Supreme Councils
of Ukraine and Crimea saying, inter alia, that
“[T]he Crimea, being a part of Ukraine, shall be provided with all legal and political
conditions to realise its potential proceeding from its geographic position, have the
economy open for foreign investments and become a zone of fruitful economic and
cultural cooperation. Not striving for the status of political international legal entity
enjoyed by Ukraine, the Crimea shall have the right to enter into relations with other
states in socioeconomic and cultural domains.”41
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It was also agreed to set up the joint group by June 5, 1992 to continue the work on
division of powers between the governments of Ukraine and Crimea proceeding
further from the previously reached agreements. Thus, by the end of the month, the
compromise solutions were found to almost all the disputable issues, particularly
regarding citizenship of the inhabitants of peninsula (joint Crimean-Ukrainian
citizenship was agreed) and their property rights (the Crimeans got property rights for
all the land and natural resources on the territory of peninsula).42 The power-sharing
scheme with the new amendments was subsequently approved by the Crimean
parliament. However, its Ukrainian counterpart ruled that this law would enter into
force only after the Crimean constitution and legislation were brought in line with the
national constitution and laws and the idea of referendum forgotten.43 Thus, with the
proposal of Nikolay Bagrov, on the session of the Crimean parliament on 9 July 1992,
it was decided to place a moratorium on referendum with 106 votes in favour, 17 –
against, and 7 abstentions.44
Thus, a kind of a middle course between the centre and periphery was found. But,
even at that time it was clear that the problem was not over. Although, the Crimean
authorities got most of what they wanted and the poorly formulated law “On Division
of Powers” practically separated the Crimea from Ukraine, it would be important to
note that Kyiv in its policies was relying only on Bagrov’s team, therefore, ignoring
the interests of its other supporters. Most importantly, their final so-called
compromise in no way facilitated solution of the problem of the Crimean Tatars, the
only organised force determined to defend Ukrainian interests on the peninsula. It was
obvious that the Ukrainian authorities understood this fact, but in reality there were
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more mistakes than correct actions in Kyiv’s policy towards the Crimean Tatars. For
instance, recognition of autonomy on a territorial base gave a free way to the
separatists and became a source for social tensions. Secondly, the Ukrainian
authorities rejected direct dialogue with the Meclis and refused to grant it a status of
the only representative body of the Crimean Tatars, who then did not have any chance
to participate even in the process of division of powers; on the contrary, Kravchuk
called the activities of the Meclis unconstitutional. Thirdly, the money set aside for
the resettlement of the deportees had been used by the Crimean authorities to “patch
up the holes in local economic infrastructure” and by doing so, they said they
improved the overall situation of economy what was very beneficial for the new
returnees. But only 26,500 out of 180,000 of the Crimean Tatars were living in
normal houses and others were spending cold winters in tents and wagons.45 Thus,
aggravation of the situation was very probable. At the same time, the Crimean
parliament had still at its disposal the referendum threat, which they could use
whenever they wanted and their quest for independence was still very intense. More
significantly, the half of the Crimean parliament representing the RMC was not hiding
that its intention was not simply to establish an independent state but to re-unite the
Crimea with Russia, what could question the very existence of Ukraine.
2.4. Elections to the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and the Question of ‘National
Quotas’
The tensions intensified in 1993, the time when Ukraine was experiencing
hyperinflation and deep economic crisis, whereas Russia seemed to do in this respect
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far better. In an attempt to take an advantage of this situation, the Crimean parliament
adopted a number of laws and resolutions strengthening the Crimean autonomy.46 For
instance, the legislative body passed on 17 September 1993 the law “On Elections of
the Crimean Parliament” and on 14 October 1993 – the law “On Elections of the
President of the Republic of Crimea.”47 Dissatisfied with the work of the local
parliament, actually, with its inability to promote effectively a cause of independence,
the RMC already in March of 1993 had declared its intention to gather signatures to
hold a referendum in support of pre-term elections to the Crimean parliament.48 In
August of the same year, it was reported that the campaign had ended and 198,000
signatures in favour of the termination of the plenary powers of the parliament had
been collected.49 However, the central electoral commission revealed a number of
violations and withdrew almost 13,000 signatures,50 therefore rendering another
attempt at holding a poll unsuccessful. But, the RMC showed again its desperate
desire to get power as soon as possible and that it would not leave everything as it
was.
More attention during 1993, though, was directed to the issue of ‘national quotas’ for
the Crimean Tatars. The very concept of ‘national quotas’ or disproportionate
representation of the Crimean Tatars in the authority structures of republic could
simply be justified by the fact that there was not a single deputy representing these
people in the local parliament as they constituted a minority in every electoral district.
Only a few of the Crimean authorities could understand the significance of finding of
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solution to this problem, but it was clear that it would be very difficult to make the
rest of the Crimean deputies, who were generally very anti-Tatar, to accept any
proposition regarding the granting of special rights to the Crimean Tatars. “Some say
that there must be no exceptions for anybody, but I am profoundly convinced that in
order to attain inter-ethnic conciliation a mechanism needs to be devised to ensure
that the deported peoples are duly presented in parliament…Perhaps, ethnic electoral
districts should be set up,” once said Nikolay Bagrov in his speech to the Crimean
Presidium.51
As it was noted earlier, the Chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet in March 1991
had proposed a quota of seven seats for the Crimean Tatar deputies (1 deputy for
10,000 eligible voters), however, as with the establishment at that time of the Crimean
ASSR the overall number of deputies increased substantially, this offer could not
satisfy the needs of the Crimean Tatars and therefore was rejected by the Meclis.52 On
its side, the Meclis had suggested its own solution to this problem through the
introduction of a two-chamber parliament in the Crimea - the proposal that emerged
in the alternative project of the Constitution for the Crimean republic prepared by the
Crimean Tatar National Assembly. As this project was not put into practice, the
representatives of the Crimean Tatars started to make new proposals that could still
meet the interests of its people. Thus, “taking into consideration today’s political and
demographic realities, the Meclis elaborated its own variant of the law on elections, in
accordance with which every citizen of the Crimea would have two votes, one - in
territorial single-mandate electoral district and second – either in multi-mandate (party
lists) or in national single-mandate (for the Krymchaks, Karaims, Armenians,
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Bulgarians, Greeks, and Germans) or for the Crimean Tatars in multi-mandate
district.”53 It was thought that the Crimean Tatars would be able to get 22 seats for
their deputies. Another proposition was to grant the Crimean Tatars “one-third plus
one” of the parliamentary seats in order to enable them to veto the resolutions
contradicting their interests; however, none of the alternatives was acceptable for the
Crimean authorities.
In the summer of 1993, on the initiative of Bagrov, a proposition for granting the
Crimean Tatars 14 seats in the legislative body was put on the agenda of the
parliamentary session, but again was rejected by the majority of the deputies,
vigorously speaking against the offering of any privileges to the minorities.54 The
unwillingness of the Crimean Supreme Council to find a compromise generated a
very negative reaction of the Crimean Tatars, five thousand of whom gathered in front
of the building of the Crimean government on 28 September to express their protest;55
the next day demonstrations spread from the capital and similar demonstrations,
supporting the Crimean Tatars, were organised in London, Bonn, and other European
cities.56 Some Ukrainian parties also indicated a negative stance regarding
developments on the peninsula and expressed full support for the Crimean Tatars.
Thus, Rukh in its statement declared that while the law on elections gave “virtually no
opportunity for the proper representation in the parliament of the indigenous peoples
and the national minorities,” it was simply a “manifestation of discriminating against
and ignoring the human rights of those who suffered from the communist totalitarian
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regime” and that at present these rights were “being encroached upon by the
authorities.”57 A statement of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party has noted
that the law “aims at all costs to prevent their [the Crimean Tatars’] return to their
homeland.”58
It must be said that all these mass protests on and outside the territory of the peninsula
had had a positive effect and on 14 October 1993 an addition to the law “On Elections
to the Supreme Council of Crimea” was adopted by 115 out of 153 deputies voting in
favour of this resolution. In compliance with this addition, representatives of the
Crimean Tatars were to receive 14 mandates, while Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks,
and Germans (but not Krymchaks and Karaims) would be able to choose one deputy
each.59 It was also said that the candidates for these quotas could be members of the
political parties and movements/blocs, cultural and social organisations, and also of
the national congress of the Crimean Tatars – the Qurultay; it was not clear, however,
whether the Meclis would accept participation in the elections as the 14-seats quota
was obviously not enough to change the situation substantially.60
Therefore, in order to discuss all the questions related to the parliamentary elections
the third - emergency session of the Qurultay was held on 28 November 1993 where,
after considering all the pros and cons, it was decided to participate in the
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forthcoming elections set up for 27 March 1994.61 It is noteworthy that all 14 deputies
have been elected from the list of candidates representing the Qurultay and not, for
instance, the NMCT; it is an indicator of not only well-organised work, but also of the
fact that the Meclis in reality represents the will and interests of the whole Crimean
Tartar nation.62
         2.5. Presidential Elections in the Crimea
More negative developments on the peninsula had taken place with regard to the
creation of a Crimean presidency and the presidential elections that were scheduled
for January 1994. The presidential post initially was provided for by the Constitution
of 5 May 1992, however, confrontation between Kyiv and Simferopol concerning the
division of powers and political struggle around the referendum had halted the
practical realisation of this project for one and a half year until the law on the
presidency was passed by the Crimean parliament in September 1993.63
From the very beginning, the leaders of the Crimean Tatar national movement
expressed their negative attitude towards the establishment of the Crimean
presidency. “There cannot be two presidents in one state. Presidential elections in
[the] Crimea will not solve a single problem, but will only increase tension,” said
Mustafa Kırımoğlu in one of his interviews.64 Dissatisfaction of the Crimean Tatars
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with the idea of elections was increased by the fact that the law on presidency
possessed a clause implicitly discriminating against the deported peoples of the
peninsula. In accordance with the conditions set up for those who wish to put forward
their candidacy in the presidential elections, a person had to collect five thousand
signatures in his/her support, pay an electoral deposit equal to 50 minimum wages,
and should have resided in the Crimea for the last 10 years.65 Disregarding the real
claims to the post of the Crimean presidency that the Crimean Tatars certainly were
not to claim, these people even theoretically were stripped out of a chance to run their
candidate for the elections as only few of them, particularly within the political elite
of the Qurultay, were living in the Crimea ten years ago.66 Thus, the emergency
meeting of the Crimean Tatar assembly scheduled on 27th November had to reveal its
clear position towards these elections.
More importantly, the fact that the real “presidential movement” in the end of 1993
was a reflection of the most ‘terrible’ prognoses, particularly for the Crimean Tatars
[and for the Ukrainian centre, too], as to “consolidation of the anti-democratic forces
on the peninsula, the activation of reactionary groups striving for the Crimea’s
secession from Ukraine, and the strengthening of pro-Russian imperial tendencies.67
Thus, on 27 December, when the Central Electoral Committee had completed the
registration of candidates for the Crimean presidency, the list, consisting of six names
- Nikolay Bagrov, Ivan Yermakov, Vladimir Verkoshavskiy who were registered as
independents, and Yuriy Meshkov (the RMC), Leonid Grach (the CPC), and Sergey
Shuvaynikov (the RPC), all representing the pro-Russian and pro-Communist forces
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of the peninsula68 - was evidence of the difficult choice that the Crimean Tatars were
faced with. Mustafa Kırımoğlu commented on this situation in the following way:
“It, of course, matters for us whether the presidential chair will be occupied by an
admiral [Yermakov], who is saying in his circles that if he becomes a president he
will ‘deal’ with all these “tatarva;”* by the Communist leader, propagating maniacal
ideas about the restoration of the Communist empire; by a leader of the chauvinist
party, trying to ‘go’ to Russia…with our motherland or, in the end, by a more realistic
politician, though in the past - a communist partocrat, involved in unlawful acts
against our people, but understanding well enough the situation and possessing a long
experience, ie. the one with whom it is possible to find a common language.”69
In the last example of alternative variants of a president, the leader of the Crimean
Tatar national movement was talking about the Chairman of the Crimean Supreme
Soviet Bagrov. It was difficult to be sure about the real intentions of this candidate as,
for instance, in one of his speeches during his elections campaign, although
endeavouring to stress the socio-economic side of the issue, Bagrov stated that, taking
into account the consequences of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the
“Crimea should choose an independent path of development through the formation of
a new type of economy which will fully exploit the potential of the republic and will
open up wide opportunities for the active work of state enterprises and
entrepreneurs.”70 But it was obvious that he was less radical or the least “evil” and
more concerned with the preservation of the status quo. However, even in the end, the
Meclis of the Crimean Tatars did not dare to support the candidacy of Bagrov openly.
There were several reasons for this and the most significant probably was the fact that
the Crimean Tatars could not forgive him his old ‘sins,’ the anti-Tatar policies, and
their fear that open support would have a reverse effect on the number of votes
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received by him, as everything what was considered good for the Crimean Tatars was
regarded as bad for the Russians.71
Members of the Meclis, after long debates and discussion on its session on 2 January
1994, first, decided (18 to 8 with one abstention) to boycott the elections of the
president as none of the six candidates had taken a clear stand on the Crimean Tatar
interests.72 However, a week later, the Meclis gathered a second time in order to
discuss the situation regarding the elections. It was said there that the pre-election
situation had changed drastically and there were fears that a person insisting on re-
drawing the current borders might come to power.73 Therefore, the Meclis had called
on the Crimean Tatars to participate in the forthcoming elections and to cross out the
names of Grach, Shuvaynikov, Yermakov, Meshkov, and Verkoshanskiy. At the same
time, the resolution passed by the Meclis on 8 January 1994 stated that the “Meclis of
the Crimean Tatar people would not recognise the presidential powers of a person
whose policy would be directed against the right of the Crimean Tatars to self-
determination and solution of the problem on the status of Crimea without taking into
consideration the will of the Crimean Tatar people.”74 Hence, it was implied that the
Meclis and its supporters would give their vote to Bagrov who, unfortunately, had
started to make more challenging statements, arguing that Russia alone could
guarantee stability in the region; “the Crimea cannot be rescued outside an alliance
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with Russia or peaceful reintegration into our historical Motherland,”75 though these
words do not reflect his official position, which was perceived as less radical and yet
pro-Ukrainian.
The course of the election campaigns had revealed an unconcealed anti-Ukrainian and
chauvinist orientation of programmes adhered to by all the candidates; the mass media
was full of malice against Ukraine and called for the restoration of the USSR. The
reaction of the democratic forces of the Crimea and Ukraine to these developments
was very negative; they came out decisively against the introduction of the institution
of the presidency on the peninsula as this might lead to the obstruction of the central
presidential power and strengthening of separatism and confrontation. Thus, for
example, the Ukrainian Civic Congress of the Crimea in its resolution had required
the Ukrainian Supreme Council and the president to do the following:
•    Consider the question of the systematic violation of the Ukrainian Constitution and
current legislation in the Crimea
•     Condemn the attempt by the Communist nomenklatura to introduce the institution of
the presidency and to cancel the Crimean presidential elections as being at variance
with Ukraine’s current legislation.
•     To implement Ukraine’s law “On the Ukrainian Presidential Representation in the
Crimea.”
•     To remove Ivan Yermakov from his post as Ukrainian presidential representative in
Crimea.
•    In carrying out the Ukrainian state-building policy in the Crimea, to rely upon
patriotic political and public organisations.76
However, none of these tactics of counteraction was implemented by the Ukrainian
government simply because it was too late and, consequently, the results of the
presidential elections alarmed Kyiv, proving the weakness of its position on the
peninsula.
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 2.6. The Results of Presidential Elections
Nikolay Bahrov, despite the speeches he made during the last days of the pre-election
campaign, was usually perceived by the Crimean population as too accommodating
towards Kyiv. His association with the ruling party – the PERC - and the fact that in
the last three years the Crimea had been experiencing deep economic crisis had
diminished his popularity drastically. At the same time, his programme did not
promise more than “vague formulae on the desirability of increased autonomy for the
peninsula, balanced by the economic necessity of preserving links with Kiev.”77 This
attracted the Ukrainophiles and the Crimean Tatars, but damaged seriously his
reputation among the Russian-speaking population of the peninsula. Thus, according
to the results of the presidential elections held on 16 January 1994, 254,042 (16.9%)
out of 1,447,482 of the Crimeans voted for the candidature of Bagrov. His most
visible opponent Yuriy Meshkov, who based his programme mostly on emotive
sloganeering [as did the rest of the candidates] and was advocating the establishment
of an “independent democratic legal state entering the CIS on the basis of political
and economic agreements,” received 557,226 (38.5%) of the votes.78  Other
candidates obtained the following number of votes: Shuvaynikov – 196,342 (13.6%),
Grach – 176,330 (12.2%), Yermakov – 90,347 (6.3%), Verkoshanskiy – 14,205
(1%).79 As no candidate received a majority in the first round, it was decided to hold a
run-off election on 30 January 1994 where the voter could have a chance to decide the
presidential chair between Bagrov and Meshkov.
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It was clear that a victory would be on Meshkov’s side, as after he had dealt with the
challenge coming from the more conservative parties such as the CPC and RPC in the
second round their vote was transferred to him, because the leaders of these parties,
fearing that Bagrov would be again in power, started calling for their supporters to
back the candidature of Meshkov. Interestingly enough, immediately after the first
round victory, on the press conference Meshkov told journalists that the Crimea
would not separate from Ukraine. “We will not live under either Russia or Ukraine
but rather with both of them. No one is talking about the changing of the borders,”
added Meshkov.80  These words could hardly calm down the passions and it was not
only the Ukrainian politicians who were worried about the possible consequences of
these elections; the Russian and US officials were repeatedly expressing their fear that
a secessionist movement in the Crimea would pit the Ukrainian nationalists against
the Russian extremist and that a conflict would torpedo the agreement that calls for
Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees of the inviolability
of the Ukrainian borders, which include the Crimea.81
Unfortunately, nothing could stop Meshkov from winning these elections and after the
second round, held on 30 January 1994, he, counting for 1,040,888 (72%) votes
against 333,243 (23.4%) given in support of Bagrov, became a first president of the
Republic of Crimea.82 Now Meshkov had time to prepare for the parliamentary
elections and it was clear that he would do anything possible to ensure the victory of
his “Russia” bloc. Thus, in one of his first speeches in the capacity of president,
Meshkov announced his intention of holding a referendum on the peninsula’s future
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on March 27, saying that “there is no justification for Kiev’s current ban on the
holding of a referendum and adding that “it is a question of [the] Crimea’s right to
determine independently the content and the forms of its relations with neighbouring
states.” His views on the relationship with Ukraine had changed instantaneously; he
announced his plans to form and send to Moscow a plenipotentiary delegation to
conclude a close economic and cultural union with Russia and added that as the
people of the Crimea always formed part of the people of Russia, “the restoration of
unity is…a question for the very near future.”83
2.7. Parliamentary Elections
All Meshkov’s actions, however, were directed at consolidating his power in the
parliamentary elections. It was an important task for Meshkov, because the law “On
the President of the Crimean Republic,” passed on 14 October 1993, did not create a
presidential republic, but stated that the Crimean president had to govern with the
consent of parliament. As in the old parliament the “Russia” bloc controlled only 28
out of 196 seats and the largest number of seats (60) was occupied by the centrist
PERC, the primary and the most significant objective for Meshkov had to be winning
a majority of seats in the new parliament for it to back his policies.84 And his attempts
were successful as the bloc “Russia” won impressively in the elections of March and
April 1994.
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The election rules were as follows: the new parliament was decreased to 98 members,
who were to be elected by two votes, the first given by every eligible voter in one of
the 66 territorial single member constituencies and the second “would then be used to
choose from one of the six lists drawn up on ethnic lines,” ie. local
Russians/Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars would vote for their parties, both
selecting 14 deputies, while Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian and German communities
would elect one deputy, rather than choose from a list.85 The results of the elections
revealed that the bloc “Russia” acquired 54 plus four seats more that were occupied
by the independents very close to the bloc; the RPC got 1, the CPC – 2, the PERC – 2,
the independents close to the PERC – 4, the independents (including Bulgarian and
Greek deputies) – 13, and the Qurultay received 14 seats in the new parliament.86
These elections, therefore, marked another victory of the pro-Russian movement and
demonstrated that the peninsula’s Ukrainian population – “disproportionately rural,”
absolutely Russified and possessing no dedicated leaders – did not constitute as
effective a political force as local ethnic Russians, “disappointing Kiev’s hope that
they could act as an effective counterweight against separatist sentiment in the south.”
On the other hand, “the Crimean Tatars, although effectively mobilised by the
Qurultay, are not numerically strong to provide an effective substitute.”87
          2.8. The Crimea under Meshkov
Meshkov’s accession to power did not resolve any of the old problems, but created
many new ones. Tensions between Kyiv and Simferopol firstly intensified following
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Meshkov’s decree of 10 March 1994 to hold a public opinion poll, easily predicted
results of which would had strengthen his negotiating powers with Kyiv. The reaction
from Kyiv was instantaneous and Kravchuk issued his own decree cancelling Clauses
1 and 2 of the Meshkov’s decree, the first of which was about the restoration of the
provisions of the Crimean Constitution of 6 May 1992, specifying the regulation of
mutual relations between the Crimea and Ukraine on the basis of a relevant treaty and
agreements and the second - about the renewing of the provisions of the same
constitution proclaiming the right of the Crimean citizens to dual citizenship, as  being
counter to the constitution of Ukraine.88 Moreover, it was stated that the decree of the
President of the Republic of Crimea contravened the law of Ukraine “On All-
Ukrainian and Local Referendums,” while prohibited a referendum, concerning issues
not falling within Crimean jurisdiction.89 At the same time, the democratic forces such
as the UCCC, the “Crimea with Ukraine” committee, the PERC, and the Crimean
Tatar Meclis expressed their vehement reaction to this decree in their joint statement,
saying that the poll which was to be held “under the pressure of chauvinist forces”
and which would not in any sense “be conducive to the ideas of inter-ethnic accord”
in itself was “a call for a continuing separatism” that would only lead to greater
deterioration of the situation in the Crimea.90 However, the decision of Meshkov
seemed to be irrevocable.
Thus, despite all objections and barriers, Meshkov’s “consultative questions” were
asked on the first round of 27 March elections. Voters were asked whether they were
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in favour of the restoration of the 6 May 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea,
the establishment of dual citizenship between the Crimea and Ukraine or between the
Crimea and Russia, and the granting of the right to the president of Crimea to rule by
decree in areas not covered by the Constitution.91 All the questions received voter’s
affirmation (78.4%, 82.8%, 77.9%, respectively).92 However, the Electoral
Commissions in both the Crimea and Ukraine ruled the poll to be unconstitutional, as
the questions had to be printed on separate papers. Although, the results had no legal
effect, they were used by the ruling party to justify the restoration of the May 1992
constitution.
It was even before Meshkov’s election to the post of the Crimean president that the
central government took various preventive measures in order not to lose control over
the situation in Crimea. Aware of Meshkov’s political orientation, the Ukrainian
government on 20 January 1994, just between the first tour and run-off elections,
brought amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution enabling the Ukrainian president
to overrule any actions of the government of the Crimean Autonomous Republic that
contradicted the Ukrainian constitution and laws.93 Meshkov, while reiterating his
unwillingness to lead the Crimea’s secession from Ukraine, took a number of steps
aiming at getting greater power over the governing bodies of the peninsula. On the
same day when he issued the decree concerning the referendum, he disbanded the
Council of Ministers, announcing that a new government would be formed under the
economist Yevgeniy Saburov, who was a Russian citizen. He also moved the
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Crimea’s clocks from Kyiv to Moscow time and declared Russian to be the
peninsula’s sole official language.94
More serious consequences followed Meshkov’s decision of 12 April 1994 to replace
the Crimean Interior Minister, Major-General Aleksandr Plyuta, with General Valeriy
Kuznetsov and the local security service director, Ivan Kolomytsev, with Vladimir
Lepikhov, both of whom were people of his team.95 As an answer to this, the
president of Ukraine ordered to cancel the Crimean presidential decrees of 22 April
1994 No. 33 “On the Acting Chairman of the Security Service of the Republic of
Crimea” and No. 34 “On Suspending the Powers of Acting Chairman of the Security
Service of the Republic of Crimea” as being at variance with the Ukrainian
constitution and Ukrainian laws “On Division of Powers” and “On Ukraine’s Security
Service.”96 He also asked Ivan Kolomytsev, the former head of the local KGB, to
replace General Lepikhov.97 In order to confirm the implementation of the Ukrainian
president’s decree, dated 18 May 1994, “On the Ukraine Ministry of Internal Affairs’
Chief Administration in the Crimea,” which says that, in accordance with Articles
114-115 of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Crimean Ministry of Internal Affairs is to
be reorganised as the chief administration in the Crimea of its Ukrainian counterpart,
the small delegation headed by the Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Internal
Affairs, General Valentin Nedrigaylo, has arrived on the peninsula. The media and the
Crimean politicians started talking about contingents of troops sent by the Ukrainian
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authorities to the peninsula and about the preparation of military coup to oust the
Crimea’s acting Minister of Internal Affairs Kuznetsov.98
The situation deteriorated further when on May 19, Leonid Kravchuk issued decrees
on reorganisation of the Security Service and the Ministry of Justice as chief
administrations of Ukraine’s corresponding departments and subordinating them to
Kyiv.99 However, by the evening of the same day, the Crimean parliament had
confirmed General Lepikhov as Chairman of the Crimean Security Service and Mrs.
Lyubov Yeliseyeva-Bora as the Crimean Minister of Justice; it was also decided to
consider the issue of the restoration of the May 1992 constitution on the next session
of the parliament.100
In his appeal to the Crimean deputies, Leonid Kravchuk has asked the parliament of
the Crimea not to consider the “constitutional issue” without consulting the central
authorities as “settlement of said issues falls within exclusive jurisdiction of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,” and as the restoration of the May 1992 constitution in
its original form would imply the revision of basic principles regulating relations
between Ukraine and the Crimea, he warned politicians that “violation of these
principles may lead to conflict situations and other unpredictable consequences.”101
As the 6 May 1992 constitution was perceived by the Ukrainian authorities primarily
as a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, at a 19 May press conference in
Kyiv, Kravchuk said that he would “act decisively and consistently to protect the
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territorial integrity of Ukraine.”102 However, many were blaming particularly
Kravchuk for the existing situation, Serhiy Holovatyi (the Rukh), said Kravchuk was
three years late with his ‘threats’ and ‘decisive actions’ and any action of his could
now exacerbate the situation even more.103
On 20 May 1994 the Crimean parliament, despite the warnings, which came even
from Meshkov, about the possible aggravation of the situation, voted overwhelmingly
(69 in favour, 2 against, and 2 abstained) to adopt a law “On Restoring the
Constitutional Foundations of the Republic of Crimea’s Statehood,” i.e. they fully
restored the Republic of Crimea’s 6 May 1992 Constitution, envisaging that the legal
basis of relations between the Crimea and Ukraine were to be governed by treaties
between the two governments and giving a right to form military forces and for the
Crimeans – to have dual citizenship.104 It must be noted that none of the 14 Crimean
Tatar deputies to the parliament did participate in the voting. Nadir Bekir, a head of
the Legal-Political Department of the Meclis and a member of the Crimean
parliament, made the following statement: “None of the members of the Deputies’
faction of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, not wishing to share
responsibility for such a dubious political action, would participate in the vote on this
question.”105
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine reacted quickly to this decision by suspending it.106
In its resolution, the Ukrainian Supreme Council has stated that pursuant to Article 2
of the law “On Division of Powers between the State Bodies of Ukraine and Crimea,”
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“the highest bodies of state power of the Crimea do not possess the powers given to
the highest state bodies of Ukraine” and recommended to the Crimean parliament to
“put, within the space of 10 days, the Crimean Constitution into correspondence with
the Constitution of Ukraine” and the above mentioned law on division of powers.107
The Ukrainian parliament had also demanded an annulment of the vote within three
days as against the possibility of direct rule from Kyiv; some deputies even proposed
introduction of economic sanctions against the Crimea as a means of bringing it to
heel.108
The Crimean Supreme Council, however, refused to back down; on 20 May 1994 it
adopted an appeal to the Ukrainian president and government to deny media
allegations of separatism and violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, stressing that
“not a single provision of the restored constitution entails violation of the Ukrainian
territorial integrity or revision of the current Ukrainian state border.” It also prepared
an appeal to the UN, the UN Security Council, the CSCE, the president of the Russian
Federation, the Russian Federal Assembly and the people of Ukraine, which says,
“The leadership of Ukraine has taken a series of measures aimed at destroying the
statehood of the Republic of Crimea. It threatens to use force, including military
force.” The Chairman of Crimean Supreme Council Sergey Tsekov, on his part, said
that the new Verkhovna Rada of Crimea had originally intended to take even more
radical decisions, up to declaring the Crimea’s independence. However, deputies
decided not to aggravate the situation and therefore restricted themselves just to
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restoring the constitution of 6 May 1992. “This was done in keeping with the voters’
will. Therefore, the Crimean parliament did not intend to revoke its decision.”109
The situation was somehow defused when both sides decided to set up a working
group that would consider proposals made by negotiating parties as options to find a
compromise in the conflict; it was also agreed not to implement any decree
concerning the issue during the work of the commission.110 However, when the ten-
days-period was over, nothing had changed as the Crimean authorities decided that
there were no grounds for rescinding their decision.111 The Ukrainian authorities also
declined to take any drastic measures. On its session on 1 June 1994, the Ukrainian
Supreme Council had a long-lasting discussion on measures that had to be taken to
regulate the situation in the Crimea. Kravchuk took a soft line in order to avoid an
armed conflict; instead, he proposed setting up a Constitutional Court to deal with the
differences in the Crimean and Ukrainian legislature.112 But, the Ukrainian parliament
passed its resolution, bringing into force its earlier decision concerning the
termination of the law on the restoration of 6 May 1992 constitution, asking the
Committee for Legal Policy and Legal Reform within the period of two weeks to
submit proposals on amendments and supplements to the current legislation to bring
the Crimean legislature in line with the Ukrainian one, and proposing the Ukrainian
President as a guarantor of the Ukrainian Constitution to submit a list and set of
measures, which would be constitutionally and legally based, that might be used to
resolve the conflict.113
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During the second round of the talks between the Crimean and Ukrainian delegation,
the latter succeeded in persuading the former to agree that the Ukrainian Constitution
was to take precedence over Crimean laws. It was also decided that the working group
would be set up to determine the sphere of authority of the governing bodies of
Ukraine and the Crimea. A joint statement, reaffirming that the Crimea was a
constituent part of Ukraine, was issued, but later on it was rejected by the Crimean
parliament.114 Thus, there was persistent turmoil between Kyiv and Simferopol until
the end of the year. Leonid Kuchma, the successor to Kravchuk in his presidential
post did not satisfy the expectation of the Crimean electorate when he came to power
in June 1994 by simply continuing to veto the laws and resolutions of the Crimean
parliament contradicting the Ukrainian legislature. But, the inability or unwillingness
of the central authorities to deal effectively with separatist tendencies in the Crimea;
their attempts to solve the problem without using military force meant that violent
explosion of the crises was avoided and conditions appropriate for finding a
compromise still existed. Permanent at that time negotiations between the two sides
were aimed at the solution of the problem concerning the status of the peninsula and
the sphere of legal influence of the governments of Ukraine and the Crimea assuaged
both sides’ most radical elements, demanding decisive measures to put an end to the
imbroglio.
Meanwhile a kind of pacification reached in Kyiv-Simferopol conflict, it did not
certainly bring to the end the complex situation within the Crimean government and
the Crimea as a whole. Meshkov’s popularity has been rapidly declining because of
his inability either to improve the economic situation or to take drastic measures
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towards complete independence or “re-union with Russia” as he promised. At the
same time, the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of the
Crimean government loosened Meshkov’s grip and contributed considerably to the
crisis within the pro-Russian nationalist movement.
The struggle for power between the executive and legislative branches of the Crimean
government started when the Crimean Supreme Soviet Presidium at its meeting on 29
August 1994 had denied legal status of the Service of Security and Interstate
Relations, set up by the Crimean president in a classified decree of 12 March 1994;
this decision was based on an argument that the service performed functions
contradicting the Crimean Constitution.115 More serious developments had taken
place on 7 September 1994, when the deputies of the Supreme Council passed (64
votes in favour) the law “On Changes and Amendments to the Law “On president of
the Republic of Crimea,” reserving the right for the Crimean MPs to express their no-
confidence in the president. Meshkov, on his part, described the passage of the law as
an anticonstitutional coup attempt and said that the people themselves would give the
verdict and keep either the Crimea’s Supreme Council or him – the Republic of
Crimea president - to lead them.116 On the next day of the session, the Crimean
parliamentarians adopted a law “On the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Crimea,” according to which the new body was to be the highest judicial organ
dealing with the issues of the constitutional law. The president, the Supreme Council,
and the Supreme Court were to nominate to the court one candidate each; this law
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stripped the president of the power to decide on the whole composition of the court
and to appoint the procurator of the autonomy.117
Now discord reigned between the “fellow thinkers, who with one voice promised
[the] Crimeans Russian citizenship and the ruble zone and the manna from heaven
derived from them.” The president’s primary task seemed to be to rid himself of the
parliament; the Supreme Council, on the other hand, was endeavouring to find a
chance to express no confidence in the president. The question of the composition of
the government became the stumbling bloc in relations between the president and the
Supreme Council. The ministerial portfolios for which the Rossiya bloc was hoping
went to Moscow ‘newcomers,’ headed by Yevgeniy Saburov and the winners of the
elections found themselves not in the administration. The president, who was formally
the head of the cabinet, usually found himself in conflict with the ministers, therefore,
practically took no part in the work of the cabinet; he voluntarily limited participation
in the political life of the republic and showed the unmanageability of the process
occurring on the peninsula, as a result, created a momentum for the rise of a coalition
in opposition.118
While by the beginning of summer 1994 Meshkov’s Rossiya bloc still dominated the
parliament with 44 deputies [although 11 of its original supporters already left to form
more radical Respublica (Republic) faction], after the events of September Meshkov
had at his disposal only 14 deputies, who named themselves “Russia-consolidation”
(or Russia-unity): 11 joined the Agrarians and 25 deputies now were under the control
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of the chairman of the Supreme Council Tsekov.119 Another faction that was formed
as a result of the split of the Rossiya bloc was the “Crimea” group led by the local
businessman Alexandr Korotko, who was previously associated with the PERC. This
group represented more moderate politicians, prepared to work together with Kyiv in
finding a compromise; this desire especially became apparent after Kuchma launched
the first serious economic reform.120 The Rossiya bloc’s dominance in the Crimean
politics did not last long, “and factional infighting and the shifting of balance of
power between Kyiv, Moscow, and Aqmesjit (Simferopol’) soon began to break the
political logjam, to the Tatars’ advantage.” Moreover, the failure of the pro-Russian
government to bring any improvements into the economy of the Crimea “allowed
centrist parties more friendly to Tatars to regroup and make a partial comeback.”121
By time, events in the Crimea reached a climax. On 11 September 1994, the people of
the peninsula heard on the radio a speech by Yuriy Meshkov, in which he read out his
decrees disbanding the parliament and local councils, stripping deputies at all levels
of their mandates, drafting a new constitution for the republic and setting up a
constitutional council tasked with drawing up a draft for a new constitution by 9
December of the same year and submitting it to a referendum by 9 April 1995. Sergey
Tsekov, on his part, said that the decisions taken by the Crimean Supreme Council
were absolutely constitutional and would not be rescinded.122 An interesting argument
was put forward by one Russian journalist, who said that the real reason for the
conflict was the government’s policy of “uncontrolled transfer of [the] Crimean riches
                                                          
119 Andrew Wilson, “Presidential and Parliamentary…,” p. 122.
120 Andrew Wilson, “Politics in and around the Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming,” in Edward A.
Allworth (ed) The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland, Duke University Press, Durham and
London, 1998, p. 308.
121 Ibid., p. 307.
122 SWB, 12 September 1994; Facts On File World News Digest, 22 September 1994.
75
into private hands and the accelerated capitalisation of the peninsula according to
Western recipes that had already proved their untenability in Russia.”123  However, it
is difficult to talk about the credibility of such commentaries.
Meanwhile, the conflict between the branches of government was exacerbated,
forcing Kyiv to become involved and Kuchma initiated intensive consultations with
both Meshkov and Tsekov in order to find a compromise. The “zero option” (to
restore the legal status that had existed before September 7) was proposed by
Meshkov, but not accepted by the parliament. Instead, the Supreme Council passed a
vote of no confidence to Saburov’s government and demanded the resignation of
Meshkov within a week.124 On 22 September 1994, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
passed a resolution “On the Political and Legal Situation in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea,” according to which the deadline of 1 November 1994 was set up for the
Crimean parliament to bring the Constitution and laws of the Crimea in line with
those of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada of Crimea instead passed a law (68 votes in
favour) on 29 September “On the Government of the Crimea,” pursuant to which the
chief executive in the republic would be the prime minister and not the president.125
Continuation of the activities of that sort led the Ukrainian Supreme Council to
abolish all laws and legal act that run counter to the Ukrainian law and instructed the
president to abolish all unlawful actions and decrees of the Crimean president.
Already at that time it was anticipated that the central authorities would take more
radical steps concerning the Crimean government, but in the end the situation was
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resolved quite easily as the Rada’s final decision had merely eliminated the
contradictions between the legislature of the Crimea and Ukraine.
Members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine completely lost their patience in the
beginning of 1995, when then the Crimean Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution
announcing that the state property of Ukraine was the property of the Crimea. This
action destroyed a consensus favouring economic reform within the territory of
Ukraine. While it was finally agreed on the prolongation for 1995 of the “Treaty on
Budget Relations between the Governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea”
and it was decided that the Crimea’s tax revenue to Ukraine would be deduced by
100% and additional aid from the central government allocated,126 this resolution of
the Crimean Supreme Council and the way the new conflict was resolved convinced
the Ukrainian leadership to bring the Crimea back to Ukraine’s jurisdiction.
At the 17 March 1995 session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine a whole series of the
Crimean laws, including the Constitution, were abolished, the post of the president
eliminated and the Ukrainian law “On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea,” significantly limiting the sphere of influence of the Crimean authorities, but
not revoking the very existence of the autonomy and confirming the legitimacy of the
Crimean parliament, were adopted.127 The Crimean Supreme Council was asked to
submit a new version of the Crimean Constitution to the Rada for its approval.
The decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to annul the Crimean constitution and
the post of president became a precedent of Kyiv’s most radical stand in dealing with
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the Crimean issue. The indeterminate and vague position of the centre now seemed to
become part of history.128 However, it could be added that, actually, the results of the
17 March session that proved so disastrous for the Crimean leadership were pushed
by these leaders themselves. The policies of Meshkov, usually aimed at irritating
Kyiv, did not succeed in implementing the promises that he was reiterating during his
pre-election campaign. Moreover, neither he nor the pro-Russian government led by
Saburov had improved the economy of the republic and the standards of living of the
Crimean population. Therefore, it was pointless to expect rioting in the Crimea. As it
turned out, the people of the Crimea, actually, cared little about what happened to the
local leadership and it was clear that people were no longer convinced that their
problems, especially economic ones, would be solved by merely joining Russia.129
In principle, these developments were favourable for Kyiv, but they had less positive
effect for the allies of the centre – the Crimean Tatars, though this serious blow the
secessionist forces of the peninsula felt with the latest decisions of the Ukrainian
authorities, from the first sight could also be perceived as very beneficent for the
natives of the Crimea. On the one hand, these developments, before and after the
Kuchma decrees of 17 March, led to the formation of a coalition around the Qurultay
faction, which by early April could count on 35 and by late April on 43 deputies, what
in turn meant that the Crimean “Tatars could build pragmatic alliances with centrist
Crimean politicians, to the extent of assembling a fragile governing majority, albeit
one that probably lacked long-term coherence.” Second, the crisis and the change of
government gave the Qurultay faction real influence in the governing of the
peninsula. Third, it was once again demonstrated that the Crimean Tatars could work
                                                          
128 The Crimea: Chronicle os Separatism…, p. 118.
129 Pikhovshek, p. 51.
78
productively with Kyiv and, “by helping oust Kyiv’s opponents from power,
demonstrated to the Ukrayinan [Ukrainian] authorities the political benefits working
with the Qurultay/Mejlis” [Qurultay/Meclis].130 However, “despite the fact that a
growing proportion of [the] Crimean Tatar returnees added a new element to the
Ukrainian-Russian struggle over [the] Crimea by actually supporting Ukrainian state
integrity, and thereby becoming a factor that all the conflicting sides, as well as
international bodies and organisations, were compelled to reckon with,” the most
significant achievement of the Crimean Tatars – namely, their guaranteed
representation in the local legislative organs – unfortunately was eliminated together
with other Crimean laws that were not to be found in the Ukrainian legislature.131
                                                          
130 Andrew Wilson, “Politics in and around the Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming,” p. 309.
131 Belitser, p. 4.
79
CHAPTER III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN THE CRIMEA IN THE
CONTEXT OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS: 1995-2000
3.1. New Status of the Crimea
The adoption of the law of 17 March 1995 “On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”
by the Ukrainian authorities radically changed the status of the peninsula, but the new
definition was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the peninsula retained the
name of the autonomous republic, however, Article 1 of this law referred to it not as a
“political” but as “an administrative and territorial autonomy within Ukraine.”1
Theoretically, an entity holding the name of ‘republic’ cannot be considered as a
territorial-administrative unit. The same definition regarding the status of Crimea was
used in the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine, Article 75 of which mentioned about the
special status of Crimea within Ukraine, but the usage of the term ‘unit’ practically
meant a denial of the status of ‘republic.’
One of the Russian writers, the lawyer A. V. Fedorov, in his Legal Status of the
Crimea, Legal Status of Sevastopol, commenting on the situation that resulted from
the legal acts and resolutions passed by the Ukrainian government, said that the status
of Crimea was reduced to the level not even of oblast but of “colony.” He argues then
that by abolishing the Crimean constitution, provided by its Article 126 the post of
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presidency, and the law “On Division of Powers between the State Bodies of Ukraine
and Crimea,” all of which used to define the rights of the republic and was stating that
the parameters of these powers could not be changed without mutual agreement, the
Ukrainian authorities decided on the matters that were not within their jurisdiction.
Particularly, Fedorov emphasised that the elimination of the laws “On President of the
Republic of Crimea” and “On Elections of President of the Republic of Crimea,”
which gave the right to the Crimeans to define the structures of their government,
were illegal, especially keeping in mind the fact that the very first official meeting of
the Crimean president was with his Ukrainian counterpart, which in itself legitimised
this post.2 However, this opinion fails to recognise the fact that there cannot be two
presidents in the same country, a point of view that was many times reiterated by the
Crimean Tatar Meclis leaders before and after the elections of the Crimean president.3
Similar counterargument might be put forward concerning the elimination of the
constitution, as there can be no two constitutions on the territory of the same state
[which is not federal], especially if they run counter to each other. In fact, such radical
decisions were in consequence of the Crimean authorities’ failure in implementing or,
more exactly, ignorance of the directions of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada to bring
the Crimean constitution and laws in line with those of Ukraine. Therefore, the
decisions of the centre seemed to be fully substantiated. It was also true that it was the
Ukrainian Rada that agreed on the law of the division of powers, which had to be the
next step for the separatist-minded politicians in their drive towards the Crimean
independence, but it certainly understood the importance of the matter and would
never repeat the same mistake. Now, when this law was cancelled, “the Crimean
leaders lost their legal basis for their claims of independence and found themselves in
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the same state in which they were at the very beginning of their struggle for
autonomy.”4
The Ukrainian parliament, meanwhile, was proposed to implement even more radical
steps. Yuriy Karmazin’s Commission, the one which was assigned to prepare the bills
abolishing the Crimean presidency, put on the agenda of the Rada’s session two
resolutions aiming at the abrogation of the Crimean Rada’s resolution, according to
which the “conscripts drafted within the autonomous territory were to serve only in
the Crimea,” and the termination of the laws “On Elections to the Verkhovna Rada of
Crimea” and “On the Government of Crimea.” It was also proposed that the Ukrainian
president should define the new powers of the Crimean government and to
subordinate it to the “bodies of state executive authority of Ukraine and for the
Verkhovna Rada of Crimea to submit a new version of its constitution before May 15,
1995. But, neither the long lasted debates nor four votes on them could help pass the
resolutions in full. Only the suggestion concerning the Crimean constitution was
accepted, while other proposals were stalled.5 This again showed the indecisiveness of
the central authority. Most probably, the Ukrainian government was afraid that
subordination of the Crimean power structures to the executive branch of Ukraine
would decide its own fate. Under the then effective Constitution, the government of
Ukraine, headed by the president, was still accountable to the Verkhovna Rada.
However, in the power bill, which for a long time had been a subject for debates,
Kuchma proposed and insisted on being delegated the right to form the government
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single-handedly. This probably was the crucial factor in deciding the fate of the
Crimean government.6
It was clear, however, that the Crimean authorities would not leave everything as it
was and would continue their struggle against the centre. While the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine was waiting for reinforcement from the president, the rebellious peninsula,
seeing Kyiv’s indecisiveness, was planning to launch a counteroffensive. Already on
18 March 1995, the MPs of the Crimean parliament (the Qurultay faction ignored the
vote) issued a statement saying that they would “never accept the loss of their
constitution” and threatened to denounce the moratorium on holding a referendum on
the status of the Crimea.7 At that time, local media informed about the formation of a
new coalition in the Crimean parliament, campaigning for the Crimea’s independence.
A serious attack by this coalition was launched on the government of Anatoliy
Franchuk, whose policy was called “anti-state” [anti-Crimean]. An important role in
Franchuk’s premiership in the Crimea might have been played by the fact that
Franchuk’s son was a son-in-law of the Ukrainian President Kuchma. On the same
session, a vote of no-confidence was passed for Premier Anatoliy Franchuk, while he
was hospitalised because of pneumonia, and the Vice-Premier, Andriy Savchenko,
who delivered the Cabinet’s report on behalf of the former. The Qurultay faction,
prior to the ballot, declared that it would vote against Franchuk’s dismissal and stated
that these issues were “inspired by certain political forces within the Crimean
Parliament,” which were “interested in destabilising the situation on the peninsula”
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and “resolved to build their own political image on the Crimean ruins.”8 After a brief
intermission, another Vice- Premier, Arkadiy Demidenko, declared about the
Cabinet’s full resignation; March 23rd session appointed on the post of Premier A.
Drobotov, but the very next day it was decided to reject the resignation of the old
cabinet. These events once again proved the weakness of the central authorities and
the fact that the Crimean separatist-minded politicians were not going to surrender;
the inability of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to adopt the resolutions proposed by
the Karmazin Commission made possible for the Crimean parliament to retire not
fitting their interests government.9
3.2. Elections to the Local Soviet Councils of People’s Deputies
Despite the fact that quota system of 1994 parliamentary elections turned to be a
successful instrument in bringing the Crimean Tatars into the political life of the
peninsula, the fragility of these arrangements became apparent when the time came
for the elections to the local Soviet Councils of People’s Deputies of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, which were scheduled on 26 April 1995. By its decree, dated 24
March 1995, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine delayed the holding of the elections
until 25 June 1995 as the decrees of 17 March 1995 abolished the law on the elections
to the local councils of Crimea and time was needed to bring into line the
corresponding Ukrainian law that would provide the quotas for the Crimean Tatars
and other deported peoples. However, when the new law “On Participation of the
Citizens, Deported from the Crimea” was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
the Crimean Tatar leaders announced that their people would not participate in the
                                                          
8 The Crimea: Chronicle of Separatism…, p. 120.
9 Ibid., p. 119.
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forthcoming election as this law in practical terms was actually depriving the Crimean
Tatars of the possibility of taking part in the elections.10 The decision was based on
the fact that approximately 64,000 of the Crimean Tatar returnees still did not have
Ukrainian citizenship. The mechanism of formation of additional constituencies for
the deported peoples foresaw the establishment of such constituencies if the electors
of any administrative-territorial unit expressed wish through submitting their
applications indicating all personal data and deportation details and only if then the
number of applications would be equal to the average number of the electors in basic
constituencies. These applications were to be submitted to the electoral commission in
at least two copies (approximately 300,000) as each elector would take part in
elections of the two levels of power and it had to be done until April 21, 1995, a
deadline which practically was very difficult to meet as there were only two weeks for
this work to be accomplished.11 Therefore, the arguments behind the decision of the
Crimean Tatar Meclis about the impossibility of the enactment of this law seemed to
be relevant.
As a result of the Meclis’ instructions to its population and probably general
disillusionment with the state of politics in the Crimea, turnout was very low – 53%.12
As regards the results of the vote, 290 Communists, 37 members of the PERC, 5
Republicans (the RepPC), and 7 candidates from other parties, including the
Ukrainian Republican Party, were elected to the Crimean local authority structures;
there were two Communists among the newly elected district council chairmen and
town council chairmen included one member of the USRC, two the CPC members
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and one from the PERC. The Communists took charge of 13 village councils.13
However, it was stated that only 36% of mayors and 30% of deputies have been
elected to town councils and that repeat ballots would take place in a week and by-
elections - in late August.14 Thus, the fact that the local councils – the main bodies in
charge of implementation of practical measures to the problems such as provision of
electricity or water to the Crimean Tatar new settlements - were to be occupied by the
Communists meant that the authorities would be no better disposed towards the
Crimean Tatars than before.15
These elections were another illustration of the fact that the post-totalitarian society
on the peninsula in many features remained the old communist system, only
superficially touched by the process of political, social, and spiritual modernisation
that started after the demise of the old empire. Thus, it was very difficult to talk about
the end of the communist era and the establishment of a new democratic state. It was
true that a similar situation existed in most of the parts of the ex-Soviet Union
however, the above-mentioned characteristics are more clearly articulated in the
Crimea.16
Most probably, influenced by the results of the local elections in which pro-Moscow
candidates lost heavily, on 4 July 1995 the Crimean Supreme Soviet took a decision
(54 to 35 with 2 abstentions) to oust its Chairman Sergey Tsekov, who led the
region’s failed attempts to distance the Crimea from Ukraine and establish close ties
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with Russia.17 While one of the deputies, commenting on the dismissal, said that the
reason behind this decision was Tsekov’s orthodoxy and inflexibility in regard to
Ukraine and failure to “built good relations with Kyiv and find a resolution for the
confrontation,” other deputies stressed that this was an “obvious defeat for pro-
Russian forces” as Tsekov was replaced by the centrist, Yevhen Supruniuk, a member
of the Crimean Agrarian faction.18 The Chairman of the Meclis, Mustafa Cemiloğlu,
on the other hand, predicted that a new speaker would “not herald fundamental
changes to the autonomous republic’s parliamentary policies.” Tsekov confirmed this
prediction by saying that he had no intention of leaving the political scene and, on the
contrary, announced his plan to form a group that would be in “constructive
opposition” to the parliament. The formation of such faction, the Republican Party of
Crimea, led by Sergey Tsekov, was realised already on 2 August 1995.19
 The dismissal of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet was followed by the full
resignation of its presidium. Thus, on 13 July 1995, the Crimean parliament elected a
new presidium, the new Deputy Speakers of which became Refat Çubar (the Crimean
Tatar from the Qurultay), Anushevan Danelyan (Armenian from the Reform faction),
Yuriy Podkopayev (Russian from the Rossiya).20 So, a reshuffle of the powerful
presidium of the Crimean Supreme Council had a positive effect on the Crimean Tatar
position within the Crimean government and granted the Qurultay faction two seats:
together with Çubar’s position, the post of the Committee for Nationalities Policy and
the Affairs of the Deported Nations as well.
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One of the first appeals of the new presidium was addressed to Leonid Kuchma on 26
July 1995 to change his decree of 31 March 1995, taking away the power of the
Crimean parliament to form the new government that in practice, impeded interaction
between the legislative and executive branches of power what, in turn, had a
“negative effect on efforts to tackle the peninsula’s social and economic problems.”21
As an answer to this appeal, the Ukrainian president on 9 August 1995 issued his
decree [which was ratified on 21 August 1995], Article 1 of which ruled that “pending
the adoption of a new Ukrainian constitution, the prime minister of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea would be appointed and dismissed by the Supreme Council of
Crimea as agreed with the president of Ukraine.” Regarding the members of the
Crimean government, they were to be chosen by the Crimean prime minister in
agreement with the Supreme Council.22 As a payback for the concession, the Edict
additionally stipulated that the state administration was to replace the executive
committees in all the regions of Crimea and be subordinated to the Crimean
government, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine and
their activities be guided by the Supreme Councils of Ukraine and Crimea.23  Most
probably, Kuchma’s decision was based not merely on his conviction that an appeal
of the Crimean presidium was a true manifestation of the desire for fundamental
change of the political and economic life of the Crimea, but on the revocation of the
vote of no-confidence in the pro-Kyiv Prime Minister of Crimea, Anatoliy
Franchuk.24 However, after the Crimean parliament got some concessions from the
Ukrainian president by using the annulment of the vote, in December of the same year
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it put the issue again on the agenda and then approved (73 votes to 8) a no-confidence
vote in Anatoliy Franchuk.25 Although it was claimed that the resolution “On No-
confidence in the Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea” was adopted in violation
of the constitutional law of the Crimea “On the Government,” according to which a
vote of no-confidence would not be extended to the prime minister, and not in line
with the presidential decree “On the Bodies of State and Executive Power of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” arranging that such decisions might be taken only
in agreement with the president of Ukraine, this time the resolution was not reassessed
and even Kuchma could not back Franchuk as he did in the earlier attempt of the
Supreme Council to unseat the letter.26 Thus, a new acting Prime Minister (deputy
prime minister) of Crimea on 27 January 1996 was appointed Arkadiy Demidenko,
who previously was in charge of industry.27 His official installation to the post of the
Prime Minister of the Crimea was approved by the Ukrainian president a month
later.28
3.3. Towards New Constitution
Meanwhile, the Crimean parliament was working hard in its preparation of the new
Crimean constitution. Thus, the version adopted by the Crimean Supreme Council on
21 September 1995 interpreted the Republic of Crimea as an integral autonomous part
of Ukraine, which was to settle the matters within its remit independently as
determined by this constitution and the constitutional law of Ukraine. The relations
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between the Crimea and Ukraine were to be predicated on legislative acts and accords
on the basis of mutual agreement. Additionally, the Crimea could establish relations
with other national and international organisations in the economic, environmental,
and socio-cultural sphere independently.29 However, this version did not envisage the
re-establishment of the rights of indigenous peoples. The only concession made was
the recognition of the co-existence on the territory of the Crimea of three languages
Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar, while the official language of communication
was said to be Russian.30 The same provisions were adjourned into the next draft of 1
November 1995.31
The presented drafts of the constitution certainly could not be accepted by the
Crimean Tatars, and ten of the deputies of the Qurultay faction in the Crimean
parliament, declared an indefinite hunger strike. In its statement, the Qurultay
deputies, arguing that the newly prepared constitution did “not reflect the legitimate
interests of the Crimean Tatar people,” demanded the re-consideration of the draft in a
way that the representation of the Crimean Tatars in the Supreme Council and local
government bodies would be guaranteed and equal status to all state languages in the
Crimea granted.32 As a response to the hunger strike, the Crimean Supreme Council
amended Article 107 of the constitution, in accordance with which the parliamentary
elections now were to be held in a mixed system (deputies would be chosen in a
Crimea-wide multi-seat electoral constituency in proportion to the number of the
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votes cast for candidates, nominated by electoral associations).33 But, unfortunately,
this provision did not correspond to the clause regarding the elections in the final
version of the constitution. The Crimean Tatar Meclis was deeply disappointed with
the position of the Ukrainian government because of its disinterest on this issue.
“Protection of our legitimate rights is a matter of stability in the Crimea and that of
maximum interest for Ukraine. So far, Kiev has made no decisive steps in that
direction,” the leader of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Kırımoğlu said on the press
conference concerning the latest developments in the Crimea.34
The demands of the Crimean Tatars immediately received support of the democratic
forces of the Crimea and Ukraine. Thus, the Crimean Democratic Forum for the
Promotion of the Constitutional Process in Ukraine in its message to the Ukrainian
president and prime minister condemned “the Ukrainian parliament’s open disregard
for issues vitally important to the whole Crimean Tatar people” and pointed to a
drastic reduction in funds allocated by the central government to the re-settlement of
the returnees.35 The State Independence of Ukraine (SIU) organisation, for its part,
declared that it intended to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatars in the
government structures of Ukraine by drawing the attention of relevant departments to
the problems of the deported peoples of the Crimea.36 On the other hand, the pro-
Russian and Communist organisations of Crimea, fearing that permanently continuing
at that time rallies and pickets of the Crimean Tatars would help them to attain their
objectives, issued statements aiming to counterweight the pressure put by the Meclis
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and other democratic forces on the Crimean and Ukrainian authorities. “Deputies
from the Qurultay are currently demanding that their national privileges be protected
by the constitution in perpetuity, which would enable the Crimean Tatar minority to
become a privileged ethnic group in [the] Crimea, permitting them to transform the
republic into a Crimean Tatar state at some point in the future,” reads, for instance, a
statement of the RepPC faction of the Crimean parliament.37
Unfortunately, the Ukrainian officials opposed the implementation of any laws or
decrees establishing special rights for the Crimean Tatars, as they simply did not want
singling them out among the other returnees, and “intended to solve the whole
complex of repatriation problems on the basis of the criterion that they all belonged to
the category of formerly deported peoples rather than to a specific ethnic group” as, in
their opinion, adoption of such a course might “create an undesirable precedent in the
aspect of development of the constitutional system in Ukraine.”38 Certainly, the real
reason behind this was a fear of the central government that any policy favouring the
Crimean Tatars would enrage the Russian element of the Crimean society and
exacerbate the situation even further. Thus, the Crimean Tatars, numerically far
bigger and consciously more coherent as a nation than other ethnicities (namely,
Bulgars, Greeks, Germans, or Armenians), were equated with all other minorities –
the status that they had been possessing since 25 July 1992 when the Ukrainian law
on national minorities was adopted.39 So, all the proposals, claims, statements, and
resolutions of the Meclis/Qurultay were either rejected or neglected.
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3.4. The OSCE and the Crimean Question
The OSCE first became an active participant in the situation in the Crimea in the
autumn of 1993, when the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)
established contacts with the Ukrainian government subsequent to a letter, dated 15
July 1993, from then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anatoliy Zlenko, to all CSCE
states concerning the situation in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over
Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. Soon, the HCNM undertook several visits to the
different parts of Ukraine, meeting with the leading representatives of the national
minorities and NGOs, the parliaments and governments of Crimea and Ukraine. In its
first decision of 26 May 1994 concerning the situation in Ukraine, the OSCE
Permanent Committee (later the Permanent Council) “expressed great concern at the
recent developments in the Republic of Crimea within Ukraine,” describing them as
“a potential threat to the OSCE principles” that should “guide the search for a
negotiated and legitimate solution of the present problems relating to the Crimean
Republic’s autonomy within Ukraine.”40 At its 27th meeting, the Committee of Senior
Officials (CSO – now Senior Council) expressed its deep concern over the situation in
the Crimea and reaffirmed “its commitment to support the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine, in accordance with the OSCE
principles.”41 At the same meeting, it was decided to appoint a team of experts on
constitutional and economic matters to be sent to Ukraine and to establish a CSCE
Mission in Ukraine to support the work of experts and to report on the situation in
Ukraine; the mandate of the mission was approved on 25 August 1994.
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Despite the intense involvement and attempts to solve the problems of minority
language issues and the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars, or to facilitate Kyiv-
Simferopol dialogue on constitutional matters, little progress was achieved in concrete
terms. Sometimes, in fact, the actions of some of the members of the mission even led
to the worsening of the situation as, for instance, did a speech of the Swiss diplomat
Andreas Kohlschutter, then the head of the OSCE mission to Ukraine, who in the
conflict between the Ukrainian and Crimean sides provided his full support for the
letter and charged the “powerful radical forces in the Ukrainian parliament” with
vicious intentions to “punish and discipline the Crimea, and to destroy the Crimean
autonomy.” This speech evoked much protest within Ukraine and met sharp negative
reaction from many prominent international experts.42
More positive results had brought the round-table discussion of the Crimean and
Ukrainian delegations on 11-13 May 1995, held in Locarno, Switzerland that was
organised by the OSCE.43 The meeting came amid rising tensions as the Crimean
parliament announced on 25 April 1995 its intention to hold a referendum asking the
Crimean population whether they were in favour of the reinstatement of the May 1992
Constitution and to hold a “consultative referendum” on 25 June 1995 with a
question: “Do you support the creation of an economic and political union of three
states – Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine?44 The Locarno Round-Table helped
participants to come to the general agreement that the impasse could be overcome by
readoption of the law “On Division of Powers between the State Bodies of Ukraine
and Crimea” or of the 25 September 1992 version of the Crimean constitution, with
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the law’s provisions added to it.45 Both options for compromise were proposed by the
Crimean delegation, which thought that the OSCE experts could chose one of them
and then come up with their own recommendation. The HCNM considered the first
proposal to be more appropriate, but in order to make the parties move to the
substantive matters of division of powers it endeavoured to convince the Crimean side
that it would not proceed with a referendum on its constitution while the Ukrainian
government would not move to dissolve the Crimean parliament.46 Although, the
referendum was not held, some Crimean politicians still used every opportunity
[especially when they thought Ukraine, by not approving some of the clauses of the
Crimean constitution, was crushing their autonomy] to remind the central authorities
about the ‘referendum weapon.’
The HCNM also organised a Round-Table in Yalta on 20-22 September 1995 on
“Reintegration of Deported Peoples in the Crimea.”47 Addressing this issue suited the
interests of many parties, particularly, by drawing the attention of the international
community to the need for significant financial support in order to ease the burden of
Ukraine concerning the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars. The Yalta Round-Table
afforded the HCNM to raise with various parties issues such as the acquisition of
citizenship and effective political participation in Kyiv and Simferopol of the Crimean
Tatars.48 Thus, Max van der Stoel, the head of the HCNM mission in Ukraine, in his
letter to the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Hennadiy Udovenko, in November 1995
recommended keeping electoral quotas for the deported people in the Crimean
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parliament and stressed the need to simplify the Ukrainian naturalisation procedure
for the returnees.49
Similar recommendations concerning the Meclis’ participation in the nomination of
candidates for elected bodies and a proportional representation of the Crimean Tatars
in the parliament of the ARC (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were also made in
subsequent letters dated 19 March and 5 April 1996.50 These letters also suggested
that the government of Ukraine approve the constitution of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea without delay, save for those provisions that were still contested and that
the remaining constitutional differences would be resolved within a month
thereafter.51 As far as the provisions that were in dispute were concerned, Max van
der Stoel said that there was no need to stipulate a Crimean citizenship in addition to
the Ukrainian one as it was foreseen by the draft constitution of 21 September 1995.
He also called for keeping the Crimean right to sign agreements that guaranteed the
use of a just share of proceeds from Ukrainian property and the Crimean natural
resources for the benefit of the Crimea.52 Essentially, the High Commissioner
recommended that the “fundamental matters of State (such as defense, security, and
control over the continental shelf) should remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the authorities in Kiev, while a wide variety of other matters could fall within the
jurisdiction of the authorities in Simferopol.”53 The reaction of the Ukrainian
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government to these recommendations was very positive and, in fact, on 4 April 1996,
the Ukrainian parliament adopted (230 against 7) the law “On the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea,” approving the vast majority of the articles of the Crimean
Constitution and leaving aside about 20 provisions from a total 136 articles.54 Thus,
the diplomatic activities of the OSCE and the skilful and timely interventions,
combined with the personal attention devoted by the head of the HCNM have
contributed significantly to the development of dialogue between two parties and to
consideration of possible solutions, especially regarding matters related to the
resettlement and repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. In the following years, Max van
der Stoel continued to devote his attention to the “Crimean question.” During his
visits to the country he pursued the role of a mediator in the contest between
Simferopol and Kyiv on issues such as constitution, law on the elections to the
Crimean parliament, and the problems of national minorities.55
3.5. The Ukrainian Constitution and the Status of the Crimea
As a result of the constitutional process in Ukraine and the intense debates that were
going on regarding the adoption of a new Ukrainian constitution, the majority of the
Crimean political parties and movements (excluding, of course, the Crimean Tatar
ones) had issued an appeal which stated that
 "[T]he Autonomous Republic of Crimea was restored on the strength of the Crimean
people's will and the results of the all-Crimea referendum of 20th January 1991. The
desire to deprive [the] Crimea of the constitution means that a national-unitarian state
is being built in Ukraine, where national minorities are stripped of their human and
civil rights… The inconsistency and unreliability of the Ukrainian president, Leonid
Kuchma, as regards his promises concerning federalism, bilingualism and greater
economic rights for [the] Crimea, which he gave to the people of Crimea during the
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presidential election, evoke surprise and do not contribute to the consolidation of
society. …No-one can deprive us of the right to be part of the multi-ethnic people of
Ukraine rather than a narrow ethnic subject called the ‘Ukrainian people,’ or of the
right to use Russian as the second official language, to have our own constitution, our
own legislative body - the Supreme Council of Crimea - to use the natural resources
of Crimea independently and to have our own state symbols and territorial integrity,
with Sevastopol being part of [the] Crimea.” 56
The authors of the appeal demanded that the above rights of Crimean people be fixed
in the Ukrainian constitution and if they were to be ignored, the authors of the
document did “reserve the right to block the adoption of the antipopular constitution
of Crimea-Ukraine by all legal means and acts of civil disobedience. We draw the
attention of the world public to the violation of ethnic, economic, political and
territorial rights of Crimean people,” says the document.57
This statement was another indication of the state of consternation among the
Russian-speaking Crimean parliamentarians and fears that the new constitution of
Ukraine would considerably limit their powers. And when the Ukrainian Constitution
was adopted on 28 June 1996,58 their worries were partly justified, though the
Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Oleksandr Moroz, pointed that the new
constitution granted the Crimea a much wider range of powers than any previous
legislation.59
The final text of the new constitution included a part – Chapter X – on the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which, under the document, was an “inseparable
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and integral part of Ukraine” and examined “issues within the limits of the powers
ceded to it by the Constitution of Ukraine” (Article 134). The Supreme Council of
Crimea possessed the right to adopt its own constitution, subject to approval by “not
less than one-half of the constitutional composition of the Ukrainian parliament”
(Article 135). This constitution granted the Ukrainian legislative body wide power
over its Crimean counterpart. Thus, the Supreme Council of Ukraine had the right of
“terminating the powers of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea prior to the expiration of its term if the Constitutional Court of Ukraine hands
down a decision that it has violated the Constitution of Ukraine or the laws of Ukraine
and calling special elections” to it (Paragraph 28, Article 85). The president of
Ukraine, on his part, has the right to revoke the acts of the Council of Ministers of the
ARC (Paragraph 16, Article 106). Article 136 stipulates that the chairman of the
Supreme Council of Crimea shall be appointed and dismissed “with the approval of
the president of Ukraine,” which simply confers a veto power over the head of the
government of the ARC. It may also be noted that the Constitution of Ukraine does
not grant the ARC power to make its own ‘laws’ but rather to adopt ‘normative acts.’
The lack of expressed law-making power led many observers to be critical of the
Ukrainian Constitution’s treatment of the Crimean autonomy.60 If that is not
constraining enough, the constitution said that “should the normative-legal acts of the
Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea contravene the Constitution
of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine, the president of Ukraine might suspend such
normative-legal acts.., simultaneously submitting them to the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine for a decision on their constitutionality” (part 2, Article 137).61
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It was clear that the constitutionally entrenched power that devolves to the Crimea by
the new constitution was limited. However, in accordance with Article 155, Chapter
X and other parts of the constitution dealing with the ARC may not be changed except
by the process of Constitutional amendment required a qualified majority of two-
thirds of the full membership of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Therefore, it was
clear that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea would exist on the territory of
Ukraine, but as substantial as the autonomy might in fact be in practice, it was to
remain under close scrutiny from Kyiv.62
The adoption of the new constitution brought some positive effects for the Crimean
Tatars’ drive to get an official status as indigenous people [rather than as one of the
national minorities of Ukraine or the Crimea]. The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution was
the first document where the legal term “indigenous peoples” has been used. Thus,
Article 11 stipulates, “the state shall promote the consolidation and development…of
the unique ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious attributes of all the indigenous
peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.” According to Article 92 (Paragraph 3)
“the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities” must be established
exclusively by the laws of Ukraine, whereas Article 119 (Paragraph 3) reads that local
state administrations with jurisdiction over a relevant territory shall ensure “execution
of state and regional programmes for socioeconomic and cultural development,
environmental protection programmes in areas of compact settlement by indigenous
peoples and national minorities, also the programmes for the national-cultural
development of these people and minorities.” Unfortunately, the whole Chapter X
bears no mention of indigenous peoples or any kind of specific provision ensuring
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their rights with the only exception of Article 138 (Paragraph 9) saying that one of the
prerogatives of the ARC is “participating in preparing and implementing state
programmes on the repatriation of deported peoples.”63
Following the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Ukrainian Ministry of
Justice and the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities
and Inter-ethnic Relations formed together with the Meclis’ “Law and Politics”
department a joint working group, which was going to prepare a draft legislation
regarding the indigenous people of Ukraine.64 In 1996-1997, a draft “Concept of
National Policy of Ukraine Relating to Indigenous Peoples” as well as draft law “On
the Status of the Crimean Tatar People” were developed and subjected to international
review, then receiving positive responses. But, neither draft was accepted by the
Ukrainian legislative body for further consideration, and high expectations raised by
the developments seem to be gradually fading away.
3.6. The Third Qurultay
At a time when the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Ukrainian constitution, the Crimean
Tatars convened the Third Qurultay (26-29 June 1996), the main task of which was to
set out guidelines for the activities of its representative body – the Meclis - in the next
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five years.65 New delegates for this convocation were elected; now 80 out of 157
represented the OCNM.66
Kırımoğlu’s keynote speech was a reflection of a more radical mood that now was
prevalent among the delegates. It attacked the “chauvinist and … semifascist
parliament” of the Crimea and, emphasising Kyiv’s failure to re-impose the quota
system and saying that it was “sanctioning … discrimination against our people and
the denial of their legal rights,” condemned the Ukraine’s indifference to the plight of
the Crimean Tatars.67 The chairman of the assembly said that
It is sad that in our struggle with chauvinism and sometimes with outright Russian
fascism in [the] Crimea, we have not received the necessary support from Ukrayina,
although [the] Crimean Tatars and their representative body – the Mejlis – have
always been the main and the most consistent supporters of the integrity and
independence of Ukrayina. [It seems that] there are sufficient forces [in Kyiv], above
all, those of a Communist and pro-Soviet orientation, to consciously torpedo the
restoration of our rights.68
Mustafa Kırımoğlu has also stressed that if the Meclis was not recognised in the future
… and if several of Ukraine’s laws protecting rights of Crimean Tatars are not
adopted, then “one can predict, with regret, that the political barometer in [the]
Crimea will rise in an undesirable direction in the future.”69 The deputies, on their
part, manifested their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs concerning the Crimean
Tatars by the preparation of a document, entitled “On the Struggle with the Colonial
Regime,” calling for “the complete liquidation of the Russian colonial regime in [the]
Crimea, the re-establishment of the national territory on the territory of the peninsula,
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and the withdrawal of all the Crimean Tatar deputies from the representative bodies of
the republic within two weeks unless they were guaranteed 33% representation at all
levels. The document called on the Meclis to “make the necessary preparations for a
mass, ongoing campaign of civil disobedience,” and declared that as “the possibilities
for searching for agreement through parliamentary political activity are exhausted, the
time has come to talk to political barbarians in a language they will understand.”70
 Instead, the deputies adopted an appeal to the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe
and other international organisations asking them to use every means envisaged by
international law in order to help Ukraine effectively restore the political, civil,
economic, social and cultural rights of the Crimean Tatars.71 Although, the document
used similar language, attacking the Ukrainian state for “encouraging a system of
apartheid” in relation to the Crimean Tatars and behaving “no differently from the
previous [Soviet] regime,”72 the general attitude towards Ukraine was still positive as,
for instance, the Meclis was ordered by the delegates to “resist vigorously any
separatist attempts aimed at [the] Crimea’s secession from Ukraine.”73
Thus, the Third Crimean Tatar Qurultay certainly raised even more questions than it
resolved old ones. Many observers, noting the then more articulated radical views
revealed by the assembly members, began to express their worries in regard to the
possible changes in the course of the Meclis’ activities. However, re-election of its
leaders, Kırımoğlu and Çubar, confirmed the continuation of the application of the
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basic principles of nonviolence and constitutional protest that had been used by the
Meclis in its work since its establishment.74
3.7. Renewed Attempts to Secede?
During 1997 some positive changes, particularly in the field of economy, occurred in
Ukraine, but the socioeconomic situation in the Crimea could only be described as
catastrophic and the authorities of the autonomous republic continued to demonstrate
their inability to solve any problems, preferring involvement in politicking and
struggle for power. In the beginning of the year, one of the most important events was
adoption of a resolution on the re-organisation of the Cabinet of Ministers of the
ARC, which was initiated as a result of its unsatisfactory work. In every sphere of
industry the situation was critical and plans were not completed; mass violations,
confirmed by documents, of the expenditures of the budget were revealed. Thus, the
resignation of Arkadiy Demidenko, the head of the government, and his Cabinet was
demanded.75 In February, when the Sixth Session of the parliament had to take place,
“Anti-corruption Deputy Faction,” headed by Sergey Tsekov, in an attempt to get
some ministerial seats, for a long time paralysed the work of the council;76 and in
March of 1997, the Crimean parliament stripped seven deputies, who belonged to the
opposition, of their mandates. This created an adequate legal basis for the dissolution
of the Crimean parliament as the central authorities argued that the act was
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“unconstitutional and undemocratic.”77 On his part, Kuchma signed a decree vetoing
two Crimean Supreme Council legal acts of 12th and 13th March – “On the Emergency
Procedure for Organising the Work of the Crimean Supreme Council,” according to
which resolutions adopted by a majority of deputies present at a session would
acquire the status of the Crimean Supreme Council resolutions, and “On the Measures
to Overcome the Crisis in the Crimean Supreme Soviet,” suspending the powers of
these seven deputies before the end of their term, respectively.78 Both resolutions
were manifestations of the attempts that seem to have become everlasting - to gain
greater autonomy from the centre.
However, being faced with the threat to be dissolved as a whole, the ruling bloc
“Respublika Krym” and “Anti-corruption opposition” of the Crimean parliament were
reconciled and undertook a joint attempt to replace then present government, and only
on 4 June was Demidenko replaced with Franchuk.79 The Crimean Tatar Qurultay
faction, which was now the only opposition left in the parliament,80 in its statement,
dated 21 May 1997, said that the majority of the deputies forced to resign
“the head of Cabinet, known to be neutral in the relations between the parliamentary
factions, and supporting the constitutional order and the President of Ukraine, and
elected the candidate, who already once had occupied this post and was replaced for
incompetence, bad governing, a number of very serious failures in the socio-economic
sphere that happened little more than a year ago. This candidate paved the way to the
heart of the majority not with his professional competence, but generous promises of
distributing offices and his well-expressed anti-Crimean Tatar position.
Characteristically for the Crimean parliament, the decision was taken with violation of
determined by the law order, as the President of Ukraine was faced with an already
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accomplished action; on the other hand, the government, formed on the bases of all-
parliamentary coalition, was brought to the edge of collapse.”81
Interestingly enough, it was the same parliament which in 1995 held a vote of no
confidence in Franchuk and it was not simply because of his incompetence, but also
because of allegations against his using the post in private interests when dealing with
such issues as privatisation and budget expenditures. Now, Franchuk was re-elected
with an absolute majority of votes (77 out of 89).82
The following initiative of the Crimean parliament that certainly did not facilitate the
stabilisation of the relations between Simferopol and Kyiv was the adoption of a
resolution proclaiming Russian the official language of business communication on
the territory of the peninsula and passing of the law “On Timekeeping in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” according to which the peninsula should switch to
Moscow time.83 The subject of the first resolution referred to one of only two articles
of the new draft of the Crimean constitution that had remained outside of any
agreement and maybe because of that the reaction Ukrainian authorities was not so
abrupt.84 However, the second decision was overruled before its implementation by
the president’s decree.85
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In the beginning of 1998, the Crimean parliamentarians took more radical decisions
aimed at irritating Kyiv. Thus, on 4 February 1998 session, 45 out of 62 deputies
attending the meeting approved the proposal, put forward by Deputy Nataliya
Grudina, to draft a bill on the constitutional return of the ARC to Russia and to submit
it to the Ukrainian Supreme Council for the approval. In the same session, the
parliament supported a proposal to hold a referendum on a status of the Crimea
simultaneously with the elections to the Crimean Supreme Soviet.86 Although, the
decision was not implemented, it would be noteworthy to say that the discussions
about the referendum were going on throughout the whole year. Some deputies, such
as Vladimir Klychnikov, a head of the Constitutional Commission, and Leonid Grach,
when contemplating the articles of the draft constitution were proposing to take as a
basis for the autonomous status of Crimea the referendum of the 20 January 1991, but
this possibility was rendered obsolete by the old parliament;87 so; the only alternative
was to hold new poll, the consequences of which could be far more reaching.
Interesting comments on this event were made by the Russian newspaper Izvestia,
which said that such initiatives by the Crimean parliament brought a lot of harm to
Russian-Ukrainian relations, and especially Russia as Ukraine was still a fraternal
Slavic state and Russia’s strategic partner. The author summed up by saying that
before applauding such actions they [the Russians] must give serious thought to the
question of whether the return of the Crimea to Russia complied with the interests of
concord between Kyiv and Moscow, even if the majority of the Crimeans leaned that
way.88
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3.8. The 1998 Parliamentary Elections
The situation on the peninsula intensified further before the parliamentary elections of
1998. The form the elections to the Supreme Council of Crimea were to take place
was not codified in the Crimean constitution, so the debate in both parliaments
developed around the issue. On 28 December 1997, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
approved (227 against 42) the final version of the law of Ukraine “On the Elections of
Deputies to the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” in
accordance with which the Crimean parliament would consist of 100 deputies, 50 of
whom would be elected in single-seat constituencies and another 50 – from the lists of
candidates nominated by republican branches of political parties.89 Unfortunately, the
law did not mention the quotas for the national minorities that were introduced before
the 1994 elections. This meant that 55% of eligible voters of the Crimean Tatar
nationality that still did not have the Ukrainian citizenship would not be able to vote
in the forthcoming elections. The only concession, if it could be called such, that was
made was related to the formation of the constituencies. In accordance with the law, if
the number of electors belonging to an ethnic minority was greater than required to
form one constituency, constituencies were to be formed so that electors representing
the minority would constitute a majority at least in one of the constituencies.90
However, Kuchma objected the new law; he argued that majority/proportional
elections would only lead to the intensification of political fighting on the peninsula,
therefore the election to the Crimean parliament had to be held according the majority
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system only.91 As a result, the Ukrainian parliament agreed with the president’s
proposal and also amended the Article 4 of the law on the Supreme Council. The new
version stipulated that the Crimean parliament could appoint and dismiss the
chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Crimea with the agreement of the
Ukrainian president and had the right to regulate the formation of the Council of
Ministers of the Crimea as well as monitor its activities in accordance with the
Ukrainian laws, whereas the previous version gave the right to the Crimean Supreme
Soviet to appoint and dismiss the chairman of the council on the recommendation of
the parliament’s chairman.92 Thus, the legal powers of the Crimean parliament were
once again constrained. Interestingly enough, it was already in May of 1997, the time
when the draft law on the Crimean parliament was presented by the Ukrainian
Ministry of Justice, that the proposal was vehemently criticised by the media and
called a “juridical bomb” for the Crimea. Then, Krymskiye Izvestiya, raised the
following question, “Is the Crimea an “internal colony” or a field for experiments by
the Ukrainian government?” Alluding to the fact that the adoption of the new law
would substantially limit the powers of the executive branch of the government and
make it totally dependant on the central authorities, journalists came to a common
opinion, saying that Kyiv’s practices were of “colonial” character.93
However, no amendments were made with regard to the national minorities’
representation in power structures; the proposal of Kuchma to the Ukrainian
parliament to create conditions whereby the Crimean Tatars and other deportees who
returned to Ukraine for good, but had no citizenship at that moment could vote in the
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forthcoming elections was rejected,94 mainly because of the Ukrainian Communist
and leftist parties’ fear that it might boost chances of rival parties in the elections.95
Meanwhile, the Crimean Tatars initiated protests and demonstrations on the territory
of the peninsula and were received by armoured vehicles and the police force, the
numbers of which were slightly less than the numbers of the participants in these
rallies.96 The reaction of the authorities to these demonstrations was strongly criticised
by the democratic forces of Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian president’s
administration Yevgeniy Kushnaryov blamed the parliament for the actions that put
the Crimean Tatars in the focus of developments in the country and stressed that the
ignorance of their problems would only lead to the aggravation of the situation in the
country. He added that it was abnormal that in a democratic state people had to defend
their rights by means of staging demonstrations and acts of disobedience.97
Despite all these protests and appeals, the elections took place in accordance with the
earlier adopted law without any amendments. The worst predictions came true for the
Crimean Tatars as none of their deputies was able to acquire a seat in the Crimean
parliament, except Lentun Romanovich Bezaziyev, the fully Russified Communist,
who was elected due to the overwhelming support of his party. His stance towards the
Crimean Tatars can be understood only by the fact that he is a member of the CPC –
the party policies of which have always been directed to oppress these people.
However, the Crimean Tatars knew Bezaziyev, too. They still did remember that in
the beginning of 1980s, when the USSR government in order to halt the beginning of
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the return of the Crimean Tatars to the Crimea initiated a project that was aimed at
building of an “artificial motherland” for these people in Uzbekistan’s Kaşkaderya
desert (Mübarek and Baharistan towns), he was playing very important role in
realisation of this idea in Mübarek.98 They also would never forget the speech he
made on May-Day celebrations of 1997, where addressing the crowd of communists
and chauvinists he said, “If we do not build the union of Slav states… in the near
future Turkish soldiers will come to the Crimea and putting their hands under
women’s skirts, they will be squeezing their tits.”99 It is not possible to say much
about the person who was in capacity to say these kind of words, but it is much easier
to understand his position with regards to his nation.
In general, the Communist Party of Crimea won most of the seats in the parliamentary
elections  (36%), while members of the Agrarian party won 5%, the Soyuz (Union)
and People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine (PDPU) – 4% each; the PERC got two
seats, the Socialist Party and the Russian Community of Crimea got one seat each.
Independent candidates won half of the seats in the Crimean Supreme Council.100
Following the elections to the Supreme Council, its members in the secret ballot
elected their new chairman: Leonid Grach, the leader of the Crimean communists;101 a
coalition government, mainly consisting of the representatives of the first four parties
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that received most of the votes, was formed;102 and Sergey Kunitsyn, the leader of the
local branch of the PDPU, was elected the chairman of the Council of Ministers.103
         3.9. The Adoption of the Crimean Constitution
The newly formed parliament, headed by the experienced and skilful Grach,
completed the work that their predecessors could not accomplish. The fifth version of
the Crimean Constitution, as usual prepared without participation and taking into
consideration the views of the Crimean Tatars, was passed by the Supreme Soviet of
Crimea on 21 October 1998. In accordance with the new constitution, the chairman of
the parliament received additional powers in approving the appointments of heads of
peninsula’s ministries and agencies with subordination to Kyiv. The article stating
that the Russian language would be the only official language of autonomy was
excluded; this caused the Russian-speaking population of the peninsula to spread out
on the streets with slogans, blaming Grach for this development.104 The new version
stipulated that the functioning, development, usage and the protection of Russian,
alongside with Ukrainian, as the official/national language, and Crimean Tatar, were
guaranteed, but that the Russian language would be used as a language of
communication in all spheres of public life.105 Interestingly enough, the Russian State
Duma, on 23 October 1998, issued a statement “On the Affirmation by the
Constitution of the ARC of the Ukrainian as the Only State Language on the Territory
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of Crimea.”106 Although, the mentioning of Ukrainian as official language was
perceived by the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and by Moscow as a
concession made to Kyiv, nothing prevented the Crimean authorities from using
Russian, whereas the Crimean Tatar was consigned to the status of the language of
any other nationality in the Crimea.
The final version of the constitution was consequently adopted by the Ukrainian
parliament (230 against 67) on 23 December 1998 session,107 though only a weak
before, on 15 December, the Ukrainian parliamentarians could not reach a consensus,
as the right-wing politicians claimed that the Crimea was given too many rights.108
The members of the Rukh, for instance, stated that although the most unacceptable
notions like separate Crimean citizenship and statehood had been eliminated, a
number of the articles was still in conflict with the Ukrainian constitution.
Additionally, the new Crimean Constitution did not mention the specificity of the
legal status of the Crimean Tatars and did not provide them with the guaranteed
representation in the local legislature.109 However, the adoption of the draft
constitution took place and it became possible after the Rukh deputy Ivan Zayets
proposed an amendment, stating that in case of collision between the provisions of the
Crimean and Ukrainian Constitutions, the latter would take precedence. The inclusion
of this amendment seriously violated the parliamentary procedure as the Ukrainian
deputies had no right to introduce any changes, but were able only to approve or
disapprove the constitution as a whole.110
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The law “On Approval of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”
was signed by the Ukrainian president on 1 January 1999 and the new constitution
came into force on 12 January 1999, when its text was published by the official
gazette of Ukraine.111 Its “author,” Leonid Grach, said at a news conference that the
adoption of the constitution “was a holiday achieved through suffering” and claimed
that the political struggle would intensify instead of subsiding, as “anti-Communist
hysteria” would be started.112 He also expressed his appreciation to the “forces of
Crimea and Ukraine, which ‘worked’ on the constitution” and to the president of
Ukraine “for display of wisdom and political realism.” Talking about the merits of the
new constitution, Grach has pointed out that “it declares the inviolability of today’s
autonomy” (which can not be changed without all-Crimean referendum and
corresponding decision of the Crimea’s Supreme Soviet) and makes the autonomy the
only “owner of its lands and natural resources, thus, giving the Crimean government a
right to play a role of guarantor for attraction of domestic and foreign investment.”113
Certainly, Grach had the right to cherish his “child,” but it was clear that
implementation of such a constitution would not positively affect the political
situation in the Crimea and, especially, inter-ethnic relations. The stabilisation of the
situation could not even be imagined first of all with such leader as Grach, whose
powers and position were much strengthened by the new constitution.
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A clear-cut position with regards to the new constitution was immediately expressed
by the leaders of the Crimean Tatars community who said that it undermined the
restoration of the rights of their people and would not promote inter-ethnic tolerance
and mutual understanding among the peninsula’s population.114 This issue was a
major subject of the regional conference of the delegates to the Third Qurultay,
convened on 21 November 1998. The delegates appealed to the Ukrainian Parliament
and President not to consider the draft Constitution of the ARC until special laws
concerning the Crimean Tatar issues were adopted, but their request was rejected.
Instead, during his visit to the Crimea in August 1999, Kuchma stressed that “there
could not be any “favouring” for the Crimean Tatars on the state level before other
deported peoples; the Ukrainian government, therefore, could take into consideration
only the fact that the Crimean Tatars is the most numerous group.”115 No answer was
received from the Council of Europe, where several Crimean Tatar NGOs filed their
appeals. Only Grach reacted on these statements by saying that the rights of the
Crimean Tatars were violated neither by the Ukrainian authorities nor by the Crimean
administration and stressed that those who were trying to play on the sharpening of
the nationalist sentiment among the Crimean Tatars would not achieve their goals.116
         3.10. Post-Adoption Events and Developments
The fact that the new Crimean Constitution would have a negative impact not only for
the Crimean Tatar community, but for the deterioration of the inter-ethnic situation on
the peninsula as a whole soon became evident. During the night of 15 January 1999,
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the building of the Crimean Tatar parliament – the Meclis - was attacked, and the
office of its chairman burned and destroyed. The day before, the water and telephone
services to the building were cut, which provided some evidence that the crime was a
planned one.117 Throughout 1999, several mosques were burned and graveyards and
monument in the capital of the Crimea dedicated to the victims of the deportation
were vandalised. Anti-Crimean Tatar (anti-Muslim) propaganda has been resumed in
the Crimean mass media. Thus, for instance, following a rally of protest to Russia’s
actions in Chechnya, held by 30 Crimean Tatars in front of the then newly opened
Russian Consulate in Simferopol,118 the Russian and Crimean press started to
disseminate rumours about so-called military formations of the Crimean Tatars, which
had supposedly been trained for operations in Chechnya.119 Thus, the Russian
Obschaya Gazeta wrote
“Calls for a jihad are being heard in Crimea’s mosques. Militants from the ranks of
Crimean Tatars trained in special camps are fighting in Basayev’s and Khattab’s
squads. … The peninsula’s Tatar community has picketed the Russian Consulate in
Simferopol with the slogan: “We Are With You, Shamil!”…Wahhabism is being
introduced to Crimea…”120
Other newspapers were even talking about the Meclis’ assistance for the Chechen
“mafia leaders” in obtaining property, particularly houses, on the territory of the
Crimea.121 Unfortunately, despite the fact that all these was merely canards,
publications of this sort were the main political event in the Crimea in the autumn of
1999, eclipsing even the presidential elections in Ukraine, and continued to occupy
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the front pages of the Crimean press in the following months.122 Similar information
was present in the foreign press. Thus, The Economist, in one of its articles quoted
Mr. Shuvaynikov, who said that the Crimean Tatars were “hand-in-glove with the
Chechens,” and were helping “run up secret training camps with other Islamic
extremists.” However, the author has carefully assessed the situation and maintained
that although there is great sympathy among these people for the Chechens’ plight
and their impoverished community is looking after 200 Chechen orphans, the
Crimean Tatars are not to resort to the same methods with the Chechens if their basic
problems will be solved, as their concerns are mainly practical.123
Thus, all the developments following the adoption of the Crimean Constitution upset
the fragile inter-ethnic accord in the peninsula and resulted in the further
disillusionment and growing dissatisfaction of the Crimean Tatars with their position
and the response of the local and national authorities to their plight. The scale of their
protests, for instance, increased dramatically and this was apparent on the
demonstrations of 18 May 1999, commemorating the 55th anniversary of their
deportation. In an attempt to improve the situation at least a little, President Kuchma
signed a decree “On the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People,”
which in compliance with Article 106 (Paragraph 28) of the national constitution, de
facto legalised the Meclis as a consultative-advisory body under the cabinet of
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president.124 But even this compromise was not fully implemented because of the
disagreements over the way of its functioning.
Similarly, many other problems related to the Crimean Tatars still remained to be
unresolved or the decisions for their implementation were not put in practice. One of
such problems was the issue of citizenship. On 22 August 1998, the Ukrainian
government signed an agreement with Uzbekistan “On Solution of the Problems of
the Deported People and Their Families, Who Return from Uzbekistan to Ukraine,” in
accordance with which the procedure for receiving Ukrainian citizenship for deported
people was simplified. The agreement was valid until 31 December 1999 and,
according to the data provided by the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in the Crimea, 59.3% (36,605) of 61,777 people, who were citizens of
Uzbekistan were able to acquire the Ukrainian citizenship before 2000.125 The
members of the Council, representing the Crimean Tatars in the president’s cabinet,
asked Kuchma for additional measures regarding the citizenship issue such as
receiving without consulate payments a passport for international travelling and for
visa-free entering of the country for those who had already given up citizenship of
another state.126 Although the request was accepted, there were no signs of practical
realisation of the president’s decision. Additionally, no prolongation of the agreement
with Uzbekistan was achieved; thus, approximately 25,000 repatriates, not taking into
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consideration people who had returned in the last two years, still had no Ukrainian
citizenship.
Another significant problem that found no final solution was the issue of land
privatisation in the Crimea. According to the law of the president of Ukraine, land
could be acquired in private ownership only by the people - members of the
“collective agrarian enterprises” (CAE).127 Contemplating on the fact that the mass
return of the Crimean Tatars had began only at the end of 1980s, it was hard to
anticipate large numbers of these people were involved in the collective agrarian
production of the peninsula. Therefore, the Ukrainian president issued a
supplementary document N. 165/99, dated 28 July 1999, “On Additional Measures
Aimed at Satisfying Demands of Citizens for Land,” providing supplementary rules
for the procedure of the land distribution to the deported peoples and workers of the
social sphere.128 However, the work aimed at the implementation of the decisions
taken by the central and republican authorities was carried out very slowly and often
the rules established by the law were ignored by the local officials. Thus, the property
share, determined by the time of work experience and salary, had been divided
unevenly. Most of those Crimean Tatars, who had even been members of the
collective enterprises, had short work experience and low salaries, therefore they
obtained certificates, supposedly made for land purchase, worth only small sums of
money; even though, the resolution of the Crimean Cabinet of Ministers N. 182, dated
29 May 1999, stipulated that the Crimean Tatars, residing in the country side, must
get certificates making them capable for acquiring land area equal to the average of
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middle share of the CAE members.129 Being faced with the dilemma of leaving with
no land on their homeland, the Crimean Tatars started to organise protests against the
land reform, demanding redistribution.130 The tensions were exacerbated by the fact
that in the Simferopol, Belogorsk, Bahçesaray, and Sudak rayon [regions], the places
mostly inhabited by the Crimean Tatars there was a scarcity of land reserves, from
which the deportees and the workers of social sphere were supposed to obtain their
shares.131 Although, it was very often stressed that the implementation of the land
distribution programme had to be carried out fairly; and, despite the numerous
protests from the side of the Crimean Tatars, both the authorities of the autonomous
republic and the central officials came to the common opinion that the land re-
distribution could not be carried out.132 The only proposition, though it was absurd, to
solve the land issue for the deportees was made by the Crimea’s Vice-Premier, Sergey
Velizhanskiy - the Crimean Tatars were to create their own collective agrarian
enterprises and obtain land following the legal rules.133
As it was predicted, the adoption of the Crimean Constitution had generated a crisis
within the Crimean government, too. The enormous powers gained by the
parliamentary speaker Grach, particularly the control over the appointment of the
officials led to the rise of confrontation between the legislative and executive
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branches of the Crimean government. The latter, headed by Kunitsyn, managed for
the first time in the history of the ARC to achieve some economic progress. Grach,
assuming that after Kuchma’s victory on the presidential elections of 1999, Kunitsyn
together with the pro-presidential faction in the Ukrainian parliament would try to
replace him, decided to strike first and said that Kunitsyn should be sacked, blaming
them in preparing a coup d’etat in the Crimea.134 The culmination of the crisis came
in the mid-December, when Kunitsyn appeared to have gained an upper hand, by
persuading the majority of the Crimean deputies (53 members from the Respublika
and Zlahoda factions135) to vote for the dismissal of the chairman of the parliament
and the presidium, consisting of Grach’s stalwarts.136 Such a vote could not be
implemented as the chairman Grach had the right to block the actions of the
opposition, so the power struggle, so typical for the ARC, continued in an even more
acute form than before.137 Both sides were trying to get support of their respective
lobbies in Ukraine and prepared appeals to the president, who, for his part, avoided
taking decisive measures in order to demonstrate his impartiality.138
However, a more intense involvement of the Ukrainian president could not be avoided
when a similar crisis within the Crimean government occurred in 2000 and dominated
the peninsula’s politics for more than eight months. Then, the seven Communists,
including two deputy prime ministers, three ministers and two heads of the
governmental departments submitted their resignations, allegedly for reason of
propriety: “they could no longer stay in the government whose work the Crimean
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parliament had found unsatisfactory.”139 But, the following day, on 22 September
2000, neither the prime minister nor the Crimean minister of the Council of Ministers
received any document showing any intentions of resigning and, on 2 October 2000,
all these deputies appeared at the traditional weekly meting, having no clear answer as
to whether they should be considered resigned. Kunitsyn, for his part, said that he
could not “work when a set of ministers was able to betray him at any moment” and
announced the signing of a request to the Crimean parliament on the sacking of these
ministers.140 The resignation was objected by Kuchma, who alleged that there was no
necessity to do this as the government had achieved some success and suggested that
the reason behind such a step could only be a “political” one, i.e. it was merely
Grach’s “game.” It was obvious that there could not be real political motives behind
the resignation, as the coalition government was formed in agreement with all the
parliamentary factions and there was no change in the structure of political players in
the meantime. Therefore, it was only Grach’s personal reasons, which were in favour
of such developments, because the government’s style of work did not correspond
with his personal perceptions on how the Crimea were to be governed and the
“criteria of his personal interests.”141
At the same time, Grach’s many initiatives in the economic sphere only hindered the
progress on the peninsula. “The high degree of economic independence gained by the
ARC at the expense of disavowing any overt pretensions over political independence,
resulted also in increasing disputes between the central and Crimean authorities over,
for example, such issues such as the fate of all taxes collected on the territory of
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Crimea, and of the value-added tax [VAD] in particular.”142 In the case of VAT, the
Constitution of Crimea stipulated that the autonomous republic had to retain all the
taxes collected on its territory. But, at the same time, there was a Ukrainian law,
saying that the Value-Added Tax was to be paid to the state treasury.143 Taking into
consideration the fact that the VAT could be a subject to reimbursement, Kunitsyn
and his team were proposing that the collected money would go to the central budget
and then return to the Crimean economy in the form of subsides, but Grach and his
followers were insisting on the tax money staying in the Crimean budget and were
convincing the rest of deputy corpus that they would achieve that. Finally, it was
another, though not final, defeat for Grach’s ideas, which were not put into effect. On
18 July 2001, the Crimean parliament on its Seventh Session voted in favour of
dismissal of Kunitsyn from the post of the Prime Minister.144 The rumours about
government’s resignation were circulating in the building of the Crimean parliament
since May of this year and took incentive following Kuchma’s critical speech, which
was understood by the Prime Minister’s political opponents to be a momentum for
“de-freezing” of the implementation of a decision, taken a year ago - on 24 May 2000,
to oust Kunitsyn’s government (at that time, the Crimean parliamentarians could not
receive confirmation from the Ukrainian president). Kuchma’s position on the issue
was not clear. On 18 July, Grach said that Kuchma gave his consent to the decision of
the ARC’s parliament, but there was no official documentation received or statement
made by the president, whereas Kunitsyn announced that he had a telephone
conversation with the head of Ukrainian state and that the latter was categorically
opposed to the change of the government, saying it would have very negative effects
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on the yet catastrophic politico-economic situation on the peninsula.145 Kunitsyn filed
a petition to the Constitutional Court of Crimea to confirm the decision of the Central
Regional Court of Simferopol verifying the illegality of the decision taken on 24 May
2000. He also promised to punish those deputies who was carrying out errands of
Bezaziyev, whose candidature for the post of Prime Minister was proposed by Grach
and who at that time was on holidays.146 On 24 July 2001, it was announced that the
next session of the Crimean parliament’s meeting would nevertheless take place,
which meant that the president agreed on the dismissal as the parliamentarians were to
elect a new Cabinet's head. The confirmation was also found in Kuchma’s letter,
dated 20 July 2001, which also expressed the president’s wish to see in this post
Valeriy Gorbatov, people’s deputy of Ukraine and in the past his first representative
in the Crimea.147 Kunitsyn, for his part, was proposed very prestigious posts in
Ukrainian government and Foreign Service.
It was obvious that the crisis within the government was caused by the
Kunitsyn/Grach “rivalry;” it was also certain that the central authorities knew about
the abilities of the former and shortfalls and the aspirations of the latter. Thus, one
question does arise: Why the central authorities in the face of Kuchma needed Grach
as he is? The Ukrainian Den’ gives their suggestions on this account. Firstly, clearly,
Grach intends to participate in 2004 Ukrainian presidential election; thus, because of
his weaknesses he could be needed by the centre to play a role of the last communist,
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who ever inspires to become a president of Ukraine. Secondly, “Grach is not right
about many things and this situation makes him obedient and easy to direct.” Thirdly,
Grach has important influence on the Crimean electorate, thus, he can be asked to
instruct the mass how to act. Fourthly, although he is known to be a “doctor of
political intrigue” and famous for his theoretical and practical knowledge, he is still
too weak for the “hotshots” in Kyiv for them to take him seriously.148
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CHAPTER IV
THE ISSUE OF THE CRIMEA IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY
4.1. Russian-Ukrainian Relations in 1990-1991
The year 1991 fundamentally changed the history of many republics, regional parts
and nations that used to be part of the Soviet Union. The same was true for Ukraine,
which after more than seventy years of Soviet rule became independent. The decisive
moment in the maintenance of Ukraine as an independent state was the referendum
held in Ukraine on 1 December 1991, according to the final results of which, 90,3%
of people voted in favour of Ukraine’s declaration of independence. This was one of
the major causes that led to the irretrievable disintegration of the USSR and,
accordingly, to the end of the cold war. In that sense, the relationship between the two
major successors of the Soviet empire, Russia and Ukraine, acquired great
importance.
Despite the fact that particular attention to this relationship had been paid only in the
aftermath of Ukraine’s declaration of independence, as Russian-Ukrainian relations
started to deteriorated steadily, for the leaders of two republics this relationship had
been assuming increasing importance even before the final collapse of the Soviet
Union. At the end of 1990, for instance, the Ukrainian SSR and RSFSR signed a
bilateral treaty, one of the provisions of which guaranteed the inviolability of each
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other’s borders. This kind of provision meant that at that time no one could think that
there was a possibility of the dissolution of the USSR. However, after the coup of
August 1991, which became an incentive in Ukraine’s path to independence and
which dealt a serious blow to the union’s centre, the leadership of the RSFSR began
to assume the role of centre itself and this could only lead to the worsening of the
relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, already two days after Ukraine’s
declaration of independence, Yeltsin’s press secretary issued a statement saying that
Russia had the right to review its borders with other republics, except the three Baltic
states.1 This caused much negative reaction in Kyiv. Relations were strained more
when political circles in Moscow started to threaten Ukraine with border claims if it
were to secede from the Soviet Union and many called the Ukrainian proclamation of
independence “illegal.”
 However, the situation calmed down after delegations of RSFSR and USSR at the
end of August came to Kyiv to resolve the so-called “emergency situation.” The result
of this visit was the signing of a joint communique pledging cooperation to prevent
“the uncontrolled disintegration of the Union state” through the creation of “interim
interstate structures” for the period of transition, which was not identified. Another
result of these talks was the reaffirmation of the articles on the territorial integrity of
the two states and the rights of national minorities, both previously mentioned in the
provisions of the Russian-Ukrainian treaty of November 1990.2 Even though the
Russian minority in Ukraine was not specifically mentioned, it is apparently a key
element in territorial disputes between Russia and Ukraine as the 11.3 million-strong
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Russian minority in Ukraine accounts for about 22% of the whole population of the
country.
In the fall of 1991, the first confrontation between Russia and Ukraine had surfaced
over the question of the disposition of the nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine
and as to who had the right to control them. What followed was a claim from the
Russian mass media about the possibility of the nuclear conflict between the two
states and arguments put forward by Russian leaders, such as Gennadiy Burbulis and
Ruslan Khasbulatov, that the RSFSR was the only rightful heir to the former Soviet
Union.3 As the possibility of such a conflict was denied by all sides, there was an
impetus to put everything in its normal way, however, the Ukrainian referendum on
independence on 1st of December and its outcome rendered the further deterioration of
the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. First of all, many Russian politicians,
including Gorbachev, started to argue that the Ukrainian referendum could not be
interpreted as an attempt to secede from the USSR, and others, like Anatoliy Sobchak,
the mayor of St.Petersburg, began to mention the “horrors,” such as, for instance,
“forced Ukrainianisation” of the Russian minority which might result in a territorial
conflict and nuclear clash that might follow the Ukrainian independence. In the
context of the dispute over the control over the military forces, Sobchak interpreted
the realisation of the decision of Ukraine’s government to create its own army as “a
huge threat to mankind as a whole.” It is interesting why he perceived the creation of
armed forces by Ukraine to be a calamity for mankind if it [Ukrainian army] had to be
opposed to a Russian-dominated commonwealth army.4 Thus, as was already
remarked by many observers, it is obvious that the real problem of Russian politicians
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was the fact that Russia “has never faced the reality of an independent Ukraine in
general and specifically of a non-Russian Crimea, which, someone once said, is to
Russia what Texas is to the United States.”5 So, the two sides were deadlocked on the
question of the status of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine, the issue, which was linked
to the no less controversial problem of the Black Sea Fleet (thereafter denoted as
BSF).
4.2. The Beginning of the Confrontation over the Crimea
The Crimean question first appeared on the Russian official agenda when Vladimir
Lukin, head of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and External Economic Ties, in
January of 1992 distributed the draft resolution “On the Decisions of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet of 19 February 1954 and of 26 April 1954 Concerning the
Removal of Crimea from the USSR” to members of Russian Supreme Soviet, asking
them to invalidate this decision and to declare it as possessing no legal force. It was
proposed not to consider the resolution presented by Lukin in order not to aggravate
the already deteriorated relations with Ukraine.6 However, on 23rd January, the same
issue was once again placed on the agenda as a group of nationalist deputies,
representing the Fatherland and Russia parliamentary faction, led by Sergey Baburin,
had asked the Supreme Soviet to put for consideration the resolution issued by
Lukin’s committee.7 The same group also prepared an appeal addressed to the
Ukrainian parliament, urging it to recognise that the BSF was an indivisible part of
the Strategic Armed Forces of the CIS and calling on it to conduct the constructive
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negotiations on the issues related to the BSF. Russian Supreme Soviet adopted the
resolution, voting overwhelmingly in favour (166 to 13, with 8 abstentions) and
approved the appeal of the Baburin group. At the same time, it had instructed two of
its parliamentary committees, on Foreign Affairs and External Economic Ties and on
Legislation, to study the constitutionality of the Khruschev’s decision of 1954 to
transfer the Crimea from the jurisdiction of the RSFSR to Ukrainian SSR and to
inform the Supreme Soviet about their findings. It was also suggested that the
Presidium of Russian Supreme Soviet should propose to its Ukrainian counterpart to
examine the issue as well, on which the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet produced a
statement on 6th February 1992, saying that there could be no question of reviewing
the status of the Crimea as this would contradict the treaties signed between the two
states in 1990-91 and Article 5 of the Minsk agreement creating the CIS, the
provisions of which guarantee territorial integrity of the parties.8
The fact that consideration of the issue on the status of the Crimea on the official
agenda of the Russian parliament was very much motivated by the question of the
BSF became obvious after the press published the letter from Lukin to Khasbulatov.
Clearly stating the connection between the two matters, Lukin proposed to use the
issue of Crimea as a bargaining chip in the dispute over the fleet, emphasising the fact
that after the 1954 decision of transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine was declared invalid
the Ukrainian leadership would have to decide: either the Crimea or the BSF. At the
same time, it was pointed out that this kind of approach would provide the Russian
government with the time needed for the implementation of the unpopular economic
reforms and would strengthen the position of the present leadership with regards to
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the extreme nationalist wing.9 Lukin, viewing the 11th January negotiations between
Russia and Ukraine on military and political issues rather pessimistically, also
suggested that all the military forces of the former Soviet Union be placed under the
jurisdiction of Russia and that, in order to neutralise the predictable reaction of
Ukraine, Kyiv could be threatened with the transfer of the orders for the production of
the military from the plants of Ukraine to Russia or other CIS-states, so this would be
a serious blow to the economy and political stability of Ukraine.10
In the beginning of April 1992, at the time when Ukrainian and Crimean leaders were
engaged in constructive negotiations on a power-sharing agreement, Yeltsin
dispatched Rutskoy to the Crimea and the Dniester Republic of Moldova. The
delegation also included a presidential adviser and General, Boris Gromov. The
remarks Rutskoy made in his speech in Sevastopol were indicating Russia’s great
ambitions to see the Crimea as a part of Russia and to the possession of the entire
fleet. This was accompanied by Yeltsin’s warning that any attempt from the
Ukrainian side to change unilaterally the status of the BSF would result in transfer of
the whole fleet under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Armed Forces of the CIS.11 As a
response to Rutskoy’s visit and Yeltsin’s statement, Ukrainian minister of defence,
Konstiantyn Morozov, in his speech on 8th April 1992, during the session of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, explained the status of the formation of the Ukrainians
armed forces and characterised the behaviour of Russian vice-president during his
visit to Sevastopol as “direct involvement in Ukraine’s internal affairs.” Rada filed a
petition to the UN Security Council protesting against Russia’s activities in the
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Crimea. The reaction of the political circles of Ukraine was very acute. Thus, for
instance, the declaration issued by the Ukrainian Republican Party on 10 April 1992
described Rutskoy’s visit as a “provocative journey by a high-level official from a
neighbouring country which was used to ignite an international feud.”12
Yeltsin all this time, actually, had a hard time facing the dilemma of whether to
support national patriots with their claims over the Crimea, and so be ready for the
negative reaction from the international community or to support the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and be prepared for the strengthening of the opposition from
domestic elites and public. Yeltsin was faced with this kind of confrontation at the
Sixth Congress of Russian People’s Deputies in April of 1992, when conservative
forces made an effort to place the problem of Crimea on the official agenda. At this
congress Russian minister of foreign affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, put forward an
argument suggesting that the current borders of Ukraine should not be a subject for
reviewing only if it would remain a member of the CIS.13 Even though the attempt to
consider the issue of the Crimea’s status was unsuccessful, the Russian Duma, while
having a closed session a month later, passed a resolution on 21 May 1992 “On the
Legal Appraisal of the Decisions of the Highest Organs of the State Leadership of the
RSFSR Regarding Crimea’s Change in Status Accepted in 1954,” which, despite
previously made statements about respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine,
meant that Russia did not recognise the existing situation.14 The Russian conservative
anxiety to acquire a control over the Crimea was expressed in the conversation of
Sergey Baburin with the Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, Volodymyr Kryzhansky,
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during which he said, “if we do not get back Crimea from you, then there will be a
war between Russia and Ukraine.”15
On 23 May 1992, Foreign Ministry of Ukraine sent a diplomatic note to its
counterpart in Russia, stating that “the question of the status of Crimea is an internal
matter of Ukraine and cannot be subject to negotiations with any other country,”
emphasising the fact that Ukraine with its current borders is recognised by all the
countries of the world, including Russia.16 The statement also warned Russia that
further pursuit of the matter could lead to “dangerous and unforseen consequences.”17
Ukraine’s permanent representative in UN, Viktor Batiouk, gave a copy on 29 May
1992 to the UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali.18
The Crimean question was once again on the agenda at the Seventh Congress of
People’s Deputies, in December of 1992, when the commission, headed by Deputy
Yevgeniy Pudovkin, was created in order to examine the Sevastopol problem. The
decision was based on the argument that as, in accordance with the decree of the
RSFSR of 1945, the city of Sevastopol was given Russian administrative status, it
could not be subject to the resolution of 1954 on transfer of the Crimea under
Ukrainian jurisdiction.19 In respond to these developments, the chairman of the
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, Ivan Pliushch, wrote a letter to Ruslan Khasbulatov,
saying the following: “Regrettably, a significant number of influential politicians of
the Russian Federation are again trying to carry out a decision that would reanimate
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the old empire and the politics of the old empire…We cannot evaluate the
provocation relating to the Sevastopol ‘problem’ other than a relapse.”20
At the beginning of 1993, Russian ambassador to Ukraine, Leonid Smoliakov, visited
the peninsula and, emphasising that there were no persecution of the Russian-
speaking population in the Crimea, stated that Russia “respects the sovereignty of
Ukraine and under no circumstances will it try to influence its internal affairs.”21
However, such positive steps had always been overweighted by negative ones. Thus,
on 21 April 1993, the Deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Valentin
Agafonov sent on behalf of the Russian parliament a letter to the Crimean Supreme
Soviet, expressing the support of the latter for reviewing of “matters regarding the
drafting of a trade and economic agreement with Russia, the Crimea’s participation in
the activity of the CIS, and the implementation of the Crimean citizens’ right to dual
citizenship,” as well as for the conviction that “no political designs or nationalistic fits
can break the historical ties sealed in blood between the peoples of Russia and the
Crimea.” The appeal also proposed that “Russia would supervise the referendum on
the Crimean independence.”22 During the same day, there were a series of telephone
conversations between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. The day was concluded
with Agafonov’s telegram, withdrawing the letter that bore his signature.
With the deepening of the conflict between the Russian Duma and the Russian
president, the situation in and around the Crimea sharpened. This being the case, the
Russian parliament that was in the forefront of the campaign to reassert the control of
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Russia over the peninsula was disbanded by Yeltsin and “its fate was sealed by
Russian tanks” in October 1993.23 This, however, did not solve the problem of the
Crimea as a major issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations, because public opinion in
Russia and its political elite would hardly accept the fact that Sevastopol and the
Crimea were now a foreign country, as the Crimea had always occupied a very special
place in Russian history. Commonly referred as the “land of Russian glory,” it is
considered to be an inseparable part of ‘motherland’ Russia and this belief has been
strengthened by the fact that during the Soviet era, up until 1954, the peninsula was
Russian proper. Then as part and parcel of the arbitrary and divisive boundary-
demarcation practices that distinguished Soviet nationalities policy, the Crimea was
allotted as a supposed ‘gift’ to the ‘wrong’ state – Ukraine. This has inevitably (and
intentionally) embittered Russian chauvinists who consider the Crimea as purely
Russian territory.24
At the same time, the Crimea’s Russian majority, which constituted over 60% of the
population plus the completely Russified Ukrainian population were definitely no less
a destabilising factor in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. Continuous riots and
demonstrations, calling for the ‘return’ of the Crimea to Russia were an important
driving force behind the events surrounding the peninsula. Thus, a rally held in
Sevastopol on 12 June 1993 and devoted to the city’s 210th anniversary called for
inclusion of Sevastopol in the union of Russian Cities, in order to confirm that it
belonged to Russia, for the recalling deputies of the Sevastopol City Council from the
Crimean parliament, and for the launching of a strike throughout the peninsula. It also
issued a resolution demanding lifting of the moratorium on holding the referendum on
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the Crimea’s independence and that the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments give
Sevastopol the status of the main base of the unified BSF.25
The Russian Duma did not make the inhabitants of Sevastopol wait long and on 9 July
of the same year adopted the resolution (166 against 0), confirming the Russian
federal status of the city.26 While Yeltsin said that he was “ashamed” of this decision
and Kravchuk argued that the decision was against all international norms and had no
legal power, the Congress of Russian Communities of the Crimea had come with
another appeal to the Supreme Soviet and government of Russia, demanding “to solve
without delay the questing confirming the Russian status of Sevastopol and of
restoration of direct political, economic, and cultural links with Russia.”27
Ukraine, on its side, tried to take diplomatic steps in order to resolve the issue.
Ukraine’s permanent representative at the UN Organisation Viktor Batyuk, on his
meeting with the UN Security Council Chairman David Hannay handed him a letter,
dated 13 and 16 July 1993, from the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko,
which expressed deep uneasiness over the resolution on Sevastopol and requested to
convene a session of the Security Council to consider the situation that developed as a
result of a decision adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the RF.28 The Security Council,
to this effect, issued a statement, condemning the Russian Parliament’s resolution as
“incompatible” with the Russian-Ukrainian treaty of 19 November 1990 and with the
Charter of UN, thus, declaring it having no legal force.29 On its side, the Russian
Foreign Ministry, the only legitimate foreign policy maker, in an attempt to correct
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the mistake made by the parliament, submitted to the UN on 20 July an “official
document,” where the resolution on Sevastopol was described as “emotional” and “at
variance with the stated position of the Russian government and president.30
4.3. The Impact of the Crimea’s Domestic Politics on the Russian-Ukrainian
Relations
The tensions reached their peak when the propagator of the Crimean independence
and re-unification with Russia, Yuriy Meshkov was elected president of the Crimean
Autonomous Republic. Being a leader of the most powerful Crimean Russian
organisation, the Republican Movement of Crimea, it was not so hard for Meshkov by
basing his pre-election campaign mainly on emotive sloganeering to drive back other
candidates, even where their political programmes were not very different from his.
However, usually aimed at irritating Kyiv, the policies of this first and last president
of the Crimea led to nothing, except yet more chaos in Crimean politics and the
economy. In the end of 1994, it was reported that the Crimeans were supporting more
Kuchma (41.09% to 26.48%) than their popularly elected President Meshkov (26.19%
to 54.48%), according to their policies and activities.31 The Crimea’s attempt to regain
its independence in 1994 by renewing its 1992 Constitution was effectively handled
by Kyiv. In this connection, the Russian parliament adopted an appeal to its Ukrainian
counterpart “politely cautioning against any forceful moves” in the struggle between
Kyiv and the Crimea, praised Kyiv’s efforts to resolve the situation, and promised to
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promote the search for constructive compromises.32 However, when the Ukrainian
authorities in the end of 1994 took stern measures rescinding the Crimean laws that
were in violation with the Ukrainian Constitution, the Russian law-makers on 23
November 1994 adopted a declaration saying that, although Russia recognised the
reality that the Crimea belonged to Ukraine, it was concerned by Kyiv’s actions and
indicated that it could jeopardise the negotiations over the BSF and the ratification of
the Russian-Ukrainian “big” treaty.33 But ultimately Kyiv chose to ignore Moscow’s
warnings. At that time, the confrontation between the executive and legislative
branches of the Crimean government contributed considerably to the crisis within the
pro-Russian nationalist movement and the state of the Crimean domestic politics as a
whole. So, the Ukrainian president, Kuchma, lost patience with wrangling, and acted
decisively, carefully timing the crackdown to coincide with Russia’s own difficulties
in Chechnya; he abolished the presidency and curbed some important powers of the
autonomy.
 4.4. Second Phase of the Confrontation
Already mistrustful relations between Ukraine and Russia were further poisoned when
the latter parliament’s upper house on 5 December 1996 publicly laid claim to the port
of Sevastopol, saying it was part of Russia and Ukraine had no legal right to govern it.
“Unilateral actions by the Ukrainian side aimed at tearing away from Russia a part of
its territory are not only illegal under international law, but also directly damage
Russia’s security.” They “are preventing the establishment of good neighbourly and
                                                          
32 Roman Solchanyk, “Crimea: between Ukraine and Russia,” p. 11.
33 Ibid.
138
profitable relations between two fraternal peoples and are lowering the authority of
both countries in the international arena,” says the document adopted by the
Federation Council.34 It was decided also to set up a special commission to prepare a
draft law on the status of Sevastopol. Both initiatives were undertaken as a result of
the proposal put forward by Moscow’s mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who was reiterating
this kind of statements not for a first time. Simply, Luzhkov “appears to have fixed on
Sevastopol as a cause likely to endear him to nationalists and the armed forces.”35
It must be added that the resolutions came at a sensitive moment, when the talks on
Sevastopol and the BSF between Russia and Ukraine deadlocked and the NATO
expansion plans were causing a lot of tension. Probably these were the reasons that
pushed the Russian parliament to adopt the resolutions exactly at that time:
nationalists, fearing that Ukraine would become a NATO member and that Russian-
Ukrainian treaty would separate the Crimea [and Ukraine] from Russia forever were
trying to play a Crimean card in order to get more concessions from the Ukrainian
side.
The claims made by the Russian side caused considerable negative reaction and not
only from the Ukrainian government and organisations, but also from the world
community. Their backing for the Ukrainian sovereignty was immediately confirmed
by the European Union and the OSCE.36 For its part, the statement of the Ukrainian
parliament, dated 6 December 1996, was saying that “Russia was making territorial
claims on Ukraine infringing upon its sovereignty and was also assessing the actions
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of the Russian parliament as “a flagrant violation of the founding norms of
international law and as a threat to the signing of a large-scale treaty” between Russia
and Ukraine.37 However, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Tarasov,
speaking in reference to these resolutions has said that in accordance with the Russian
Constitution, “Russia’s foreign policy is determined and implemented by the
president and the government, whose stand on this question is known well. … The
Russian government’s official view is that Sevastopol and all [the] Crimea belong to
Ukraine.”38
Interestingly enough, the reaction of the Crimean politicians was rather ambiguous.
While orally most of the deputies of the Crimean parliament supported the
resolutions, as did Tsekov and a head of the Russian Society, Terekhov, both of
whom supported Russia’s claims over Sevastopol and alleged that the “Russian BSF
is the only force that was able to cool down Tatar-Turkish and Ukrainian-Galician
chauvinist ambitions in the Crimea,”39 a fairly lengthy declaration, adopted by it,
contained no evident sentence in support of one or another side, except the quite
specific demand that the future of Sevastopol had to be settled in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the inhabitants, which were well known.40 Only the Crimean
Tatar Meclis expressed its clear-cut stand on the issue, calling the resolutions to be
“ill-considered political documents,” adversely affecting Russian-Ukrainian relations
and destabilising the situation in the Crimea, and demanding the Ukrainian leadership
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should take a decision without delay on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the
state’s territory and international organisations to apply sanctions against Russia.41
The Crimean issue none the less has remained an important factor in the Russo-
Ukrainian bilateral relations. Provocative statements by some prominent Russian
politicians and resolutions questioning the Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea and
Sevastopol, which were passed by the Duma, created much unease in Kyiv. Although
Yeltsin’s government always formally repudiated such claims, it was not until 1997
that the final treaty on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and of the bilateral “Treaty
on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership,” guaranteeing the inviolability of the
Ukrainian borders, were signed in Sochi, the problem of the Crimea put serious
obstacles towards the normalisation of the relations between the two countries.
However, the presence of the Russian military establishment (the BSF units) and of
adventurous political forces on the peninsula, did not encourage qualified observers to
suppose that that the issue had lost its inflammable potential for the future.
         4.5. The Treaty on Friendship and its Aftermath
Even after the “big” treaty was signed, discussions in the Russian parliament
concerning the Crimean issue continued. More exactly, now the agenda of the Russian
Duma’s sessions was occupied with the question of ratification of Russian-Ukrainian
treaty. Because of the fact that this accord and the agreements on the BSF were met
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with furious reaction from the most of the Russian political circles, the task was seen
to be very difficult.
In the beginning, the Russian Duma had blocked the ratification, which already had
gone through by the Ukrainian parliament, until 25 December 1998. At that time, the
vote passed as a result of a sudden reversal by the Communist Party members, who
argued that the cause of helping Russians in the Crimea and “reintegrating” Russia
and Ukraine would be more effectively pursued through friendly relations with the
Ukrainian state.42 The shift on the issue was most probably intended to help the
Ukrainian Communists in the then upcoming presidential elections. But there was still
an opposition mainly formed by Konstantin Zatulin, a head of the ultra-nationalist
Derzhava [Great Power] movement and Yuriy Luzhkov, who from the very start
condemned the signing of the agreement as “incorrect,” saying it was absurd that
Russia should be renting Sevastopol from itself.43
Some called the complete ratification that was reached on 25 December 1999 (243
deputies voted in favour) to be a defeat for Russia’s foreign policy, and not only
towards Ukraine but also towards the CIS countries. A head of the RF Duma’s Profile
Committee, Tikhonov, for instance, said that the treaty was against Russia’s interests,
as it guaranteed the inviolability of the Ukrainian borders and paved the way for
Ukraine’s entrance into NATO.44 The Russian executive branch of the government,
on the other side, despite the fact that the treaty was opposed by the majority of the
Russians, undertook an all-out effort to secure the ratification, saying Russia would
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serve its strategic interests best by co-operating with Ukraine.45 It was partly true as a
failure to ratify the agreement could trigger Ukraine to refuse to ratify the signed
accords on basing of the Russian fleet on the territory of the Crimea. But,
presupposing that Russia’s attachment to the Crimea would not be rescinded in the
near future, now room for manoeuvre is limited to unofficial statements and
declarations, usually quite meaningless, like those of Luzhkov. If Russia remained
committed to a more or less democratic course of development, its hands would be
tied by the assurances that it gave Ukraine in the Moscow Trilateral Statement
(January 1994), the CSCE Budapest Agreements (December 1994), and the bilateral
Russian-Ukrainian “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership”(May 1997)
– to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.46
4.6. The Division of the Black Sea Fleet
The confrontation over the ownership of the BSF was one of the major irritants in
Russian-Ukrainian relations. In fact, more subtle and complex than it appears at first
glance, it was definitely this dispute that gave momentum to the pro-Russian
movement of chauvinist and separatist character on the Crimean peninsula, and was
used as a pretext for putting into question the status of Crimea and Sevastopol.47
4.6.1. The Formation of the Ukrainian Army
After the failed putch of August 1991, which had led to the demise of the Soviet
Union, and the subsequent declaration of independence by Ukraine, the attention of
many observers was directed to the decision of the Ukrainian state to establish its
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national army. In accordance with the resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
initiated first on 24 August 1991 “On the Armed Forces” and “On the Defence of
Ukraine,” all military units dislocated on its territory have been announced to fall
under the jurisdiction and control of the Ukraine’s Supreme Soviet. A legitimate right
to form their own armies on the basis of the conventional forces that were formerly
part of the armed forces of the USSR the newly independent states acquired as a result
of the agreement reached by the heads of the member states of then just founded CIS
on the meeting in Minsk on 30 December 1991, Article 2 of which – “On Armed
Forces and Defence Units”- provided no obstacle for Ukraine to put into practice the
decision of its legislative body.
The intentions of the Ukrainian government to have its own navy did not alarm
Russians. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, in early
November 1991, noted that “the leadership (of Ukraine) was conducting itself very
tactfully in respect of our fleet, and that Ukraine was not laying claim to the whole
command but wanted “some kind of fleet, albeit a small one.”48 Before the formal
dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was actually the attitude of Ukrainian officials that
could not be used by the other side as a pretext for the establishment of a hardline
policy on the issue as, for instance, the statement of the Presidium of the Verkhovna
Rada in late November of 1991, which noted that the creation of the Ukrainian
military forces would proceed on “a legal base, stage by stage, by means of joint
definition of military policy…and holding consultations with other sovereign states
and the USSR Ministry of Defence to work out and implement a mechanism to reform
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the all-Union armed forces.”49 It must be added that the Western leaders were not
worried about Ukrainian naval ambitions either, as they were more concerned with
Kravchuk’s view about the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory, and this
matter monopolised the West’s policy towards Ukraine in the next two years after
Ukrainian independence.50
The attitude of both sides, however, had changed with Kravchuk’s election to
presidency. On 12 December 1992, Kravchuk issued a decree, which brought him to
the post of commander-in-chief of all armed forces of all armed forces deployed on
Ukrainian territory, a subsequent step of the implementation by Verkhovna Rada on 3
January 1992 of the law on armed forces and defence.51 The supplementary decision
of this decree announced Kyiv’s intentions to create its army on the basis of the troops
of the Kyiv, Odessa, and Carpathian military districts and the forces of the BSF,
except the units that compose the Strategic Deterrence Troops, and implement this
program within six weeks.52 This decision immediately caused sharp reaction in
Moscow and CIS Defence Minister Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov sent General
Boris Pyankov to Kyiv in order to explain to the Ukrainians what it was meant under
“strategic forces” in the CIS agreement of December 1991. However, it seemed that
Ukraine was determined in its claim over the whole of the BSF, because the official
statements by many Ukrainian high rank politicians repeatedly emphasised the urgent
necessity for Ukraine to have the BSF as a part of its armed forces.53
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This marked the beginning of a more than five-year squabble between Ukraine and
Russia over the ownership of the BSF, and this question in their bilateral relationship
was the one where materialisation of the conflict potential was not difficult to see.54
The unresolvednance of the problem could again be explained not exactly by the
military-strategic meaning of the BSF for each of the states, but by analysis of the
political courses and objectives of Ukraine and Russia, the former of which was trying
to guarantee sovereignty and inviolability of its borders and the letter – to revive an
empire that would include at least 12 republics, which would be a strong fundament
for the CIS.55  Thus, Ukraine’s unwillingness to stay within the CIS security
structures and be subordinated to the Joint Command, and Moscow’s unpreparedness
for such a development of events, drew a negative reaction from the Russian side.56
Although the 1992-1997 period in the military-political field of bilateral relations
between Ukraine and Russia did not record much positive progress, especially with
regard to the question of the BSF, and was usually characterised by stop-and-go
diplomatic negotiations, the solution to important problems came for many relatively
suddenly. Only a few senior Ukrainian officials had a hope that in May 1997 there
would also be agreement on the separate package of Fleet accords, when others
believed that the Russian President Boris Yeltsin would only sign the inter-state
treaty. So, despite the predictions of the majority of specialists, in May 1997, the
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and his Ukrainian counterpart Lazarenko
signed three inter-governmental agreements on the BSF, the greatest surprise of which
was Moscow’s acceptance of provisions similar to, or even less favourable than, those
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which it had rejected in October 1996.57 Thus, the May 1997 agreements redefined
the relationship between the two states, producing a stimulus for greater co-operation
and marking an attempt to persuade Ukraine that its future lies in closer integration
with Russia. However, from Kyiv’s perspective, these agreements represented a
vindication of Kuchma’s policy, aiming at strengthening of ties with the West, which
have been elaborated through the years. This ‘vector’ of foreign policy was now
interpreted as “diplomatic manoeuvring” by the Ukrainian president “merely designed
to achieve reintegration with Russia on the best possible terms,” whereas the Fleet
accords were said to be “a cynical manoeuvre by a desperate president, determined to
distract attention from his economic failures as the 1998-99 elections approach.”58
In order to understand the meaning of the May 1997 agreements and the impact they
and the question of the BSF itself have had on the political situation in the Crimea and
on Russian-Ukrainian relations, one has to examine the developments related to the
dispute, attempts to resolve the situation and the reasons of their failures.
4.6.2. The Evolution of the Dispute
On 3 January 1992, Ukraine started building its national armed forces. All the military
personnel located on the Ukrainian territory, including the sailors and the command of
the BSF, were expected to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine before the end of
January. Thus, on 4 January, Ukrainian Defence Minister, Konstantin Morozov,
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announced that the BSF “should belong to Ukraine.”59 Yeltsin’s response a few days
later was that the BSF was and would remain Russian.60 General Shaposhnikov
expressed an even sharper critique, saying that Kyiv’s moves to assert the control over
the BSF were hastily and ill-considered and in violation of the accords agreed upon in
Minsk on 30 December 1991.61 The main argument put forward by Russia to
denounce Ukraine’s claim was a formula, agreed in the Minsk Agreement on the
means of division of the military assets of the Soviet Union, in accordance with which
the term “strategic forces” was defined as
group formations; units; institutions; the military training institutes for the strategic
missile troops; air force; navy; air defences; the directorates of the navy command, of
the airborne troops and of strategic and operational intelligence; …the nuclear
technical units; and the forces, equipment and other military facilities designed for the
control and maintenance of the strategic forces of the former USSR.62
This definition put all the forces of the USSR under the strategic umbrella (80% of the
BSF, according to this definition, would fall under the jurisdiction of the CIS Joint
Command), leaving only the small portion of the ground forces to the disposition of
the republics. This, of course, was not something that Ukraine was expecting to get as
even if Ukraine had laid claim to the whole BSF it could still be contemplated as
normal, because at the beginning of 1992, the BSF counted for 10% of the whole sea
forces of the ex-USSR, while Ukraine’s portion of the external debt of the USSR was
fixed at 16,35%, thus, giving it a right to ask for an additional 6% of the military
assets that used to belong to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the contribution of
the UkrSSR to the budget of the USSR during many years was about 25%.63
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Unfortunately, the Ukrainian side did not put this question on the official agenda of
the negotiations, though it certainly could be used as a bargaining chip.
Even at that time it was clear that a kind of compromise must be found. Speaking in
strictly financial terms, it was not only Ukraine who would have a loss; in order to
relocate its fleet and to build new facilities Russia would pay heavily, too.
Unquestionably, the naval bases contribute considerably to the Ukrainian economy;64
there are several possible means to assess the value of the ships and other equipment
used in the fleet, “yet the value of the naval infrastructure ashore probably surpasses
that of the vessels both in strategic and budgetary terms.”65 However, neither of the
sides wanted to make concessions, trying to get as much as possible, losing a
minimum. Consequently, as Ukraine and Russia were getting more concerned with
the assertion of influence over the BSF and little progress had been made at the first
round of the negotiations, the issue started to develop into a dispute.
As was noted earlier, the problem of the ownership of the BSF was linked with the
issue of Russian claims on the Crimea and Sevastopol. First resolutions concerning
the 1954 decision to transfer the Crimea under the Ukrainian jurisdiction and the one
calling for the unified BSF were passed by the Russian Duma on the same session. In
other words, one of the issues was always accompanied by other, though the question
of the status of the Crimea in particular was never on the official agenda of
negotiations. And as the tensions related to the Crimean question were always
aggravated by inflammatory statements of Russian officials, the same kind of
speeches could be heard concerning the BSF. Thus, during Rutskoy’s famous visit to
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the peninsula in early April 1992, on the question about whether he knew anything
about military equipment being transferred from the Crimea to Russia, Rutskoy
answered: “Why should we transfer anything from Russia to Russia?”66
Rutskoy’s remarks regarding the BSF and the status of the Crimea coincided with a
decree, issued by Yeltsin on 3 April 1992, warning Ukraine that any attempts to
change the status of the BSF unilaterally would force Russia to put the entire fleet
under its own jurisdiction; i.e. transfer it to the strategic forces of the CIS.67 Despite
these warnings, or even pushed by these statements [as the Ukrainian President in the
following document emphasised, the decision was taken “pursuant to the interference
of the leaders of the Russian Federation and the CIS Allied Armed Forces Command
with Ukraine’s internal affairs”], Kravchuk issued a decree “On Immediate Measures
for Building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” which, among other things, aimed at
the establishment of the Ukrainian navy on the basis of the BSF, deployed on the
territory of Ukraine.68 The decree instructed the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to
“proceed with formation of the Ukrainian Navy Command upon agreement, with
Supreme Commander of the CIS Allied Armed Forces, on an inventory of ships of the
Black Sea Fleet units to be temporary transferred under operational control of the CIS
Strategic Force Command.”69 The clear implication of this decree was the intention of
the Ukrainian side to lay claim over most of the fleet and to transfer only some units
to the jurisdiction of the CIS. Yeltsin’s response was a decree, issued on 7 April 1992,
calling for the fleet to be subordinated to the commander in chief of the CIS Joint
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Armed Forces. On April 9, after the issue was discussed on the telephone, the two
presidents headed off a potential confrontation by agreeing to suspend their decrees
and pursue further talks on the solution of the problem, but negotiating rounds that
followed produced no significant progress.
This kind of outcome from the 29-30 April negotiations in Odessa could actually be
anticipated, taking into consideration the developments that had taken place at that
time in the domestic politics of the Crimea. In the late April it was decided that the
next session of the Crimean Supreme Soviet would be dealing with the issue of the
referendum on independence. If the decision to hold the poll was approved – which
actually happened at 5 May session, when at the same time the Crimean parliament
had declared the creation of a sovereign state, the Republic of Crimea – and if the
result of the referendum were positive, then the Russian position with regard to the
fleet could change radically. As a matter of fact, Russia had only to wait for the final
results of the poll and then the problem of the BSF could be solved by itself as three
fourth of it was located on the territory of the peninsula.70 Although the Crimean
lawmakers hedged by adding an amendment to the declaration confirming that the
Crimea remained a part of Ukraine, it was indicated that the scheduled August
referendum would proceed.71
It is worth-noting that simultaneously the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was taking
measures that could strengthen the Ukrainian position concerning the fleet vis-à-vis
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Russia. On 9 April 1992, Ukraine’s legislative body issued a resolution “On
Additional Measures to Ensure Adoption of Nuclear-Free Status by Ukraine,”
confirming Ukraine’s intention to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.72 Deputies
also examined a draft document, later presented to the Russian delegation, “On the
Creation of a Nuclear-Free Black Sea Zone,” declaring the Black Sea basin a zone of
peace.73 The document included an appeal to the UN Assembly and its Secretary
General with the request to support this initiative. By doing so, the Ukrainian MP’s
wanted to neutralise Russia’s trump card that the BSF was a nuclear force and
therefore should remain under the jurisdiction of the military command of the CIS, the
successor of the USSR. On 6 May 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were transferred
from the territory of Ukraine, including those of the BSF, thus forcing Russia to
replace the “strategic” argument with more nationalistic, emotional, and historical
arguments that had “continued to solidify since then into a coherent strategy.”74
“Consequently, initial claims by the CIS High Command that the Black Sea Fleet was
required to counter the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea smacked more
of traditional cold war rhetoric than any real basis in contemporary strategic
thinking.”75
4.6.3. The Dagomys Agreement
After almost a year, presidents of Ukraine and Russia finally sat at the negotiating
table at the Russian Caucasian resort town of Dagomys in order to make an effort to
resolve some of the outstanding questions. Although, the wide-ranging agreement was
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signed on 23 June 1992, the intention of the parties was to use this accord as a
preliminary step that would clear the way for a “new, full-scale political treaty.”76
The Dagomys summit mainly dealt with the status of the strategic forces of the CIS
and the implementation of the two parties’ obligations, concerning several agreements
on strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the negotiations were dominated by economic
issues. The two sides agreed to coordinate their actions with regard to the
reorganisation of payments and the financial transactions, the regulation of
commercial relations, including relations between enterprises of military-industrial
complex.77 Such interest in the economic side of the relationship could be explained
by the fact that the situation in both Russia and Ukraine was far from satisfactory and
any dispute in this sphere might be counterproductive for the implementation of
fundamental economic reforms domestically, which in turn would have a great impact
on the future of both Kravchuk and Yeltsin as political leaders.
As regards the BSF, the Dagomys agreement called for the continuation of the
negotiations aimed at creation of a Russian and Ukrainian Navy on the basis of the
BSF. The sides also reaffirmed their readiness to refrain from unilateral actions and to
finance the fleet jointly until its complete division. Although, the Dagomys agreement
did not resolve any particular problem regarding the fleet, it provided the basis for
future negotiations, thus, marking the beginning of a long process. However, it must
be added that the question of who “owns” the Crimea was not on the agenda of the
negotiations. This was a significant achievement for the Ukrainian side inasmuch as it
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amounted to Russian acquiescence to Ukraine’s position that the Crimean issue was
strictly an internal matter of Ukraine and, therefore, not subject to discussion with
other countries.78
Before the negotiations following the Dagomys accord resumed new disputes arose,
highlighting the unstable situation within the fleet. The tensions once again increased
when the Fleet Officers’ Assembly, an apparently pro-Russian element within the
BSF, accused the Ukrainian Defence Ministry of trying to “Ukranianise” the fleet by
encouraging servicemen to swear allegiance to Ukraine.79 Contrary to these
arguments, there was much evidence that those who had sworn allegiance to Ukraine
were persecuted by the pro-Russian command of the fleet: unbearable conditions had
been maintained for sailors in order to force them to retract their decision for military
serving, officers were dismissed from their posts, which led to inefficiency. Those
who had not yet at that time taken an oath were scared by the so-called
“Ukrainisation” and in a case of which promotion priorities would be given to one
who knew Ukrainian and who was of Ukrainian nationality.80
These developments almost led to violence on two occasions – first, when the
Ukrainian command and sailors, asserting their right to land facilities, had decided to
use one of the garrisons in Sevastopol, the majority of the personnel of which took an
oath of allegiance to Ukraine. On 14 July 1992, Russian sailors, acting under the
direct orders of Admiral Igor Kasatonov – the BSF commander- reasserted control of
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this naval garrison.81 Again, a more serious incident occurred on 21 July 1992, when a
BSF frigate – SKR-112, after hosting the Ukrainian flag, took course to the port of
Odessa. It was followed by the vessels and aircraft, loyal to the BSF, but, an effort to
force it to return was unsuccessful.82 These incidents, in fact, were another proof of
the complexity of the situation and the difficulty in finding a common language in the
dispute.
4.6.4. The Yalta Agreement
The summit held in Yalta on 3 August 1992 produced an agreement removing the
BSF from under the military command of the CIS and placed it under joint Russian-
Ukrainian control for a transition period of three years (until the end of 1995). The
two governments were to have equal authority over the appointment and dismissal of
a joint command; fleet facilities were also to be used jointly and the fleet was to be
manned equally by Russian and Ukrainian conscripts.83 However, from the very
beginning it was clear that the agreement would bring even more confusion into the
issue rather than resolve it, therefore it made for more serious tensions.
The fact that the key questions of how to divide, command and finance the fleet
during the transitional period were not directly addressed was giving a chance for
both sides to interpret the provisions in the suitable for them way and many of these
provisions later became points of contention. As a consequence, on 31 March 1993,
                                                          
81 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
82 Lepingwell, pp. 79-80.
83 Ibid., p. 50; Savchenko, pp. 84-85.
155
the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine issued a statement, saying that it was examining
proposals to be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on renouncing the validity of the
Yalta agreement.
“This step has been caused by constant violations of bilateral accords on the Black
Sea Fleet by the Russian military department, which constantly distorts the
interpretation of the main principles set down in the Yalta agreement, and assigns the
task of exchanging, removing, storing, and redeploying military hardware to the
command of the BSF, without coordinating with the Ministry of defence.” 84
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence went further to allege that Ukrainian funding of
the joint BSF command was being diverted to pay salaries of the Russian crew at
Russian rates, instructed to do so by the Russian Federation’s government.85
The response came from the pro-Russian BSF press centre, which stressed that “the
Defence Ministry’s statement can be assessed as an attempt to disavow the signature
of the president, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, put to the
Yalta agreement through the supreme legislative body.” It has also warned that such
actions can lead to “stirring up of inter-ethnic hatred at the fleet because they were
inflicting moral and material damage to both states.”86 Russian Defence Ministry, on
its side, said that its Ukrainian counterpart was trying to exercise control over the
BSF, bypassing the two presidents.87 This kind of reaction had to be expected as the
decision to put the fleet under joint command was taken without consideration of the
fact that in reality there was no Russian Navy and no separate Ukrainian Navy; there
was the BSF, which was oriented towards Russia and subordinated to the orders of the
CIS armed forces command – surrogate for Russia’s military command.
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4.6.5. The Moscow Agreement of June 1993
While the Yalta agreement did little to reduce tension among the fleet personnel, it
prompted another summit in Moscow in June of 1993 where the two parties agreed to
split the BSF equally, to establish interstate commission that would deal with the fleet
division, and, in order to strengthen the ties between Russia and Ukraine, it was
decided that efforts were to be made to speed up work on drafting political treaty.88
Thus, while the Moscow agreement did appear to include some significant
achievements on certain issues, it was clear that the vagueness and absence of
decisions on tough questions would make this effort to attain final solution fail, as
even at that moment the prospects for ratification by both parliaments were doubtful.
A day earlier before the Moscow agreement was signed, an emergency session of the
Crimean Supreme Soviet, opened on 16 June 1993, adopted an appeal to the
Ukrainian and Russian presidents calling on them to preserve the BSF as a single
military unit, “taking into account the social, economic and defensive interests of the
Crimea, while considering the retention of Sevastopol as the fleet’s main base.”89
Although the decision to split up the BSF was taken, this statement certainly gave an
impetus for those who opposed the division of the fleet. Thus, the agreement was
immediately denounced by an Assembly of the BSF Officers, and received a negative
reaction from the Russian politicians, who, on their side, issued a declaration to all
BSF personnel declaring support for public and political movements in Russia,
                                                                                                                                                                     
86 SWB, 8 April 1993.
87 SWB, 12 April 1993.
88 SWB, 19 June 1993.
89 FBIS-SOV-93-115, 17 June 1993.
157
Ukraine, and other CIS countries, which “stand for preserving the BSF, the work and
honour of several generations of our people, as a single unit.”90
Taking into consideration the decision of the Russian parliament of 9 July 1993 that
declared Sevastopol part of the Russian Federation, it could be argued that as the
failure of the attempt to initiate the referendum on independence of the Crimea
strengthened Ukraine’s sovereignty over the peninsula, Russian political circles put
all their efforts in to the retention of Russia’s presence in Sevastopol as a minimum
task. This particularly became apparent when Ukraine declared that only the fleet, not
land-based facilities, should be divided, and backed this statement by an argument
that the permanent presence of the military bases of another state would infringe the
territorial integrity of Ukraine. It gives grounds to argue that “the BSF issue
essentially has been reduced to a test of sovereignty right over Sevastopol.”91
Therefore, Russian officials have continued to insist that “Sevastopol is, and will be,
the Russian naval base,” a view expressed by the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev,
who has also argued that “the same relates to the Black Sea Fleet, whose division is
absurd in itself. Sevastopol was a Russia’s naval base and it must remain as such.”92
Increasingly politicised officers of the BSF opposing fleet division and supporting
Russia’s claim to the sovereignty over the Sevastopol, the majority of population
where is Russian, dreaming of being a part of Russia, and the Crimean pro-Russian
government, convincing the sides of the need to retain the unified fleet: all aggravated
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the situation on the peninsula, weakening Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis the Russian
state.
4.6.6. The Massandra Agreement
In September 1993, on the summit in the southern Crimean town of Massandra,
Russia proposed that Ukraine give up its share of the fleet that would be counted as a
payment of debt for energy supplies and lease Sevastopol for the Russian Navy.
Although the Russian media had subsequently reported that Ukraine agreed to give up
its share of the fleet, ratification by the Ukrainian parliament could only be seen as
illusionary.93 It was obvious that if a fleet-debt exchange were viable, the perceived
unfairness of such a transaction would leave Ukrainian ultranationalists bitter,
“fuelling the cold war dynamics.”94 Back in Kyiv, Kravchuk tried to explain his
position by saying that “an unflexible stand on the Black Sea Navy problem and on
the Crimea may result in Ukraine losing them both,” but added, apparently realising
that ratification in the parliament was highly improbable, that “if the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet, after examining the Russian offer, chose to blackball the Crimean
version,” Ukraine would have to find other sources to repay its debt to Russia.95
Although some politicians spoke in favour of transfer of the military bases deployed
in Sevastopol to Russia for rent, as did the then Ukrainian Premier Minister, Leonid
Kuchma, who said that “this would be the proof that Russia recognised Sevastopol as
Ukraine’s territory” and underlined that “Russia would not leave Sevastopol just like
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that.”96 Kravchuk, accused of high treason by influential nationalist forces, de facto
disavowed the signing of the document.
Rossiyskaya Gazeta saying that the fate of the BSF became clear and that in a month
Russian banners would be raised over the ships, stated that the Ukrainian president
had no other choice than to accept the proposals as Ukraine was “under considerable
pressure because of its empty coffers and the more than baleful state of its economy.
Kravchuk knew perfectly well that if the decision on the BSF failed to meet the
aspirations of the Black Sea sailors – subordinating the fleet to a single and definitely
Russian command – then the servicemen would themselves cover Sevastopol Bay
with St. Andrew’s flags the very next day.”97
In April 1994 there were new incidents, which might have degenerate into a full-scale
conflict between Russia and Ukraine in their continuing “war” over the fate of the
BSF. One of the incidents was the arrest of a Russian survey ship by Ukrainian forces.
The more serious one, later known as the “Odessa Incident,” occurred when on 9
April 1994 Ukraine airborne units were sent to stop a hydrographic vessel Cheleken,
belonging to the BSF, which left the port of Odessa with valuable navigational
equipment worth $10 million that was property of the port. The Cheleken
commanders ordered the 318th Division of the BSF to fire on the borderguard boats of
the Ukrainian Navy, but it did not comply with the order as most of the servicemen
were Ukrainians. Although force was not used, the incident was the most serious to
date. It prompted the Ukrainian Defence Ministry to begin incorporating more BSF
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units into the Ukrainian Navy in order to avoid conflicts over whose orders sailors
were to follow.98 These developments caused a negative reaction in the Russian
capital and another agreement, suspending the incorporation of the BSF units into the
Ukrainian Navy, was forged on 15 April 1994 in Moscow between the two
presidents.99
At the bilateral Ukrainian-Russian talks on the level of defence ministers held in
Sevastopol on 21-22 April 1994, details on an agreement regulating the problems of
the BSF were worked out. It was agreed that Ukraine would receive 18.3% or 164
operational vessels and the remainder of ships 31.7% were to be transferred to Russia,
either in return for settling Ukraine’s debts or to be sold. Thus, Russia would have at
its disposition 669 ships of different classes.100 However, the sides could not agree on
the issue of the naval bases and Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, abruptly
left Sevastopol, without signing of any protocol. During the negotiations he said that
“Sevastopol should be the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. …The fleet should also
be based in Balaklava, Feodosiya, Kerch and Donuzlav, where the main forces of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet are deployed and also where units and formations are
stationed. It is clear that we do have the right to, and we will not undermine the
combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet, a battleworthy and full-blooded formation of
the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as this would create a real threat to the
security of Russia in this region.”101
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The Ukrainian side initially suggested that the BSF be based at Donuzlav, but when
this option was rejected, the Ukrainians proposed to share Sevastopol as a base for
two fleets.
4.6.7. Kuchma at the Helm
On 10 July 1994, Leonid Kuchma was elected a new president of Ukraine. Usually
identified as pro-Russian, Kuchma was seen to be more open to compromise with the
Russians than was his rather “nationalist” predecessor. However, even the willingness
of the new president to improve relations with Russia did not help in finding a lasting
solution to the BSF dispute. The BSF bases in Izmail, Ochakov, Donuzlav and
Balaklava were now the places of dislocation of the Ukrainian Navy. On the
negotiating table in August of the same year it was proposed that Russia pay for
leasing the bases to accommodate the interests of the Crimeans, but no specific
response was made to the Ukrainian proposal.102
On the eve of the Sochi meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents,
people in Russia started once again saying that Kyiv’s position hardened. Moskovskie
Novosti, in one of the articles, trying to assess the pre-meeting situation, had argued
that the Ukrainian position was substantially reinforced by the West as it [Ukraine]
received large credits on favourable terms. Author said that “the West lent serious
support to Kiev during the Crimean crisis in April, in effect forcing the Russian
authorities to forget use of their main trump card – the unresolved problem of
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Ukraine’s debt,” and Clinton’s visit to Kyiv convinced Ukrainian politicians that the
trans-Atlantic power was on their side. As the comments to the question of whether
the West was trying to isolate Russia from the civilised world with a buffer of
unviable states because of a preconceived view of Russia as a country that had
incurably aggressive aspirations, the author asserted that it would be unadvisable for
the West to do so “as long as there was still a chance of bringing Russia itself into the
system of Western values.” Adding that the creation of an anti-Russian buffer would
put Ukrainian unity to a serious test as there were strong secessionist movements
within Ukraine, author nonetheless did not forget to mention dangers that Russia
would be faced with in that situation. He said that “the creation of a pan-European
coalition incorporating Ukraine and directed against Russia would be an outright
nightmare for Russian diplomacy,” since “Moscow, lacking sufficient economic and
military potential to maintain a balance between the blocs, would hardly be able to
formulate a rational policy that would enable it to effectively safeguard its
interests.”103
4.6.8. The Sochi Agreement
On 9 June 1995, in Sochi, Yeltsin and Kuchma concluded what was to be one of the
most important agreements in the long history of the BSF talks. In terms of its basic
parameters, a new accord duplicated the documents that Russia and Ukraine signed in
the past and that had been violated repeatedly since then. The property of the BSF was
to be divided in half, in accordance with the separate agreement that had not been
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signed yet; the ships and vessels were to be partitioned on the basis outlined earlier
(i.e. part of Ukrainian share of the BSF would be given to Russia as a payment for
energy debt); fleet officers and warrant officers were free to decide their future, i.e.
which state they want to serve. More importantly, the so-called Sochi protocol, clearly
stipulating that the Crimea formed part of Ukraine, was signed as a separate
document. This document was the first after the 1994 Tripartite Agreement and
Budapest Agreement of the same year to express explicitly Ukraine’s sovereignty
over the Crimea.104
However, most of the attention was directed to the formulation of the part of the
agreement related to basing. During the negotiations Russia agreed to the formulation:
“The Russian fleet will be based in Sevastopol.” It agreed to withdraw the expression
it insisted to use earlier “Sevastopol is the main base of the Russian fleet” – the
wording that could be interpreted as territorial claim on the Ukrainian sovereignty
over Sevastopol. The use of the latter expression could mean that only the Russian
fleet would be based in Sevastopol, however the new formulation did not exclude the
possibility that the two navies could be jointly based there.105 The question of separate
basing was not resolved later in November 1995, when 26 agreements, related to the
division of the fleet, were signed by the defence ministers of the two sides.106
Although, the agreement was received as a “breakthrough,” it was clear that the
opposition on the both sides would be soon criticising vehemently the decisions
                                                          
104 Sherr, p. 36, 48.
105 Moshes, p. 134; Aleksandr Keretsky, “Yeltsin and Kuchma Have Reached Agreement: The Dispute
Continues,” Kommersant Daily, 14 June 1995 in The Current Digest, Vol. XLVII, No. 23 (1995), p.
13.
164
reached in Sochi and it was by no means an end of the “battle.” Thus, already in
September, Boris Yeltsin had stated that Ukraine was deviating from the Sochi
agreement on the BSF – the allegations that the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Yevhen
Marchuk, described as “unfounded,” whereas the Chairman of Verkhovna Rada, said
that the sides now were very close to the final solution of the problem.107
Probably the Russian president’s words were another attempt to undermine the deal
and another evidence of the real intentions of political circles in Russia, the aim of
which was the retention of Russia’s presence on the peninsula. Commenting on this
issue, the former commander of the BSF and then first deputy commander of Russia’s
naval forces, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, in September 1995, expressed his hope that the
complicated situation, given Ukraine’s “attempts to oust Russia” from the Crimea,
would be improved after Russia’s legislative body elections, as the new Duma would
be more receptive to Russia’s position on the BSF.108 The same idea was once again
reiterated by a delegation of the Russian Duma deputies, headed by the Duma CIS
Affairs Committee Chairman, Georgiy Tikhonov, and made up mainly of the
Communists and Agrarians, to Sevastopol, where they warned Ukraine that it would
be unable to appropriate its share of the BSF as the Russian elections in June would
bring to power “forces that will stop the fleet’s break-up.”109 All this was happening
despite the fact that the pro-Russian Crimean parliament, working on a new
constitution and trying to produce a document amenable to both Simferopol and Kyiv,
approved the article of the draft, stipulating that the Republic of Crimea was “an
autonomous constituent part of Ukraine,” whereas Sevastopol was defined as “an
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inseparable part of Ukraine,” thus giving no special status in line with the wishes of
political and military leaders in Moscow.110
The first step to put its plans into life was taken by the Russian Duma on 14 February
1996, when it passed a bill halting BSF partition,111 thus caused the second stage of
partition to fail. And although there was a sign of progress, as a newly-adopted
Constitution of Ukraine in its Transitional Provision (Paragraph 14) provided for “the
use of existing military bases on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing
of foreign military formations … on the terms of lease,” the Russian Duma, with no
votes against and no sign of dissent, on 23 October 1996 adopted a resolution “On
Abrogating the Division of the Black Sea Fleet,” pending international treaties,
regulating the whole range of relations between Russia and Ukraine. It also made a
direct claim on the sovereignty over Sevastopol and, obliquely, the Crimea. The
Duma’s action was an attempt to upgrade the territorial claim from the political to the
constitutional and state level;112 the decision came as a surprise for those who thought
that previous similar resolutions of 1992 and 1993 were the products of the old era.
Some explained that such decision was an outcome of Yeltsin’s absence, while others,
like Vladimir Lukin, said that “the Russian deputies were frustrated that Ukraine had
blocked several previous agreements on the fleet’s disposition.”113 One plausible
explanation, advanced by the Russian Public Television, was that “Chernomyrdin
deliberately engineered a “scare” to push Ukraine into conceding points still in
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dispute.”114 However, the Verkhovna Rada was preparing a no less challenging
resolution, which was to remind Russia, as well as the West that “Russia’s guarantee
of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the 14 January 1994 Tripartite Agreement was a
precondition to Ukraine’s unilateral nuclear disarmament,” threatened to “fix a date
for the withdrawal of the BSF” and to “annul paragraph 14 of the Constitution’s
Temporary Provisions.”115 Similar extreme actions were also initiated by some
Ukrainian political parties.116
4.6.9. The Final Accords
Despite all the differences in the positions of the two sides and pressure from political
groups in Russia and Ukraine, Chernomyrdin and Lazarenko signed a total of 14
inter-governmental documents on 28 May 1997. The mere fact that these agreements
were signed by the prime ministers and not presidents meant that they could be legally
implemented without parliamentary ratification; the “formula adopted that they ‘enter
into force from the date of signature and are temporally operative until parliamentary
ratification’ – seems to express the wish of both governments to have it both ways.”117
Most importantly, the treaty put to the end the confrontation over the legal status of
the Crimea, Sevastopol, and the BSF; the possibility of raising claims over their status
on the official level in the future was made impossible. Thus, the Ukrainian
newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli, commenting on the signing of the final agreement, said
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that one of the states [Russia] now not only in theory, but also in practice had to
abandon the idea of “destroying the sovereignty” of the other state and claimed that it
became only now possible to talk about any kind of partnership.118 Additionally, the
treaty represented “the cutting of knots” preventing normal economic relationships
and guaranteed stable supplies of fuel” for Ukraine, “confirming beyond doubt that
these obstacles, including tariffs and energy cuts, were ‘artificial’ … imposed by
Russia for political reasons.”119
However, with the signing of these treaties more confusion had been brought to the
definitions of Ukraine’s foreign and security policy. The set of treaties between
Russia and Ukraine represent the second part of Ukraine’s official foreign policy
formula - “Integration with the West, Cooperation with the CIS,”120 but the question
here is whether the first part of the formula would retain its weight. This seems to be
more problematic if one to consider Russian-Ukrainian Joint Declaration’s provision
“to cooperate in ensuring the security of the southern borders of our two countries,”
which appears to reintroduce the principle of “external CIS borders” that Ukraine
have been rejecting for many years.121  One of the Russian newspapers Sovetskaya
Pravda called both the BSF agreements and “big” treaty a significant, yet tactical,
victory of Chernomyrdin, as “the Russian Prime Minister was able to win back from
his colleagues from Kiev a number of important conditions, related not only to the
role of Russia in providing Ukraine with the energy and participation of the Russian
companies in the petrol market, but also spheres which were very far from “gas
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interests” such as the BSF bases and the rent prices.” The newspaper added that the
treaty might either aggravate the situation in Russian-Ukrainian relations or facilitate
rapid reconciliation between two countries.122 Thus, according to Russian observers,
the treaty favoured their side and not the Ukrainian.
There are other problems related to the treaty on the BSF, which show that despite the
fact that Russia has ceded the Crimea, its tools for pressure remain. One of the issues
concerns the economic side of the agreement. Russia has agreed to pay a rent of
$97.75 million per annum, which in 20 years will cover $1.95 billion of the $3.074
billion debt that Ukraine must pay Russia. If to consider Russia’s payment for
Ukraine’s 31.7% part of the fleet - $526.5 million and compensation over the nuclear
tactical weapons $200 million, over 20 years Ukraine will receive $2.5 million, not
much short of the debt which it has to discharge. However, Ukraine must pay this
debt back within ten years and as it will be paying more it receives, there is a threat of
Ukraine falling behind the schedule and, accordingly, creating a risk that Russia will
request renegotiation.123
There are problems related to the military aspect of the lease, which was agreed for a
period of 20 years (renewable for a further five). Although it represents a compromise
between Russia’s initial bid for 40 years and Ukraine’s desire for 5-7, an important
questions to ask are: “What will happen in case of military attack by the Russian fleet
on other state?” What will be the consequences for the Ukrainian state in such an
event in legal terms?” What would happen if the Russian adversary initiated
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counterattack aimed at the territory of Ukraine? Actually, “the absence of an
agreement on actions to be taken by both parties in case of emergency situations and
the need to rescue people in the open sea” remains the most important unresolved
issue among the parties.124
Another very important problem for Ukraine will be the presence of the Russian
officers, sailors and their families for the next 20-25 years which puts doubts over the
idea that the signed agreement will somehow facilitate the end for the secessionist
aspirations on the Crimean peninsula.
Nonetheless, the agreement was concluded and it must be admitted that for Ukraine
Yeltsin’s regime was “a lesser evil in a country still inclined to think in imperial
terms,” which is “also weak, with too many power centres inside it, and too much
opposition outside it.” It was no secret that if one of the most capable opponents –
Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, General Aleksandr Lebed, or the LDPR leader
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy – were to inherit the problem of the BSF, the situation might
be much different.125 At the same time, it was also true that psychological framework
within which policy had been made was changing. One evidence for this was the May
1997 Founding Act with the NATO. Ivan Rybkin was graphic on this issue, saying
that
“We have to find the strength within ourselves to overcome this obsession with
Sevastopol. …Putting reunification of [the] Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia on the
agenda would be to launch a new Chechen war. If Russia and Ukraine can rise to the
level to which de Gaulle and Adenauer rose in their time to solve the issue of Alsace
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and Lorraine, then we will be able to work together, help each other and overcome
mistrust. We must look at the world with open eyes and see it as it really is.”126
4.7. Issue of the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars and the Role of Turkey
The Crimean peninsula had always been of the utmost importance for Turkey. During
the times of the Ottoman Empire the lands north of the Black Sea provided the basis
for the Ottoman’s power. However, the Russian annexation of the Crimea created a
serious threat to the very existence of Turkey and led to the emergence of the so-
called “Eastern Question,” i.e. a possible partition of the Ottoman Empire. The demise
of the USSR came therefore as a relief for Turkey. The establishment of the
independent states on the territory of the old empire was welcomed by the Turks; and,
certainly, its northern neighbour - Ukraine was among the most important countries
for Turkey. The Ukrainian interests in maintaining and retaining their independent
democratic state and restraining all those Russian forces longing for the revival of the
old empire exactly coincided with the interests of Turkey.127
It is curious to note that when putting forward arguments promoting Russian claims
over the Crimea, many Russian politicians and pro-Russian circles in the Crimea itself
were stressing that by accepting Ukrainian jurisdiction over the Crimea, ‘they’ were
granting the rights to claim the Crimea to Turkey, which had jurisdiction over the
peninsula before the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was signed, in 1774. However, the
meaninglessness of such allegations was proved by Russian international experts
themselves, who stated that the 1774 treaty recognised the Crimea and adjacent
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regions “independent of authority,” i.e. declaring the Crimea an independent territory.
Only in 1783 was the Crimea annexed by Russia, which did not give Turkey any
ground for territorial claims either against Russia or Ukraine.128 Turkey has, on the
other hand, always given unequivocal support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine
and stated that the peninsula should belong to Ukraine and not any other state (i.e.
Russia).
As far as Turkey’s position is concerned, one of the most critical factors in the
Crimean issue is the question of the Crimean Tatars, the closest group in terms of
ethnic make-up, language, and customs to the Turks of Turkey.129 Although the
Crimean Tatars have their own distinct rich past and national formation, their history
was always associated with that of Turkey. Even after the Russian annexation of the
Crimea these ties did not weaken, one of the main reasons for this was the big waves
of migration of the Crimean Tatars to Turkey. According to some statistics, though
they are not official, there are not less than five millions immigrants from the Crimea
and their descendants, now living in Turkey.
When talking about the relationship of the Crimean Tatars with the Turks of Turkey
an important issue to examine is the question of religion. The Crimean Tatar
community has always been deeply religious. Even when the peninsula became a part
of Russia, the activities of the religious circles were very intensive: as the religious
teaching was controlled, young people were sent to Turkey to study in the Ottoman
medreses. During the first years of the USSR, Islam was seen as a kind of weapon
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against the Bolshevism and almost all mosques and religious institutions in the
Crimea were closed down by the Bolsheviks. After the repatriation, the Crimean
Tatars could hardly find any signs of Islam on the territory of the peninsula; all
building of the mosques were either destroyed or used as warhouses. It is important to
say, however, that people were more concerned with socio-economic problems, but,
indifference towards these problems on the side of the Crimean and Ukrainian
authorities pushed some of the Crimean Tatars to rethink the means to achieve their
goals; thus, for instance, the Milli Fırka [the Nationalist Party] and Party of Revival of
the Islam in the Crimea, both of which propagate radical Islamist views. There are
other religious organisations, many of which have their own newspapers and
magazines. In total, there are more than 130 organisations of that type but of different
calibre operating on the territory of peninsula. So, Islam is a very important factor in
the lives of the Crimean Tatars and their attempts to preserve their national identity,
which is very difficult to do amidst the predominantly Slav population; it also became
a kind of bridge connecting the Crimean Tatars with other Muslim states, particularly,
Turkey, and serious involvement in the revival of religious life in the Crimea.130
Possibly, the issue of the Crimean Tatars was one of the most important factors
determining the nature of Turkish-Ukrainian relations. The problems related to the
repatriation and reintegration of the Crimean Tatars constantly appeared on the
agenda of the bilateral negotiations of these two states. The plight of the Crimean
Tatars attracted the attention of the Turkish public, which organised several large-
scale campaigns of humanitarian aid; most of such initiatives were undertaken by the
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Crimean Tatar diaspora. At the same time, the activities of the Turkish government
had a positive effect in that the Ukraine started to pay more attention to the problems
of the Crimean Tatars.
It was clear that the Ukrainian government understood the importance of the Crimean
Tatar factor in its domestic politics; it also knew that the Crimean Tatars turned out to
constitute the only organised force determined to defend the Ukrainian interests on the
peninsula. However, the Ukrainian government in order not to irritate the pro-Russian
forces further always refrained from acting decisively in support of the Crimean
Tatars. An important reason restraining the Ukrainian authorities in helping the
Crimean Tatars is that it is afraid that while trying to defeat Russian separatism it may
foster a Crimean Tatar one.131 The pro-Russian population, especially media, of the
Crimea has always played the role of reminder of the possibility of the realisation of
such scenario and was granting Turkey in this story line the role of catalyst. Thus, for
instance, one of the newspaper articles, accusing Turkey of double standards in
dealing with separatism (supporting Chechens and Turkish Cypriots, but fighting
Kurds), gave advice to the Rukh leader Chornovil to “direct his attention to the
friendship and connections of Cemiloğlu [Kırımoğlu] and other leaders of the Meclis,
aimed at the establishment of the Crimean Tatar state on the territory of the Crimea,
with Turkey,” meaning Ukraine one day might be faced with the problem of Crimean
Tatar secessionism.132 It is not difficult to understand the irrationality of this
allegation as the fact that the Crimean Tatars constitute only 12% of the Crimean
population and as it is unlikely that the Slav immigrants will leave the country makes
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it hard to believe that these people would be able to claim territorial separation in the
future. Mass resentment in Russia of the ‘chorniye’ (black) in general – resentment
based on the assumption that they increase their demographic presence in the post-
Communist state, actually, always outwitted naïve Russians – had often been fed by
paranoia. What concerns Turkey in this case, Turkish diplomats have always been
stressing the fact that Turkey has no intentions of infringing upon the sovereignty of
its northern neighbour and that all the issues related to the Crimean Tatars are the
internal matter of Ukraine.133
It is important to note that while Turkish diplomats endeavoured to establish friendly
relations with Ukraine – to strengthen political and economic ties between two states
and to help its kinsmen - the Russian nationalists both in Russia and the Crimea
during the last few years made intense propaganda about the existence of the Turkish
threat. They put forward an argument claiming that Turkey, using the Crimean Tatar
card, is trying to re-assert its imperial presence in the Black Sea region. As a
supportive argument, those forces use a case with the BSF, saying that the division
and neglect that weakened dramatically the capacity of the fleet gives Turkey an
upper hand in the region and leaves the southern borders of Ukraine and Russia open
to military attack from the south.134 Sometimes this kind of “theories” reached
fantastic dimensions; for instance, there were rumours about Turkey’s supplying of
the large Crimean Tatar guerrilla groups on the peninsula or even landings of Turkish
arms and tanks on the Crimean shores.135 The leader of the Russian Party,
Shuvaynikov, in one of his interviews went on to assert that intensive work was going
                                                          
133 Hakan Kırımlı, “Turkey – Ukraine - Moldova,” p. 10.
134 Ibid., p. 13.
135 BBC Monitoring Service, 13 October 2000, as distributed by Reuters.
175
on aimed at initiation of a military conflict on the territory of the Crimea, an area
vitally important for the interests of the USA and Turkey.136 It is important to say that
such rumours, despite their absurdity, were usually very effective in ‘contributing’ to
the inflammation of inter-ethnic relations in the Crimea; a continuity of similar
allegations also may damage diplomatic relations between Ukraine, Russia, and
Turkey.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis is an attempt to trace the developments related to the constitutional process
in the Crimea. It is depicted in the context of inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula, as
one of the major problems, not only for the Crimea but, also, for Ukraine remains that
of the Crimean Tatars.
 The constitutional process in any state would aim to give an entity its legal “passport”
that would be the reflection of the historic, ethnic, and cultural peculiarities of region.
In our case this legal document had to be integrated into the general texture of
political and economic life of a state of which the Crimea is a part, i.e. Ukraine.
However, the analysis of the constitutional process in the Crimea had given us an idea
that the main aim was not to find a legal solution to the problem the Crimea had been
faced after the dissolution of the USSR with regard to its status and the status of the
people living there. On the contrary, the actions of those who were in power were
always aimed at acquirement of greater autonomy, even independence, from the
centre and, by doing so, they wanted to satisfy the secessionist-minded Russian
majority of the population. For its part, the Ukrainian government, most of the time
tried to avoid implementing tough measures against the Crimean politicians in order
not to open the way for more serious scenarios and endeavoured to mollify the
antagonism the Russian-speaking population of the Crimea nourished towards the
Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatars. As a result of this, the problems of the native
population of Crimea remained unresolved; the new constitution did not take into
consideration any of the demands of these people and, most importantly, their right
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for representation in the power structures of the republican government was not
secured.
Always talking about the potential of large-scale conflict that could be initiated by the
Russian population of the peninsula if it is not appeased, many people fail to
understand that this element of the Crimean population has a much lower potential for
mass mobilisation (of course, if it does not have strong support and inspiration from
the outside), as it does not have grounds for doing so. Instead, the Crimean Tatars are
more prone to such conflicts as they are very well organised and, representing a
unified force with strong leadership, are easily mobilised. Therefore, further delay in
adoption of legislation related to the solution of the problems of these people may
result in transformation of the rather peaceful national movement into extremely
radical political force within the ARC, which in turn can lead to the escalation of the
crisis. Correspondingly, the adoption of the Crimean constitution only aggravated the
situation instead of promoting inter-ethnic accord and stability on the peninsula.
While the 1944 deportation produced nationalism and strengthened national
consciousness among the Crimean Tatars, as an unfamiliar and often hostile
environment and society reinforced their interconnectedness, the repatriation of these
people had come to mean the further development of a strong sense of self-identity as
a coherent nation. Nowadays, the Crimean Tatars are endeavouring to preserve their
ethno-cultural and religious traditions and to bequeath them to the next generation.
That is why their drive towards self-identification, stemming mainly from their fear of
losing this identity and being assimilated within the Slav culture, should be properly
understood and respected. Avoiding a solution to their problems on the national level
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and on the basis of the central legislation may cause in the future bigger problems for
Ukraine when the democratic norms of the country will be much closer to those of the
Western world. In this respect, deeper insight into the problem (beyond the level of
economic conditions, which are indeed lamentable) is desirable not only from the side
of the Ukrainian authorities, but also from that of international community, as the
attainment of stability and harmony on the peninsula will positively affect the
situation in the whole region.
 The Crimean issue has also remained to be an important factor in the Russo-
Ukrainian bilateral relations. The provocative statements by some prominent Russian
politicians and the resolutions questioning the Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea
and Sevastopol which were passed by the Russian Duma were creating much
discomfort in Kyiv. Although Yeltsin’s government always formally repudiated such
claims, it was not until 1997 that the final treaty on the division of the Black Sea Fleet
and of the bilateral “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership,”
guaranteeing the inviolability of the Ukrainian borders, were signed, the problem of
the Crimea was putting serious obstacles to the normalisation of the relations between
the two countries. However, the presence of the Russian military establishment,
namely the Black Sea Fleet units, and of adventurous political forces on the peninsula
do not encourage qualified observers to suppose that that the issue has lost its
inflammable potential for the future.
There has also been an impact on the situation produced by Turkey, which has often
been presented by Russia as a potential threat to the security of the region. Taking as a
basis the Turkish people’s interest in the plight of its kinsmen, it was often suggested
179
that by using the Crimean Tatar card, Turkey would try to establish its dominance in
the region. The Turkish government and diplomats have in fact always stressed their
unequivocal support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and have shown their good
will with regard to both Russia and Ukraine.
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